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Abstract
During the last twenty years, the impact of security concerns on the development and
exploitation of information systems never ceased to grow. Security risk management
methods are methodological tools, helping organisations to take rational decisions,
regarding the security of their IS. Feedbacks on the use of such approaches show
that they considerably reduce losses originating from security problems. Today, these
methods are generally built around a well structured process. However, the product
coming from the different risk management steps is still largely informal, and often not
analytical enough. This lack of formality hinders the automation of the management
of risk-related information. Another drawback of current methods is that they are
generally designed for being used a posteriori, that is, to assess the way existing
systems handle risks, and are with difficulty usable a priori, during information system
development. Finally, with method using its own terminology, it is difficult to combine
several methods, in the aim of taking advantage of each of them. For tackling the
preceding problems, this thesis proposes a model-based approach for risk management,
applicable from the early phases of information system development. This approach
relies on a study of the domain's own concepts.
This scientific approach is composed of three successive steps. The first step aims
at defining a reference conceptual model for security risk management. The research
method followed proposes to base the model on an extensive study of the literature.
The different risk management and/or security standards, a set of methods representa-
tive of the current state of the practice, and the scientific works related to the domain,
are analysed. The result is a semantic alignment table of the security risk management
concepts, highlighting the key concepts taking place in such an approach. Based on
this set of concepts, the security risk management domain model is built. This model
is challenged by domain experts in standardisation, risk management practitioners and
scientists.
The second step of this research work enriches the domain model with the different
metrics used in a risk management method. The proposed approach combines two
methods to define this set of metrics. The first one is the Goal-Question-Metric (GQM)
method applied on the domain model. This method allows to focus on reaching the
best return on security investment. The second one enriches the metrics identified
with the first approach, through a study of the literature based on standards and
methods addressed during the first step. An experimentation on a real case of these
metrics is performed, in the frame of supporting a SME towards the ISO/IEC 27001
certification.
Finally, in a third step, a set of conceptual modelling languages dedicated to infor-
mation security is noticed in the literature. These languages are mainly coming from
i
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the requirements engineering domain. They allow to tackle security during the early
phases of information system development. The conceptual support proposed by each
of them is evaluated, and thus the gap to bridge for being able to completely model
the different steps of risk management too. This work ends in an extension proposal
of the Secure Tropos language, and a process to follow for using this extension in the
frame of risk management, illustrated by an example.
Résumé
Durant les vingt dernières années, l'intérêt pour la sécurité lors du développement et
l'exploitation des systèmes d'information n'a cessé de croître. Les méthodes de gestion
des risques de sécurité sont des outils méthodologiques, qui aident les organisations à
prendre des décisions rationnelles sur la sécurité de leur système d'information. Les
retours d'expérience sur l'utilisation de telles approches montrent une réduction con-
sidérable des pertes liées aux problèmes de sécurité. Aujourd'hui, ces méthodes sont
généralement construites autour d'un processus bien structuré. Cependant, le pro-
duit issu des différentes étapes de la gestion des risques est encore très largement
informel et souvent pas assez analytique. Ce manque de formalisme est un frein à
l'automatisation de la gestion des informations relatives aux risques. Un autre in-
convénient des méthodes actuelles est qu'elles sont généralement destinées à évaluer
a posteriori comment les systèmes d'information déjà existants gèrent les risques, et
sont difficilement applicables a priori, pendant la conception de tels systèmes. Enfin,
chaque méthode utilisant souvent une terminologie qui lui est propre, il est difficile
de combiner plusieurs méthodes afin de profiter des points forts de chacune. Afin
de répondre aux problèmes mentionnés ci-dessus, notre contribution propose une ap-
proche basée sur la modélisation de la gestion des risques, utilisable dans les phases
amont de conception de systèmes d'information. Cette approche est fondée sur une
étude des concepts propres au domaine.
Notre démarche scientifique se compose de trois étapes successives. La première
étape vise à définir un modèle conceptuel de référence relatif à la gestion des risques de
sécurité. La méthode de recherche adoptée propose de fonder le modèle sur une étude
approfondie de la littérature. Les différents standards de gestion des risques et/ou de
sécurité, un ensemble de méthodes représentatives de l'état actuel de la pratique, ainsi
que les travaux scientifiques se rapportant au domaine, ont été analysés. Le résultat est
une grille d'alignement sémantique des concepts de la gestion des risques de sécurité,
mettant en évidence les concepts-clés intervenant dans une telle démarche. Sur base
de cet ensemble de concepts est ensuite construit le modèle du domaine de la gestion
des risques. Ce modèle a été confronté aux experts du domaine, provenant du monde
de la standardisation, des méthodes de gestion des risques et du monde scientifique.
La deuxième étape de notre recherche enrichit ce modèle du domaine avec les dif-
férentes métriques utilisées lors de l'application d'une méthode de gestion des risques.
La démarche proposée combine deux approches pour la détermination des métriques.
La première est la méthode Goal-Question-Metric (GQM) appliquée sur notre modèle
de référence. Elle permet de se focaliser sur l'atteinte du meilleur retour sur investisse-
ment de la sécurité. La seconde enrichit les métriques identifiées par la première ap-
proche, grâce à une étude de la littérature basée sur les standards et méthodes étudiés
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lors de la première étape. Une expérimentation sur un cas réel de ces métriques a été
réalisée, dans le cadre de l'accompagnement d'une PME vers la certification ISO/IEC
27001.
Enfin, dans une troisième étape, nous relevons dans la littérature un ensemble
de langages de modélisation conceptuelle de la sécurité de l'information. Ces lan-
gages sont issus essentiellement du domaine de l'ingénierie des exigences. Ils permet-
tent donc d'aborder la sécurité lors des phases initiales de la conception de systèmes
d'information. Nous avons évalué le support conceptuel proposé par chacun d'eux
et donc le manque à combler afin d'être à même de modéliser intégralement les dif-
férentes étapes de la gestion des risques. Le résultat de ce travail permet de formuler
une proposition d'extension du langage Secure Tropos et une démarche d'utilisation
de cette évolution dans le cadre de la gestion des risques, illustrée par un exemple.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I nformation systems (IS) are everywhere. They have a large impact on the every-day life of organisations and individuals. In the light of ambient, pervasive and
ubiquitous computing, this impact is increasing significantly. At the heart of these IS,
security aspects play a vital role and are thus becoming a central issue in IS effective
usage. IS are required to be more secure in order to resist to a potential large number
of attacks. The importance of security technologies and of their enabling technical
platforms has been widely recognised and is therefore receiving a continuous attention
(see e.g., new encryption algorithms, public key infrastructures, etc.).
However, organisations are also more and more considering the management dimen-
sion attached to security. As an example, we can observe that many organisations (like
e.g., banks) have first introduced public key infrastructures, considered as the most
secure technical platform for coping with authentication, confidentiality, integrity and
non-repudiation security issues. But after a while, many of these organisations have
abandoned such solutions for lighter platforms, because of the generated costs. Sources
of these costs are mainly related to associated management activities, interoperability
issues, and also indirect costs, due to the difficulty of usage by their clients. To sum-
marise, many security solutions and infrastructures exist and can be deployed, but the
key question is to know if their associated direct and indirect costs are well adapted.
The ROSI (Return On Security Investment) issues, related to the cost of security
technologies with respect to their benefits, are thus becoming a vital question in many
organisations. As a consequence, we can observe that the traditional role of IS secu-
rity officers is evolving more and more from a pure technical profile to a new profile,
where a mix of business and technical competences is required. Those are needed for
being able to evaluate the fit that must be established between the secure Information
Technology (IT) infrastructure and the assets to be protected at the business level of
an organisation. Central to this business/IT alignment problem [HV99] is the Risk
Management (RM) process. This need for the set-up of security RM processes within
organisations is further reinforced at the Institutional and/or sector-based levels, with
large initiatives like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SoRiC02] governing the integrity of finan-
cial and accounting data or, in the banking industry, the Basel II agreement [Bas02],
which requires banks to comply to instructions for defining the level of their capital
requirements, in relation with the maturity of their RM activities.
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and research objectives
IS Security RM (ISSRM) is paramount because it helps companies to adopt cost-
effective security measures. Indeed, security threats are so numerous that it is impos-
sible to act on all of them because (1) every technological security solution has a cost,
and (2) companies have limited resources. Hence, companies want to make sure that
they adopt only solutions for which the ROSI is positive. This is done by comparing
the cost of a solution with the risk of not using it, e.g., the cost of a business disruption
due to a successful security attack. In this sense, ISSRM plays an important role in
the alignment of a company's business with its IT strategy.
1.1.1 Problem statement
Figure 1.1: Problem statement
A key to a good alignment between business domain and security of the IS, is to
keep the focus on the assets of the business. Assets are defined as anything that has
a value for the organisation and that is central to the achievement of business goals
[ISO05b]. Figure 1.1 shows different kinds of business assets extracted from the coming
running example about an architecture engineering consulting firm in the building
domain (Section 1.6). For instance, business assets are information like Technical
plans or processes like Manage accounting. Several other classes of business assets
can be identified (knowledge, reputation, relationships between employees, etc.). All
those elements are part of the business of the company and have their own value in
the business model.
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In parallel, we are calling IS assets those IT resources or other components that
are part of the IS, linked to the business assets. IS assets are often considered as
the `mirror' of the business assets, because many business goals are achieved with the
assistance of the IS. Coming back to the running example, IS assets are basically the
computers, the software, the network components, etc., used within the organisation.
People and facilities are also considered as IS assets, because they are part of the
IS and so they are essential to a good information security. As an obvious example,
despite of confidential data being encrypted, if an employee knowing the decryption
key is not aware of security, the information security is in danger (this point is further
explained in Section 1.4). IS assets are therefore the IS components needed to be
secured, in order to ensure the achievement of the business goals. The set of IS assets
is part of the IS architecture and they are selected through design decisions.
Assets need to be secure, because they are exposed to security risks. Security risk
is most often defined by three components :
Risk = Threat * Vulnerability * Impact
In other words, risk is characterised by the opportunity of a threat targeting IS as-
sets, to exploit one or more vulnerabilities originating from the design decisions, and
leading to an impact on business goals. Figure 1.1 depicts these components and their
relationships.
1.1.2 Research domains and objectives
In the preceding context, the objective is naturally to mitigate the risks by intro-
ducing countermeasures that satisfy adequate security requirements (Figure 1.2). In
this context, a lot of work has already been done in the security RM domain and
particularly on risk analysis and risk assessment, which are the activity of analysing
threats, vulnerabilities and impacts on each component of the IS, and comparing them
to the security needs driven by business goals. Many industrial methods based on risk
assessment [AD01b, DCS04b, CLU07b, SGF02] already exist. However these meth-
ods are generally applied bottom-up, once the architectural design has been defined
(represented by the links between security RM and the IS side of Figure 1.2). This
allows only an a posteriori approach to IS security, resulting in a gap between se-
curity requirements and business security needs. An a priori approach to security
engineering, based on RM performed during RE, could improve IS security much more
significantly. Therefore, this work is more focused on the RE domain, linking business
assets with security RM, instead of being only focused on architectural engineering.
Another remark about security RM concerns the product of its performed activi-
ties. Existing methods and standards are generally focussed on structuring the differ-
ent steps and activities to perform as a good security RM. Their added value rely also
on the knowledge bases of risks [DCS04b, ISO08, CLU07b] and/or security require-
ments [ISO05c, DCS04b] they provide. They are the input of the activities performed.
The methodological aspects are thus generally rigorous, because they are standing on
a well-defined process and structure to follow. However, products (i.e. documents pro-
duced as output of the different steps of the process) are generally informal, most often
in natural language, possibly complemented with tables for structuring the informa-
tion. This lack of formality prevents the automation (reasoning, evolution, monitoring
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Figure 1.2: Problem statement and security risk management
and traceability) of RM-related information. For a long time, IS engineers (including
requirements engineers) have been using `models' as a way to achieve a better formal-
ity and quality mostly to benefit from abstraction in order to tackle complexity. This
thesis proposes to introduce a modelling component, that provides a better support
for the formalisation of the knowledge created and exchanged during RM activities.
The results of this research work shall help to reach four different research objec-
tives:
• to deliver secure IS (generally in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability,
very often mentioned through the CIA acronym [ISO05b]);
• to create a link between business security needs and system security measures,
provided by risk-based approaches, to obtain the best ROSI;
• to perform a priori security (i.e. before IS design), as opposed to a posteriori;
• to produce deliverables under the form of models as proof of security manage-
ment.
1.2 Requirements Engineering
RE takes place during the early phases of the development of an IS. For this work,
the following definition for RE is adopted: Requirements engineering is the branch
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of software engineering concerned with the real-world goals for, functions of, and con-
straints on software systems. It is also concerned with the relationship of these factors
to precise specifications of software behavior, and to their evolution over time and
across software families [NE00]. Although this is subject to debate, researchers of-
ten differentiate between early and late RE [Yu97]. Early requirements analysis put
the emphasis on understanding the whys of the system-to-be rather than the what it
should do. What the system should do is addressed during late requirements analysis.
As further explained in Section 1.3.1, security should be addressed all along the IS
development, from early RE. In this context, we define a requirement, like in [Jac97],
as a condition over the phenomena of the environment that we wish to make true by
installing the machine.
1.2.1 Security requirements as non-functional requirements
It is generally accepted that functional requirements define `what' the system should do
[Gli07, RR99, IEE90, Som95]. Functional requirements are opposed to non-functional
requirements. As explained by Glinz [Gli07], no clear consensus has been found on
what is precisely a non-functional requirement, and many different definitions have
already been proposed [Ant97, RR99, Wie03, etc.]. A definition of non-functional
requirement is a property, or quality, that the product must have [...] [RR99]. Se-
curity requirements are generally considered as non-functional requirements in the
literature, like usability, performance, etc. However, regarding security requirements,
they can be sometimes functional requirements. For example, as depicted in [Gli07],
The database shall grant access to the customer data only to those users that have
been authorized by their user name and password is a security requirement that is
functional. Nevertheless, most of the time, security is considered as a non-functional
requirement [ISO00, IEE98, Ant97, RR99, Wie03]. In the context of this thesis, and
mainly because most of the security-oriented modelling languages we study consider
security requirements as non-functional requirements [CNYM00, MG07a, vL04, SO05],
we adopt this convention.
1.2.2 The important role of RE in the ISSRM context
The role of RE with regards to ISSRM can be highlighted as illustrated in Figure 1.3.
ISSRM can be characterised as a specific case of the general business/IT alignment
challenge [HV99]. IS (mostly based on IT infrastructure, but also including human-
based tasks) is supporting the realisation of the business strategy and of its associ-
ated value proposition. This value proposition is made from knowledge and services
created and managed through processes, mobilising competences of the organisation
[OP04, GPW06]. Because of the required alignment, risks associated with the IS have
a direct impact on the business value, and thus, this mis-alignment requires to be mit-
igated. Various controls and countermeasures can be set up for managing the required
mitigation. Still the difficulty is in the selection of the most appropriate one. This
is where RE and more particularly Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE)
approaches helps [BGG+04, Yu96, vLL00, Jac01]. GORE has been proved to be useful
in the management of requirements, that can vary in their granularity and be used at
different decision-making levels. More precisely, as depicted on the right part of Fig.
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Figure 1.3: Business/IT alignment at the level of security
1.3, GORE can be used:
1. At the business level, to understand the security objectives associated with the
business strategy, and the value proposition components of the organisation;
2. At the IS level, to express the requirements associated with the controls to be
put in place in response to attacks to the IS components, arisen from the IS'
environment. Requirements will express expected properties of these controls
in terms of their impact on the malicious behavior of the attackers from the
environment.
3. At the business/IT alignment level, the progressive refinement of business secu-
rity objectives, in terms of IS security requirements, is supported by the goal
hierarchy, where the different alternatives regarding the fulfillment of security
goals by security requirements are systematically investigated.
1.3 Background and research work assumptions
As seen previously, this research work relies on three main assumptions:
• Dealing with security during the early phases of IS development is better than
later in the development process or once the system is already designed;
• Using a RM approach provides beneficial results to define the security require-
ments of an IS;
• To have a model-based approach supporting the ISSRM process improves the
product coming from the various ISSRM steps.
The objective of this section is to explain the assumptions and the orientation of the
research work.
1.3.1 Security and early phases of requirements engineering
Security is currently too often considered after design of the IS or even once the IS
is already running. It has been extensively argued that security should be considered
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during the whole IS development process and it is generally accepted considering
security during RE phases of IS engineering helps to decrease the total cost of detection
and removal of security defects [DS00]. Various approaches were proposed to cope with
security in different development phases [vL04, SO05, MG04, LBD02, J02]. Some of
them address design phases or architectural engineering [LBD02, J02]. An assumption
we adopt in this work is that it is more efficient to take care of security as early
as possible. During early RE, and more generally when reasoning on business goals
[Let01], examining security allows IS developers to discard design alternatives that do
not offer a sufficient security level. Furthermore, to correct some security defects once
the IS is already designed could decrease other IS qualities such as maintainability and
efficiency, also recommended to be discussed during the early phases of RE [CNYM00].
To cope with security during early phases of RE helps to reach the best trade-off
between all of the non-functional requirements needed by the IS. The scope of the
thesis is thus focused on early phases of RE.
1.3.2 Security requirements and risk management
The application of any ISSRM approach has usually three main outcomes [SGF02]:
• The improvement of IS security;
• The justification of budget and investment for IS security management decisions;
• The assessment of the level of confidence that customers or partners can have in
the IS.
Therefore, the first advantage of ISSRM is that it helps to deal with the three main
stakeholders concerned by IS security: IS developers, organisation's managers and
organisation's clients. It provides for each of them results at their concerns' level, i.e.,
technical level, financial level and IS trust level. ISSRM has some other advantages
compared to traditional security engineering. First, ISSRM methods aim to reach
the best ROSI for the studied IS. The ROSI is (informally) defined as the final cost
savings in avoiding security incidents compared to the global cost of security measures
taken [CLU04b]. By proposing a comparison between security needs and potential
security risks, ISSRM is a powerful tool for arguing around ROSI. Second, to prioritise
security requirements (or even requirements in general) in terms of importance or
implementation order is usually seen as a challenge in RE [HD08]. Requirements
prioritisation is a tough research problem and several research works have already
been done in this field. Many requirements prioritisation methods have been defined
[KR97, BGL05, Dav03]. However risk-based approaches have already shown to be
efficient in prioritising requirements for various domains [Wie99]. Using an ISSRM
method for defining suited security requirements brings by nature the prioritisation of
the requirements.
1.3.3 Security risks and model-based approaches
In the building domain, the classical approach adopted for a long time is to produce
maps of the building before starting the construction. In software engineering, the
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same approach based on modelling has also been adopted, mainly driven by the gen-
eralisation of the use of the UML standard [Obj]. Regarding IS security risks, the
introduction of a model-based approach is motivated by several factors, related first
to the efficiency of the ISSRM process, and second to the relevance of the product
resulting of the performed process:
• It is an efficient support to communication and interaction between stakeholders
involved in a risk assessment [VML+07]. This is expected to improve the quality
of the results coming from interviews and analysis, and also speed up the risk
assessment process.
• Models have the ability to describe precisely concepts (in a non-ambiguous man-
ner) and especially at the right level of granularity. It is clearly more difficult to
have the same by using natural language. It helps also to have a clear traceability
link between the different concepts, compared to relationships expressed with the
help of tables [DCS04b].
• Formalisation of ISSRM through a model-based approach allows some automatic
reasoning (e.g., consistency and completeness checking, alternative selection, etc.)
[vL01]. Despite such abilities are not directly expected as outcomes of the thesis,
the work done brings the background to go towards such functionalities.
• Some standards requiring compliance with their requirements involve ISSRM
activities [ISO05b]. Documentation of these activities are a key point of such
standards. Models are thus a good mean to improve the documentation of ISSRM
activities.
• ISSRM is always seen as an iterative process, needing to be continuously moni-
tored and reviewed [AS/04, ISO08]. A model-based approach improves the main-
tenability of ISSRM steps and helps to speed up the updates of ISSRM results,
needed after performing a new iteration of the underlying process.
• As seen in the preceding sections, to integrate RE and RM provides several bene-
fits. A model-based approach seems to be a cornerstone of this integration. Many
RE methods, and mainly goal-oriented approaches that are moreover well-suited
to early RE steps [vL01], are standing on modelling. To introduce modelling
activities in ISSRM is a way to reconcile RE and ISSRM, and ease in general the
reuse of ISSRM results in other projects.
1.4 Scope of the work
This research work is standing in the Information System Security Risk Management
domain. In this section, we define step by step the different concepts and the bound-
aries of the work, summarised in Figure 1.4.
1.4.1 Information System
A lot of work has been done in the frame of IS terminology (and already on `system'
terminology in general [Moi77, VB93]) and many definitions were already proposed
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Figure 1.4: Scope related to the Information System Security Risk Management domain
[Moi77, FHL+98, RFB88]1. However no agreement has been found in defining what
is an IS [Car00]. The definition of IS used should generally be related to the domain
it is applied. The one provided by Wikipedia [Wik08a] is a good example regarding
the scope of this work: A system, whether automated or manual, that comprises peo-
ple, machines, and/or methods organised to collect, process, transmit, and disseminate
data that represent user information. It is thus clear that the domain of this thesis
encompass not only security of software system or IT architecture, but takes care of
people and facilities playing a role in an IS and so in its security. For example, peo-
ple following a procedure and encoding data or air conditioning for server room is as
important as software or network security. As an illustration, let's consider the as-
sumption that the client's database of @rchimed and its associated network are highly
secure, using the best practices currently known in terms of encryption, authentica-
tion, data redundancy, etc. If the employees are not aware of security, some attacks
using social engineering on an employee can be successful [MS03], leading to disclo-
sure of their personal login information to the attacker and making all of the technical
security measures useless. Thus, regarding the state of the art, it will be focused on
literature targeting the whole IS security and not literature focused only on security of
IT components. Moreover, different terms are used for meaning the security of an IS
in general, and they are usually used (wrongly) as synonymous: Information Technol-
ogy Security, Information and Communications Technology Security, Information
Security, etc. Considering the scope of this thesis is clearly focused on a whole IS,
this work uses the term Information System Security (IS security), that seems to be
the most relevant to the research context.
1This list is clearly far from being exhaustive, considering the number of publications trying to define the
concept of `Information System'
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1.4.2 Risk Management
The most generally agreed upon definition of risk is the one found in ISO/IEC Guide
73 [ISO02b]. There risk is defined as a combination of the probability of an event and
its consequence [ISO02b]. Following this definition, RM is defined as coordinated ac-
tivities to direct and control an organisation with regard to risk  [ISO02b]. Depending
on the context, RM can address various kinds of issues [The01], [ISO04a]. For exam-
ple, risks can be related to the organisation's management (e.g., illness of a key person
in regards to the business), finance (e.g., related to investment), environment (e.g.,
pollution), or security. In this thesis, we focus only on security RM in the context of
an IS (following the definition proposed in Section 1.4.1). Other kinds of risk such as
financial or project risk, even related to an IS, are out of the scope2.
1.4.3 Security
In the literature, security is generally understood in two different manners. The first
kind of approaches [Fir03] use the term `security' for what concerns malicious (or
deliberate) harm on the IS, and they use the term `safety' for what concerns accidental
harm. Firesmith [Fir07b] uses the broader notion of defensibility to cover both security
(in the above sense) and safety. The notion of security that we adopt in this work,
and that defines the scope, is broader. Actually, it is a synonym of defensibility
according to Firesmith. The different standards, methods and frameworks studied are
standing in both domains, and thus dealing with malicious and accidental harm, as
depicted in Figure 1.5. We decided to keep the term `security' because it is the most
commonly used term in the ISSRM literature [ISO05b, ISO04b, DCS04b, CLU07b,
AD01b, VML+07, etc.] for this domain.
The second typical difference recognised between security and safety is related to
the objective to reach. Security aims at protecting the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of information and/or processes in an organisation [ISO04b, Com06a]:
• Confidentiality is the property that information is not made available or disclosed
to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes;
• Integrity is the property of safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of as-
sets. Accuracy could be threatened by (unauthorised or undesirable) update or
tampering. Completeness could be threatened by altering or deletion;
• Availability is the property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an
authorised entity.
Some other criteria like authenticity, non-repudiation or accountability might be added
when the context requires, but they are usually deemed secondary [ISO04b]. Safety
relates to risk that may affect human life or environmental health [UK 96, LCJ05].
This notion is commonly used in aeronautics and other transport systems [Lev95].
This domain is not in the scope of this thesis as we focus only on information security.
2The reader should not overinterpret this statement as saying that those various kinds of risk are unrelated.
On the contrary, they are often related, e.g., an increase in security risks is usually accompanied by increased
project and financial risks for a company. The sole purpose here is to state that for a question of feasibility
only security risk is a direct object of study for us.
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Figure 1.5: Security and safety differentiated by the cause
All of the standards, methods and frameworks studied aim at maintaining confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability of information. However, information security can
sometimes be related to human life or environmental health. This intersection is es-
pecially growing as IT components are embedded in all kinds of products, and more
and more of organisation's infrastructures are managed through IS. For example, some
medical information can need integrity, otherwise patient life can be in danger. This
case remains in the scope, as depicted in Figure 1.6, denoted by the coloring of the
intersection between the two sets.
Figure 1.6: Security and safety differentiated by the objective
Summing up, the objective of ISSRM is thus to protect essential constituents of an
IS, from all harm to IS security (confidentiality, integrity, availability) which could
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arise accidentally or deliberately, by using a RM approach.
1.5 Claimed contributions and research questions
1.5.1 Proposal
Our contribution aims at proposing a model-based approach to support ISSRM,
mainly for early phases of RE, but also applicable in general. This thesis focuses on the
modelling language part of such an approach, and does not address the methodological
part or the tool support. More specifically, the first research question addressed in
this thesis is: what are the concepts that should be present in a modelling language
supporting ISSRM ? Once the ISSRM concepts are elicited, this work is completed with
the associated metrics. The second research question is therefore: what are the metrics
relevant to perform ISSRM and to reason about ROSI ? Finally, to propose efficiently
a modelling support to ISSRM, we need to investigate existing languages and compare
their modelling capabilities to the conceptual needs. Then, we can propose ways to
improve them, in the aim to provide the best support to ISSRM. The last research
question of this thesis is thus: what is the ISSRM support provided by security-oriented
modelling languages and how it can be improved?
1.5.2 What the PhD is not...
After defining the contribution and the research questions tackled by this research
work, we would like to clarify what is out of the scope of this PhD thesis.
Tools or techniques for identifying new kinds of risks
In the risk management process, the risk analysis task aims at identifying and estimat-
ing risks and their components. A lot of tools have already been proposed for precise
identification and specification of new kinds of risks, threats or vulnerabilities . We
can cite for example attack trees [Sch04] or software fault trees [HWS+02] using trees
to precisely define attacks. This research work does not address this issue. This thesis
is more in line with the risk management approaches that provide tools and techniques
for supporting the whole ISSRM process. For the risk analysis task, those build on ex-
isting risk/threat/vulnerability knowledge bases [DCS04b, CLU07b, ISO08]. The user
will use them to choose the most relevant components to his context. However, risk
elicitation approaches [Sch04, HWS+02] are complementary to these risk management
approaches and can be used to refine and improve the knowledge bases.
Tools or techniques for formulating security requirements
Much research work in RE is focused on the elicitation of requirements [NE00]. Pre-
cise, complete, non ambiguous, etc. are qualities often requested for requirements
and RE techniques are developed to reach them. As in the preceding section, this re-
search work assumes the existence of security requirements knowledge bases [ISO05c,
DCS04b]. The artefacts we produce are not meant to improve the formulation of
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security requirements, but rather help the user to choose the best matches in the ex-
isting knowledge bases. Generally, the examples of security requirements presented
in this thesis are not defined by the author but extracted from standards or methods
[ISO05c, DCS04b, DCS04a].
Tools or techniques for defining security requirements for a security product
As described in Section 1.4, the scope is limited to risk-based analyses that focus on
the whole IS. Conversely, other approaches address the definition of security require-
ments for products [Com06a], like security products (firewall, authentication system),
operating systems or network components. These methods or standards are considered
out of the scope.
1.6 Running example
In order to illustrate the different sections of this thesis with examples, we introduce a
running example. A running example is an example used all along the thesis to explain
the different concepts and proposals. The running example is extracted from a case
study [DCS04a] of the EBIOS method [DCS04b]. This case study has been developed
for illustrating the EBIOS method on an example. The document [DCS04a] describes
first a company called @rchimed. Then, a security analysis is performed, based on the
EBIOS method.
In the context of this thesis, to use such an existing example with risks already
identified, is effective considering the PhD objectives. In this thesis, the emphasis
is placed on how to manage risks already identified and improve their management,
but not on the identification of new kinds of risks in a given context, as described
in Section 1.5.2. By using such an example, the research questions addressed in this
thesis will not be dependent on the risk identification, because the risks are already
defined.
In this section, we first introduce the running example by describing the @rchimed
company (Section 1.6.1). Then a brief overview of its IT infrastructure is provided
(Section 1.6.2).
1.6.1 Description of the @rchimed company
The @rchimed society is a (fictitious) architecture engineering consulting firm in the
building domain. It's an SME in Luxembourg made up by a dozen of employees.
Its activity is based around the production of construction plans for factories and
buildings. @rchimed calculates building structures, 3D mock-ups for clients and design
technical plans for contractors. The firm follows also the progress of the building con-
struction and updates, if necessary, the plans and calculations. Its business objectives
are especially based on producing high quality documents and 3D visual representa-
tions.
Its objective is now to improve the quality of its products and efficiency of its
activities through the use of original ICT tools. The company targets national and
international projects and would like to improve its IS for answering as quickly as
possible to project proposal.
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Organisation structure
The organisation is composed of five departments (Figure 1.7):
Figure 1.7: @rchimed 's organisation
• Management:
The management is composed by the director and its assistant. The assistant
has an architectural background, but plays also the role of IT manager.
• Secretary department:
The secretarial staff is composed of a secretary, performing the secretarial work
and the phone desk. She works with a computer for doing office work and email.
• Sales department:
The sales department is composed of two employees creating and managing
clients' records. They are mainly working on defining estimates for clients. This
service is the one mainly communicating with external people. He supports so
the corporate image of the company. It communicates a lot with the study office
that provides many documents (3D mock-ups, technical plans, etc), with the ad-
ministration for the prices and with external peoples and clients (requirements
document, plans and estimates, technical information for architects, etc.)
• Study office:
It is based on 4 engineers and 3 drawers performing the following activities:
- Design technical plans for building workers
- Design 3D mock-ups for clients that should be as precise and nice as possible
- Establish structure calculations for material resistance
• Administration:
In this service, one people is working as an accountant and is also responsible of
managing administrative stuff like obtaining building permits, provided by the
relevant authorities.
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Clients
The range of @rchimed 's clients is large, ranging from private sector to public ad-
ministration and concerning also building professionals. Statistics show that the main
activity period is from October to May and that the current economic situation is
good. However @rchimed is subject to high competition, needing to be quick, precise
and original in its projects.
1.6.2 @rchimed 's IS infrastructure
The IS architecture of @rchimed can be summarised as:
• Hardware and network:
The study office has 7 computers, the sales department 2 computers, the ad-
ministration 1 computer and finally the secretary department 1 computer. The
management owns 2 laptops and the commercial service has also 2 laptops avail-
able for presentations. All of these computers are connected on a local Ethernet
network. A printing server and a file server are available for the whole company.
Every service is connected to Internet: the sales department to communicate
with clients, the study office to be able to find technical information and the
management, administration and secretary department for emails.
• Software:
A software called ARC+ is used for defining 3D mock-ups, a software called
SIFRA is used for working on a tablet PC and finally the SPOT software is used
for structure calculation with a database containing materials assumptions and
results obtained. An office software is used on each computer.
1.6.3 IS development objectives
@rchimed aims now to be able to communicate more easily with its clients and suppli-
ers. The company would like to introduce ICT components like groupware to improve
the efficiency of the communication between the different people involved in a project
(architects, contractors, public authorities, etc.) The tool should first improve docu-
ments sharing (plans, calculations, etc.) between the actors. Mechanisms for version
and conflict management are necessary. Then the building construction follow-up
should also be improved and the tool should manage the workflows and the tasks be-
tween the involved actors. For this purpose, tools like shared calendar will be put in
place. This new IS naturally involves security concerns. The information each actor
will have access to must respect confidentiality agreements. The integrity of sensitive
documents like plans or structure calculations must be respected. Finally, the avail-
ability of the whole system is essential to have access instantaneously to the documents
necessary for the construction.
1.7 Structure
This thesis is organised in four parts and eight chapters (Figure 1.8):
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Figure 1.8: Structure of the work
PART I, State of the art contains two chapters related to the review of the
current practice and research in ISSRM and security RE.
• Chapter 2: Information System Security Risk Management Standards and Meth-
ods presents an overview of the ISSRM process and its related tasks. Then, it
surveys the different RM standards, security standards, security RM standards,
and security RM methods.
• Chapter 3: Security Requirements Engineering deals first with the security
RE frameworks. Second, it provides an overview of existing security-oriented
modelling languages.
PART II, An Information System Security Risk Management Modelling
Framework is about the contribution of this thesis, which consists of the definition
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of the ISSRM domain model, its metrics, and its comparison with existing security-
oriented modelling languages.
• Chapter 4: Information System Security Risk Management Domain Model in-
troduces the domain model of ISSRM. The research method applied for its con-
struction and the different steps performed are explained.
• Chapter 5: Definition of the Information System Security Risk Management
Metrics enriches the ISSRM domain model with metrics. A research method is
again proposed and its application, combining two complementary approaches,
is described.
• Chapter 6: Assessment of ISSRM Support by Security-oriented Modelling Lan-
guages proposes a comparison between existing modelling languages and the
ISSRM domain model. The languages compared are KAOS extended to security
[vL04], Misuse cases [SO05] and Secure Tropos [GMZ05]. For Secure Tropos, an
adaptation is proposed, in the aim to better cover the ISSRM domain.
PART III, Applications shows how the results were applied on a concrete ex-
periment.
• Chapter 7: Evaluation is about the concrete experimentation of the domain
model and its related metrics. Both were used in the frame of the ISO/IEC
27001 certification of a luxembourgish SME.
PART IV, Conclusion summarises the major findings and discusses the future
work.
• Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work presents the conclusions of the re-
search problem and states the claimed contribution of this work. Identified limi-
tations and future works are also proposed.
The document ends with the Bibliography, which recapitulates all the references
used and cited throughout the thesis. Finally, appendices present some research ma-
terial used in this research work.
• Appendix A gathers useful extracts and definitions, used for the concept align-
ment of Chapter 4.
• Appendix B is a table summarising the concept alignment.
• Appendix C reports the extraction of relationships between the concepts iden-
tified for ISO/IEC Guide 73. It is used as an example of how relatioship identi-
fication is performed.
• Appendix D collects the metrics used in the different ISSRM approaches that
perform concept estimation
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Part I
State of the art
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Chapter 2
Information System Security Risk
Management Standards and Methods
T he state of the art of this PhD is composed of two complementary parts. The firstone aims at presenting the ISSRM literature, composed of standards and methods.
The second one is about security RE, proposing frameworks and modelling languages
related to security and taking place during RE. The objective of this chapter is to
present the first part of the state of the art, about ISSRM standards and methods.
During the last decade, ISSRM has been a very active domain and is still quickly
evolving. Practitioners have developed ISSRM methods to help estimate the relative
importance of security risks and the cost-effectiveness of solutions to tackle them. The
methods are mainly driven by standards and professional best practices in the domain
of security and risk management, defining the related concepts and processes to apply.
First of all, this chapter begins with Section 2.1 proposing an overview of the
traditional ISSRM process. Then Section 2.2 starts the review of the literature by
presenting RM standards. Section 2.3 is about the security standards. Section 2.4
describes standards already standing in the security RM domain. Section 2.5 shows
a representative subset of security RM methods. The chapter ends with Section 2.6
about conclusion and comparison of the literature surveyed.
It is necessary to note that in this chapter, for each described approach, we use the
terminology proposed by the approach. The different standards and methods are not
presented with a unified terminology.
2.1 Introduction to the ISSRM process
ISSRM activities usually follow an overall process composed of classical steps gen-
erally found in traditional ISSRM methods (e.g., [AS/04, SGF02, DCS04b], etc.).
Nevertheless, the reader should note that the different methods do not put the same
weight on the activities performed and this is one of the main particularities of each
method/standard. Some methods, for example, are more focused on risk assessment
[DCS04b, CLU07b, AD01b] whereas others [ISO05c, Bun05b] suggest standard se-
curity controls (or countermeasures) to be applied in order to reach a satisfactory
security level. The whole ISSRM process is summarised in Figure 2.1, under the form
of a UML activity diagram [Obj04], and is illustrated with the help of the running
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example introduced in Section 1.6.
Figure 2.1: ISSRM process
Step (a): Context and asset identification
The process starts with a study of the organisation's context and the identification of
its assets. In this step, the organisation and its environment are described, focusing
on the sensitive activities related to information security. An overview of the IS, when
already in place, is made.
Example: The @rchimed activities has been presented in Section 1.6. Within all of its
activities, the design of technical plans is an asset that should be protected. At the IS
level, the technical plans are created by drawers and engineers on computers connected
to the Internet.
Step (b): Determination of security objectives
The security needs of the organisation are then defined. Based on asset identification,
one needs to determine the security objectives to be reached. Security objectives are
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often defined in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties of the
assets.
Example: During their design, the technical plans should be kept confidential.
Step (c): Risk analysis and assessment
The main step of the process is risk analysis, eliciting which risks are harming assets
and threatening security objectives. This step consists in identifying risks and estimat-
ing their level in a qualitative or quantitative manner. We speak about risk assessment
[ISO02b] only when the level of analysed risks has been evaluated against the security
needs, which are determined during the second step of the process (cf. Step (b) ). It
could be necessary at this step to fully review the context and asset identification, if
the risk assessment is considered as unsatisfactory.
Example: A rival of @rchimed can try to use common operating system and network
protocol weaknesses to penetrate on the personal computer of an employee, where are
stored some confidential technical plans. This risk has an estimated level that is suffi-
ciently high to be considered.
Step (d): Risk treatment
Once risk assessment is performed, decisions about risk treatment are taken. Risk
treatment measures can include avoiding, reducing, transferring or retaining risk [ISO02b]:
• Risk avoidance is the decision not to become involved in, or action to withdraw
from, a risk situation (e.g., don't use the risky functionality of the IS and so
disable the risk).
• Risk reduction consists of taking actions to lessen the probability, negative conse-
quences, or both, associated with a risk (e.g., select and implement some security
requirements for mitigating the risk).
• Risk transfer consists of sharing with another party the burden of loss for a risk
(e.g., take an insurance for covering the consequence of the risk).
• Risk retention is the acceptance of the burden of loss from a particular risk (e.g.,
accept the risk as is because its probability and consequence are low enough).
The decision is generally based on cost-effectiveness evaluation between risks and risks
treatment.
Example: The decision of reducing the preceding risk with some security controls to
implement in the IS seems to be the most appropriate.
Step (e): Security requirements definition
Security requirements on the IS can thus be determined as security solutions to mit-
igate the risks, mainly if the risk reduction treatment has been chosen. However,
security requirements can emerge from other treatments, like for example risk transfer
needing generally some requirements on the third party. At the end of the risk treat-
ment step, followed by the security requirements definition, if they are considered as
unsatisfactory, the risk treatment step can be revised, or all of the preceding steps can
be revised from the definition of the context and the assets.
Example: The following security requirement has been selected to be applied on the
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@rchimed's IS: Procedures for monitoring the use of information processing facilities
should be established and the results of the monitoring activities reviewed regularly
[ISO05c].
Step (f): Control selection and implementation
Requirements are finally instantiated into security controls, i.e. system specific coun-
termeasures, that are implemented within the organisation.
Example: A firewall and an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) are selected and imple-
mented within the @rchimed's IS.
As highlighted by the two decision points of the process, the process is iterative.
It should be performed as many times as necessary until reaching an acceptable level
for all risks, taking also into account new risks emerging after security control deter-
mination. The level of risk remaining after applying the security measures is called
`residual risk' [ISO02b]. Only the main decision points [ISO08] are represented on
this process, but some others are possible and proposed within the different methods
[DCS04b, CLU07b, AD01b]. Moreover, each time such a RM process is started, some
parallel actions are also generally recommended. A risk communication process should
be undertaken to guarantee an effective communication among stakeholders. The dif-
ferent stakeholders and decision-makers should be informed throughout the process
about the RM activities and risk evolution. This helps them to have a permanent
understanding of the organisation's ISSRM process and its results. A risk monitoring
and review process is also recommended. Even after reaching an acceptable level for
all risks, the ISSRM process should be monitored and regularly reviewed. Risks are
obviously not static and should be monitored. Each modification in the organisation's
business, in its context, in its IS, each emerging vulnerability, etc. can produce mod-
ifications on risks and/or their level. In an ideal way, the ISSRM process should in
fact be continuously performed, in order to keep the organisation's business and its
associated security needs aligned with the measures taken and the ensuing security
level.
2.2 Risk management standards
RM standards are high-level references presenting RM in general and standing over
domain-specific RM approaches. This section presents two RM standards: ISO/IEC
Guide 73 [ISO02b] and AS/NZS 4360 [AS/04]. They are selected because they are the
only two standards currently standing in this domain. Moreover, they are often an
input in terms of concepts and terminology for other standards or methods [ISO04b,
ISO05b, ISO08, DCS04b, VML+07].
2.2.1 ISO/IEC Guide 73
The aim of ISO/IEC Guide 73 [ISO02b], entitled Risk management - Vocabulary -
Guidelines for use in standards and whose current version is of 2002, is to provide a
terminological basis and generic definitions for RM, in order to develop common under-
standing amongst organisations across countries and amongst ISO and IEC members.
2.2 Risk management standards 25
The guide is focused on RM in general, whatever the concerned domain. It is similarly
applicable to risk in finance, environment, project management, information security
risk, etc. It thus deals with RM from both the positive and negative perspectives (a
risk taken for example in the financial domain can have positive consequences). This
guide is especially used as an input for the definition or the revision of each other ISO
standard dealing with RM in a specific domain. However, according to the Guide, it
may be sometimes necessary to deviate from the exact wording proposed in the Guide
to meet the needs of a specific domain.
The core of the ISO/IEC Guide 73 standard is a list of definitions on RM concepts
including RM tasks. The terms defined cover the complete field of RM, including basic
terms, terms related to people or organisations affected by risk, terms related to risk
assessment, and terms related to risk treatment and control.
2.2.2 AS/NZS 4360
AS/NZS 4360 [AS/04] is a joined Australian/New Zealand standard. Its current ver-
sion dates back to 2004 and the first was published in 1999. This standard is entitled
Risk management and its purpose is to provide a generic framework for establishing
the context, identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and communicat-
ing risk. As for the ISO/IEC Guide 73 [ISO02b], this standard is generic and can be
applied to any RM domain, as well as to any sector or organisation.
The standard starts by proposing a glossary, generally compliant with the ISO/IEC
Guide 73. The core of the standard is focused on an overview of the RM process (Figure
2.2). AS/NZS 4360 provides the following iterative RM process:
• Establish the context:
 Definition of the (internal and external) context of the organisation
 Definition of the criteria against which risk will be evaluated
 Define the structure for the rest of the process
• Identify risks
 Identify sources of risks and events that might have an impact on the organ-
isation
 Identify how they can occur
• Analyse risks
 Evaluate existing security controls that already minimise risks
 Estimate the magnitude of the consequences and the likelihood of the event
of risks
• Evaluate risks
 Take decisions about risks, based on the outcome of risk analysis
• Treat risks
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Figure 2.2: Overview of the RM process (as appears in [AS/04])
 Identify options for the treatment of risks (having positive or negative con-
sequences)
 Select the most appropriate option, balancing costs of implementing against
benefits obtained
 Define and implement a treatment plan
Two other parallel tasks should be performed all along the preceding process:
• Communicate actively and regularly with stakeholders about risks and the pro-
cess to manage them, and consult stakeholders during the different tasks in the
aim of being able to take the best decisions
• Monitor and review risks, to insure that they are up-to-date, as well as risk
treatment, to guarantee its effectiveness
The standard ends with recommendations to establish effective RM.
2.3 Security standards
In this section we present two standards dealing with security, but not specifically
focused on RM activities: ISO/IEC 13335 [ISO04b] and Common Criteria [Com06a].
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These standards are selected because they are international, often used and refer-
enced in various methods or other standards [ISO05b, DCS04b, Bun05a, SHF04, Ins03,
VML+07] and presenting in particular the concepts at stake.
2.3.1 ISO/IEC 13335
The objective of the ISO/IEC 13335 standard is to define the basis for the information
security management [ISO04b]. The ISO/IEC 13335 standard was first published
between 1996 and 2001 as a set of Technical Reports (TR) entitled Guidelines for the
Management of IT Security (GMITS), before becoming an international standard. It
was composed of a set of guidelines for the management of IT security:
Figure 2.3: The ISO/IEC 13335 standard and its evolutions
• ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (1996) Concepts and models for IT Security contains
definitions applicable to all parts of the standard, and introduces various concepts
and models of IT security that may be applicable to different organisations.
• ISO/IEC TR 13335-2 (1997) Managing and Planning IT Security contains in-
formation about management of IT security, security policy, risk analysis, security
awareness, and several other issues to tackle for defining an IT security program.
• ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 (1998) Techniques for the management of IT Security
portrays RM methods suitable for people concerned with management actions
to be taken during a project's life-cycle. This may include planning, designing,
implementing, testing, acquisition, or operations.
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• ISO/IEC TR 13335-4 (2000) Selection of safeguards helps in the selection of
safeguards (meaning technical security controls) taking into account business
needs and security concerns.
• ISO/IEC TR 13335-5 (2001) Management guidance on network security pro-
vides guidelines for managing networks and communications, without suggesting
any advice on the design and implementation aspects which are out of the scope
of this document.
In 2004, the ISO/IEC 13335 series has become an international standard entitled
Management of Information and Communications Technology Security (MICTS),
with the publication of the ISO/IEC 13335-1 about Concepts and models for infor-
mation and communications technology security management [ISO04b]. This stan-
dard supersedes (merges and an updates) ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996 and ISO/IEC TR
13335-2:1997 (cf. Figure 2.3). Its content is focused on definitions of security concepts
and information about the management of ICT security. It is currently considered as
the up-to-date standard about ICT security management definition.
Just as ISO/IEC 13335-1, ISO/IEC 13335-2 was intended to supersede the technical
reports ISO/IEC TR 13335-3:1998 and ISO/IEC TR 13335-4:2000. However this new
project of standard has been stopped and replaced by the ISO/IEC 27005 standard
[ISO08] about Information security risk management. Finally ISO/IEC TR 13335-5
is moved to ISO/IEC 18028-1, becoming now ISO/IEC 27033.
The current objective of the ISO members is now to extend ICT security to in-
formation security, enlarging the scope previously focussed essentially on hardware,
software and network aspects to information management in general. The material
contained within ISO/IEC 13335-1 is proposed to be included in the ISO/IEC 2700x
series, mainly in the vocabulary standard. It is expected that ISO/IEC 13335-1 will
be withdrawn once ISO/IEC 27000 and ISO/IEC 27003 will be published.
2.3.2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
The Common Criteria (CC) standard [Com06a] results from joint work between USA,
United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Germany and Canada, unifying three stan-
dards: the European standard ITSEC (Information Technology Security Evaluation
Criteria), the Canadian standard CTCPEC (Canadian Trusted Computer Product
Evaluation Criteria) and the United States Government Department of Defense stan-
dard TCSEC (Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria). CC provides tools for
defining a set of security requirements and for evaluating the security specification of
a product or a system. These requirements are divided into two categories: security
functional components and security assurance components. Functional components
define functional requirements for the system-to-be. Assurance components help to
guarantee that the chosen security requirements correspond to the measures selected
and that they are correctly implemented. CC is currently in version 3.1 and is also
an international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) related to IS security. However, being
focused on IT security of products, CC is not completely aligned with our research
scope, i.e. IS security (Section 1.4). The requirements proposed by the standard are
product-oriented (i.e., adapted for an IT product like an operating system, a firewall,
etc.) but not IS-oriented (i.e., adapted for a whole IS within an organisation) (Section
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1.5.2). Despite of this, CC is considered in this research work, because it is a major
and well-known standard whose terminology and concepts are generally well accepted
and represent the foundations for many ISSRM methods.
CC is based on three main concepts:
• Protection profile
A Protection Profile (PP) is a set of security requirements aiming at reducing IT
security risk in a given context. A PP is defined from the user's viewpoint (iden-
tifying the desired properties of a product). It is implementation-independent
and meant to be reusable. A user can write his own PP or select an existing one
in a catalog. A PP is composed of the specific security requirements the user is
expecting for the product. He can then provide this PP as specifications to a
developer or use it to evaluate and compare existing Commercial Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) products.
• Security target
A Security Target (ST) is a set of security requirements for a given product,
generally from the developer's viewpoint. A ST is specific to a given product or
system. It is a means for a product editor to specify the security characteristics
of his product. The ST may claim conformance to one or more PPs, and forms
the basis for an evaluation.
• Target of Evaluation
The two preceding tools (PP and ST) are generally used to evaluate existing
products or systems. In this case, the term Target of Evaluation (ToE) denotes
the evaluated product or system.
CC is built around three main documents:
• Part 1: Introduction and general model [Com06a]
This part defines the terminology, the general concepts and presents an overview
of the underlying model for evaluation: evaluation of PP, ST and ToE. This part
also provides the description of the content of a PP and of a ST.
• Part 2: Security functional components [Com06b]
This part defines a collection of generic security functional requirements divided
into classes, themselves broken down into families of components, which for ex-
ample cover access control, identification, authentication, physical protection,
etc. The developer selects the best adapted requirements for his product and
instantiates them in the ST. CC also allows stating requirements for families of
products within PP.
• Part 3: Security assurance components [Com06c]
This part defines the assurance requirements, both for the development environ-
ment and for the product itself, as well as the tasks for the evaluator. These
assurance requirements are organised in classes, then in families of components,
which cover functional specification and design descriptions, like testing, life cy-
cle management, delivery procedures, security of the development environment,
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vulnerability analysis, etc. Developers can either build up their own consistent
assurance package or use one of the seven predefined Evaluation Assurance Lev-
els (EAL). EAL1 to EAL7 provide an increasing scale that balances the level
of assurance obtained on the product security with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. Each of these levels can be augmented with
one or more additional components in order to meet specific objectives.
The Common Evaluation Methodology [Com07] is a complementary document pre-
senting the principles and processes whereby evaluations are conducted using CC. It
describes the tasks to be carried out by an evaluator for checking each assurance
requirement. CC proposes three different but complementary kinds of evaluation:
• PP evaluation: evaluating whether a PP is complete, consistent, technically
sound, and hence suitable for use in developing a ST.
• ST evaluation: evaluating whether a ST meets the requirements of one or more
PPs.
• ToE evaluation: evaluating if a ToE is conform to the security requirements of
its associated ST.
The main advantage of an evaluation following the CC model is that every evalu-
ation will be done based on the same reference. This leads to comparable and repro-
ductible results. Typical products or systems (ToE) evaluated with CC are operating
systems, network components (switch, hub, VPN, etc.) or security products (firewall,
IDS, authentication system, etc.). The current drawbacks of CC evaluations are the
cost of the whole evaluation process including the effort and time necessary to prepare
an evaluation and associated documentation.
2.4 Security risk management standards
This section presents standards dealing with security that are specifically focused on
RM activities. The ISO/IEC series of standard [ISO05b, ISO05c, ISO08] is focussed
on this field, as other national standards like NIST standards [SHF04, SGF02] and the
German BSI standards [Bun05b]. We selected naturally the international standards of
this field, but also the NIST and BSI standards that are well known and used outside
of the standard's country [ENI06].
2.4.1 The ISO/IEC 2700x series of standards
The ISO/IEC 2700x series of standards deals with information security management.
It is composed of a set of standards providing information for setting up an Information
Security Management System (ISMS).
Introduction to ISO management systems
The ISO standards providing requirements and guidance about best management prac-
tices are part of the most well-known standards. The most popular management sys-
tem series of standards are the ISO 900x series about quality management systems
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[ISO00] and ISO 1400x series about environmental management systems [ISO04a].
Many other domains have followed this initiative and have proposed an adapted man-
agement system based on the same generic model (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Management standards and related sectors
Sector Standard or series of standards
Automotive ISO/TS 16949:2002
Education IWA 2:2007
Environment ISO 14001:2004
Food safety ISO 22000:2005
Health care IWA 1:2005
Information security ISO/IEC 27001:2005
IT service management ISO/IEC 20000:2005
Local government IWA 4:2005
Quality ISO 9001:2000
Medical devices ISO 13485:2003
Petroleum and gas ISO 29001:2003
Ship recycling ISO 30000
Supply chain security ISO 28000:2007
Amanagement system is defined as the framework of processes and procedures used
to ensure that an organisation can fulfill all tasks required to achieve its objectives
[Wik08b]. Within the set of common principles shared by the management systems, the
main one is the application of the Plan-Do-Check-Act paradigm, also called Deming
wheel or PDCA cycle [LNN+96]. This cycle is composed of the four following steps
to be performed iteratively [ISO05b, ISO00, ISO04a]:
• PLAN
Establish the objectives and processes necessary to deliver results in accordance
with the specifications.
• DO
Implement the processes.
• CHECK
Monitor and evaluate the processes and results against objectives and specifica-
tions.
• ACT
Apply actions to the outcome for necessary improvement.
The main purpose of a management system is always to put the organisation in a
continuous improvement for the concerned domain.
Overview of the ISO/IEC 2700x series of standards
The ISO/IEC 2700x series of standards is currently expected to be composed of 8
main standards (Figure 2.4), dedicated to information security. Some other standards,
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Figure 2.4: The ISO/IEC 2700x series of standards
numbered ISO/IEC 27001x, are reserved to sector-specific requirements or guidelines
standards. The following are expected: Information security management guidelines
for telecommunications based on ISO/IEC 27002, and Sector-Specific ISMS Standards
for the World Lottery Association and for the Automotive Industry based on ISO/IEC
27001.
ISO/IEC 27000: Overview and vocabulary. This first standard defines the basic
principles and the terminology concerning an ISMS. It will supersede the first part of
ISO/IEC 13335 [ISO04b]. Publication is expected for 2009.
ISO/IEC 27001: ISMS Requirements. The ISO/IEC 27001 standard [ISO05b] pro-
vides the requirements necessary to establish and manage an ISMS. It was the first
standard of the ISO/IEC 2700x series to be published (October 2005) and the whole
series is built around this standard. Organisations can obtain an ISO/IEC 27001 certi-
fication with regards to their compliance with the requirements of this standard. The
standard comes from a British Standard (BS 7799-2) that is now obsolete.
ISO/IEC 27002: Code of Practice for Information Security Management. The
ISO/IEC 27002 [ISO05c] standard is only the renaming (in April 2007) of the already
existing ISO/IEC 17799 standard. ISO/IEC 17799 was the first ISO standard dealing
with information security and its objective was to define a set of good practices for
insuring information security management. This standard published in 2000 was then
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reviewed in 2002 and 2005. The content of ISO/IEC 27002 is currently similar to
the one of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 and the security controls it proposes are part of the
ISO/IEC 27001 requirements.
ISO/IEC 27003: ISMS implementation guidance. The ISO/IEC 27003 standard
aims at providing implementation guidelines for establishing and implementing an
ISMS. It is focused on how to effectively perform the PDCA cycle and complete the
requirements of an ISMS. Publication is expected for 2009
ISO/IEC 27004: Information security management measurements. Amongst the
ISO/IEC 27001 requirements, some require to measure the efficiency of the ISMS. The
ISO/IEC 27004 standard provides guidelines for helping organisations to observe and
measure the efficiency of their ISMS implementation. Publication is expected for 2009
ISO/IEC 27005: Information security risk management. The ISO/IEC 27005 stan-
dard [ISO08] proposes a process to follow for performing security risk management,
required by the ISO/IEC 27001. It was published in June 2008. It is an evolution of
ISO/IEC 13335 part 3 and 4.
ISO/IEC 27006: Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of ISMS.
The ISO/IEC 27006 standard specifies requirements and provides guidance for bodies
providing audit and certification of an ISMS. It is primarily intended to support the
accreditation of certification bodies providing ISMS certification. It was published in
February 2007.
ISO/IEC 27007: ISMS Auditor Guidelines. The ISO/IEC 27007 standard is pro-
viding guidance on conducting ISMS audits. A part is dedicated to the competences
needed by ISMS auditors. This guide will be complementary with the ISO 19011
[ISO02a] standard, providing guidelines for quality and environmental management
systems audit (and generic enough to be used as a reference for an ISMS audit). No
publication date has currently been suggested.
ISO/IEC 27005: Information security risk management
The objective of the ISO/IEC 27005 standard is to describe the information security
risk management process and its tasks. As mentioned in the scope of the standard, it
supports the general concepts specified in ISO/IEC 27001 and is designed to satisfy the
requirement of having an information security based on a risk management approach.
Indeed ISO/IEC 27001 requires a systematic approach to information security risk
management. For each task of the process, the inputs and outputs are given by the
standard. Then, the action describing the task is defined and some implementation
guidance is provided. The process proposed is an evolution of the one proposed in the
AS/NZS 4360 standard (Figure 2.2).
The ISO/IEC 27005 information security risk management process consists of con-
text establishment, risk assessment, risk treatment, risk acceptance, risk communica-
tion, and risk monitoring and review. This process should be iterative and continuous.
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Figure 2.5: The ISO/IEC 27005 information security risk management process (as appears
in [ISO08])
Once context establishment and risk assessment have been conducted, it is necessary
to evaluate if sufficient information is available to take decision about risk treatment.
If not, a new iteration (maybe partial) with updated context and risk assessment, is
conducted. Otherwise, risk treatment task is performed (cf. Figure 2.5, Risk Decision
Point 1).
Several iterations of the risk treatment task could be needed to reach the best
state in terms of residual risk and ROSI. Moreover, since the effectiveness of the risk
treatment depends on the results of the risk assessment, it is possible that no acceptable
level of residual risk can be reached. In this case, a revision of the process starting
from the context establishment can be necessary to update the different parameters
(cf. Figure 2.5, Risk Decision Point 2).
After risk treatment, the risk acceptance task has the objective to ensure that
residual risks are explicitly accepted by the managers of the organisation. Finally, risk
communication is a task to be performed throughout the process, to be sure to have
all of the relevant information at each task of the process. Thereby, the whole process
should be clearly documented.
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2.4.2 NIST Special Publication 800-27 Rev A and 800-30
The NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) is a federal technology
agency founded in 1901 within the U.S. Department of Commerce. Its mission is to
develop and promote measurement, standards, and technology in order to increase
productivity in the U.S. and facilitate business.
The NIST SP (Special Publication) 800-27 Rev A [SHF04] and NIST SP 800-30
[SGF02], published respectively in June 2004 and July 2002, are part of the SP in
the `800' series of NIST standards. This series was established in 1990 with the aim
of providing documentation about computer security in general. The main targets of
NIST 800-27 Rev A and NIST 800-30 are federal organisations that process sensitive
information. However, the documents make clear that the use of these guidelines is not
subject to copyright and that they can be applied by non-governmental organisations.
NIST 800-27 Rev A is a guide about Engineering Principles for Information
Technology Security. It presents a list of system-level security principles to be con-
sidered in the design, development, and operation of an IS. The document presents
33 security principles and defines their applicability in the IS development life-cycle,
i.e. Initiation Phase, Development/Acquisition Phase, Implementation Phase, Opera-
tion/Maintenance Phase, Disposal Phase. This IS development life-cycle is described
in depth in the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information
Technology Systems (SP 800-14). Finally, this standard comes with a set of security
concepts, detailed in a glossary, on which the NIST SP 800-30 is based.
NIST SP 800-30 is entitled Risk Management Guide for Information Technology
Systems. Its objective is to provide a baseline for conducting an efficient risk manage-
ment. This guide is especially based on (and compliant with) the NIST 800-27 Rev A.
After some preliminary elements about risk management, the document proposes two
complementary processes: the Risk Assessment process and the Risk Mitigation
process. These two processes completely cover the risk management process presented
in Section 2.1, from context and asset identification to control implementation. For
each step of both processes, the inputs, the outpouts, and the tasks to perform are
described under the form of guidelines. However it is necessary to note that these
two processes are presented at a high-level of granularity, with few details concerning
the implementation of the different tasks. The Risk Assessment process determines
the potential risks associated with an IS and helps to devise appropriate controls to
mitigate them. It is composed of the 9 following steps, as depicted in the standard:
• Step 1: System Characterization
• Step 2: Threat Identification
• Step 3: Vulnerability Identification
• Step 4: Control Analysis
• Step 5: Likelihood Determination
• Step 6: Impact Analysis
• Step 7: Risk Determination
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• Step 8: Control Recommendations
• Step 9: Results Documentation
The second process of risk management for NIST SP 800-30 is called Risk Mitigation.
It involves prioritising, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate controls coming
from the risk assessment process. This process is composed of the 7 following steps,
as depicted in the standard:
• Step 1: Prioritize Actions
• Step 2: Evaluate recommended Control Options
• Step 3: Conduct Cost-Benefit Analysis
• Step 4: Select Controls
• Step 5: Assign Responsibility
• Step 6: Develop Safeguard Implementation Plan
• Step 7: Implement Selected Controls
The document ends with some good practices and keys for success.
2.4.3 The IT-Grundshutz
The IT-Grundshutz is a set of German standards, based on a security management
method. It is produced and maintained by the German Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik). This federal
office is in charge of managing computer and communication security for the German
government. The IT-Grundshutz is composed first of 3 standards and second of knowl-
edge bases on assets, threats and safeguards, called catalogues (Figure 2.6).
BSI Standard 100-1: Information Security Management Systems (ISMS)
[Bun05a]
This first standard defines the general requirements for an ISMS. The requirements are
compatible with ISO/IEC 27001 [ISO05b] and, moreover, take the recommendations
of ISO/IEC 13335 [ISO04b] and ISO/IEC 27002 [ISO05c] into consideration. The ob-
jective of this document is to facilitate the comprehension of these ISO/IEC standards
and to help user to implement the requirements through the IT-Grundschutz, by pro-
viding greater details.
BSI-Standard 100-2: IT-Grundschutz Methodology [Bun05b]
The IT-Grundschutz Methodology deals with IT security management and proposes
successive steps to effectively manage security (how to produce a security plan, how
to select safeguards, how to implement them, how to maintain and improve IT secu-
rity, etc.). The standard provides a very pragmatical approach and this document is
mainly based on examples and background expertises. The methodology relies on the
IT-Grundshutz Catalogues, providing the user with knowledge bases needed to apply
the methodology. The final objective of the methodology is to reach a standard level
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Figure 2.6: Overview of BSI publications on IT security management (as appears in [Bun05a])
of security.
BSI-Standard 100-3: Risk Analysis based on IT-Grundschutz [Bun05c]
The IT-Grundshutz Methodology together with its associated catalogues aims at
proposing measures for a standard security level. However, feedback from the IT-
Grundshutz users has shown that it is sometimes necessary to go further and provide
techniques when the needed security level is higher. This standard proposes a method
for analysing risks, complementary with the IT-Grundschutz Methodology, to be used
for additional security analysis. It is generally used only on a particular set of assets.
The IT-Grundshutz Catalogues [Bun05d]
The IT-Grundshutz Catalogues are knowledge bases for 3 security components: IT
assets, threats and safeguards. Based on these catalogues, a user could pick the IT
assets of his IS, and the catalogues directly make the link with the associated threats
and the safeguards to implement. The granularity level proposed is very detailed, it
provides implementation aspects for safeguards.
These standards are freely available and have been designed to be continuously up-
dated and extended to include new items on the basis of user surveys. The catalogues
are revised every six months to incorporate suggestions for improvements, additional
material and reflect the latest IT developments. A software tool (GSTOOL) support-
ing the IT-Grundshutz is available. It is also possible to be certified on the basis of
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the IT-Grundshutz [Bun05a].
2.5 Security risk management methods
This section is about security risk management methods. In 2004, a CLUSIF (Club
de la Sécurité de l'Information Français1) study registered more than 200 security RM
methods [Clu04a]. Among those, we selected a representative subset based on some
recent conferences and studies, like the report Inventory of risk assessment and risk
management methods [ENI06] from ENISA, surveying the methods known by the
security experts of this european agency. The availability and quality of the docu-
mentation are also first-class selection criteria considered in this selection. Methods
that are private and/or specific to a company or methods with few documentation are
not selected in our study. The set of selected methods is finally a representative panel
regarding the characteristics of the methods:
• History and background of the method;
• Method's country (France [DCS04b, CLU07b], United Kingdom [Ins03], USA
[AD01b], etc.);
• Domain of origin (industry [CLU07b, AD01b, Ins03], military [DCS04b], scientific
[VML+07]);
• Based (or not) on knowledge bases [DCS04b, CLU07b, Ins03];
• Risk approach (analytic definition of risk [DCS04b, Ins03, VML+07], based on
risk scenario [CLU07b], based on brainstorming [AD01b]);
• Qualitative [DCS04b, CLU07b, AD01b, VML+07] or quantitative [Ins03] concept
estimation.
The methods surveyed are EBIOS [DCS04b], MEHARI [CLU07b], OCTAVE [AD01b],
CRAMM [Ins03] and CORAS [VML+07].
2.5.1 EBIOS
Under the authority of the Secretariat-General for National Defence, the Central In-
formation Systems Security Division (DCSSI - Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des
Systèmes d'Information) is the French national authority for IS security. The EBIOS
(Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité) method [DCS04b]
has been created in 1995 by the DCSSI. It is currently in version 2. The EBIOS
method is used to assess and treat risks related to IS security. It can also be used to
communicate information about risk within the organisation and to partners. There-
fore, it supports the whole ISSRM process. Its use is recommended for the analysis
of French military and governmental IS, but EBIOS is also commonly used in indus-
try and other organisations. The method is composed of 5 sections. A case study
[DCS04a] explaining the method on an example has been designed. Additionally, an
open-source software tool aiming at facilitating the use of the method is now available.
1http://www.clusif.asso.fr/en/clusif/present/
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This tool is especially used for collecting data of an EBIOS study and for producing
summary documents.
EBIOS has been widely used in France, but also in Europa. The method is par-
ticularly interesting because it has an analytic approach to risk: risk is incrementally
built, based on knowledge bases of each atomic element of risk (as it is defined in
EBIOS). The documentation is publicly available and well structured.
The general principle of the method can be summarised as: identify the assets re-
quiring protection, analyse the consequence of incidents on assets, analyse at the same
time the threats and vulnerabilities of the IS and finally choose the most appropriate
security solutions to mitigate the risks. The method is composed of 5 steps (Figure
2.7):
Figure 2.7: EBIOS global approach (as appears in [DCS04b])
Step 1 - Context study In the first step, the organisation is studied, by analysing
its missions, its business, its own values, its constraints, its structure, the regulatory
references applicable to the organisation, etc. The outcome of this step is first a
description of the essential elements of the organisation (functions or information se-
curity sensitive) and second the determination of the entities or components of the
underlying IS. A mapping is done between both of them.
Step 2 - Expression of security needs The purpose of this step is to allow IS
users to express their security needs for the functions and information they handle,
independently of any technical solution. A (so called) scale of needs is first defined
for each security criteria (i.e. confidentiality, integrity, availability) to grade security
needs in the form of levels. Then, every relevant impact is assigned to one of these
levels for each security criteria. Finally a summary of the results obtained is produced.
Step 3 - Threat study This step aims at determining the threats affecting the
IS. These threats are formalised in EBIOS by identifying the following components:
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the attack methods to which the organisation is exposed, the threat agents that may
use them, and the vulnerabilities exploitable on the IS components. A knowledge base
proposing a complete list for each of these components is used as a reference for this
step (cf. Section 1.5.2). Then, the attack potential of threat agents combined with
attack methods and the level of vulnerabilities are estimated. The outcome of this
step is the list of threats specific to the IS of the organisation, but independently from
the security needs, information processed and functions supported.
Step 4 - Identification of security objectives In this step, the organisation's
security needs are compared with the identified threats. The risks are thus highlighted
and can be treated by some security objectives. These security objectives constitute
the security specifications for the target system and its environment. They must be
consistent with all of the assumptions, constraints, regulatory references and security
rules identified during the first step of the method. The coverage level of security
objectives with regards to risks can also be determined during this step.
Step 5 - Determination of security requirements The security requirements
are finally selected to achieve the defined security objectives. EBIOS proposes to
define first the security functional requirements, describing the required security be-
havior and designed to satisfy the security objectives as formulated in the previous
step. A knowledge base compliant with ISO/IEC 17799 (updated now in ISO/IEC
27002 [ISO05c]) and CC [Com06a] is proposed. The security assurance requirements,
providing the confidence that the product or system satisfies its security objectives,
can also be selected based on the requirements of CC.
The techniques presented in the EBIOS documentation are only suggestions and
the users should choose the most appropriate techniques for their context, i.e. the
culture and users in their organisation, as well as the tools they prefer to use. For
example the level of detail given in the method can be adjusted if necessary.
2.5.2 MEHARI
MEHARI (MEthode Harmonisée d'Analyse du Risque Informatique) is a security RM
method [CLU07b] elaborated since 1996 by the CLUSIF, a french association com-
posed of IS security professionals. It has been updated in 2007. MEHARI builds upon
two older methods called MARION [CLU98] (Méthodologie d'Analyse de Risques In-
formatiques Orientée par Niveaux) and MELISA [Dir89] (Méthode d'Evaluation de
la Vulnérabilité Résiduelle des Systèmes d'Armement). These two methods are now
obsolete and not maintained anymore. The MEHARI method is composed of sev-
eral guidelines presenting the concepts and the methodological part. Moreover, some
knowledge bases are available to help to use the method. A case study has also been
built for illustrating the method. Finally, a software tool (Risicare) that can be bought
has been developed in support of the method.
MEHARI is selected because it is one of the most used ISSRM method in France,
particularly in the industry. At the opposite of EBIOS, it is based on risk scenarios
to identify relevant risks related to an organisation. Even the conceptual aspects are
not extensively studied, the documentation is complete and publicly available.
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Figure 2.8: Using MEHARI modules for different outcomes (as appears in [CLU07a])
MEHARI is defined as a toolbox specifically designed for security management.
Depending on the organisation's needs and circumstances, it ensures that an appro-
priate security management solution can be designed. The method is presented under
the form of a set of so called modules [CLU07a], centered around risk assessment and
management. Each module can be used independently or in combination and leads
generally to an action plan (Figure 2.82). The modules are the following:
1. Security Stakes Analysis and Classification
This first module allows analysing what are the assets of the studied organisation and,
more generally, what is at stake regarding security. This module proposes to start by
defining a malfunction value scale, by first identifying the main activities and their
objectives, and then by identifying and evaluating potential malfunctions and their
seriousness. A second step consists of classifying resources of the IS by identifying
elements needed to be classified and rank them based on classification criteria (i.e.
confidentiality, integrity, availability) and on the malfunction scale. This first module
can be used as input for other modules, providing an impact table.
2. Evaluation Guide for security services
The objective of this module is to assess the security level of the IS by comparison with
the state of the art of security by means of knowledge bases. It highlights the main
weaknesses of the system. By performing an audit of security services, their quality
is evaluated. This review helps to produce an action plan for enhancing the security
services that have an insufficient level.
3. Risk Analysis Guide
2Despite this figure is extracted from the MEHARI documentation, the labels of the modules in this figure
are not compliant with the current names of the modules.
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The risk analysis guide is used for identifying critical risks and analysing the risk
situations. Guidelines are provided for identifying risks with the help of the method
knowledge bases, proposing standard risk scenarios. Then some automated procedures
are given for analysing the identified risks, based on evaluation of potentiality and
impact of risk. The outcome of risk analysis is the definition of security requirements
that need to be applied on the IS.
2.5.3 OCTAVE
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) is a
risk-based strategic assessment and planning technique for security. It has been de-
veloped by the Software Engineering Institute of the Carnegie Mellon University in
Pittsburgh. The current version of the method is 2.0 and it was published in 2001.
OCTAVE is a method from the USA, having a public and very detailed documen-
tation. The current version of the method is a bit old regarding the other methods,
however it remains relevant and has therefore been selected. The method especially
has an interesting approach to risk, based on brainstorming.
OCTAVE aims at being self-directed, led by a small and flexible team of people
internal to the organisation. The OCTAVE method [AD01b] is based on the OC-
TAVE criteria [AD01a], which define a standard approach for a risk-driven, asset- and
practice-based information security evaluation. An adaptation of the method has been
made for smaller organisations and is called OCTAVE-S. The OCTAVE method is a
guide of 18 volumes showing how to implement the method. The method is built
around three main phases (Figure 2.9) aiming first at examining organisational and
technological issues and second at defining an organisation's security strategy and
plan. The phases are, as depicted in OCTAVE, the following:
Figure 2.9: OCTAVE phases (as appears in [AD01b])
Phase 1: Build Asset-Based Profiles
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The first phase aims at identifying critical assets and the threats to those assets. At
each level of the organisation (senior management, operational area management and
staff), some people are interviewed during workshops. The objective is to collect their
knowledge in terms of assets, security requirements, threats, current security prac-
tices and organisational vulnerabilities. The last task of the phase is to summarise
the information collected and consolidate it by defining for next phases: assets to be
taken into account, security requirements in terms of security criteria (confidentiality,
integrity and availability), threat profiles and main vulnerabilities.
Phase 2: Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
This phase aims at identifying the vulnerabilities, both organisational and technolog-
ical, that expose those threats, creating risks to the organisation. In this phase key
components of the IS are identified and then evaluated with the help of vulnerability
evaluation tools.
Phase 3: Develop Security Strategy and Plans
This phase aims at developing a practice-based protection strategy and risk mitigation
plans to support the organisation's missions and priorities. It starts with conducting
a risk analysis. Risk impacts are described and evaluated and risk profiles are built,
bringing together impacts and threat profiles. A protection strategy plan is finally
defined based on risk profiles, organisational vulnerabilities and protections already in
place. The different action plans are finally reviewed and approved by the management.
2.5.4 CRAMM
The CRAMM (CCTA3 Risk Analysis and Management Method) method was devel-
oped since 1985 by the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency of the UK
government [Ins03]. The method, currently owned by SIEMENS and developed by
Insight Consulting [cra], is in version 5 and is mainly built around a software tool.
The tool provides guidance for the user to exploit the method and has naturally the
capability to collect the data needed.
CRAMM is selected because it is one of the first widely used ISSRM methods.
Its use is worldwide. Therefore, it has the benefit of a lot of experience. Another
key characteristic is that it is one of the rare method recommending quantitative risk
estimation. Its weak point is that the method documentation is based on the software
tool user's guide.
The methodological part of CRAMM is composed of three steps (Figure 2.10):
1. Asset identification and valuation
In CRAMM, assets are generally divided into 3 classes: physical assets (e.g., file server,
workstation), software (e.g., application packages) and data (e.g., the information held
on the IS). Their valuation is generally done in terms of replacement cost for physical
assets and in terms of the impact coming from information potentially being unavail-
able, destroyed, disclosed or modified for software and data. This estimation of assets
3Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency
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Figure 2.10: Overview of CRAMM (as appears in [cra])
can be done in a quantitative way, i.e. by valuing them in financial terms. Valuation
of data assets is performed by interview of the `data owners' (e.g., the business unit
managers).
2. Threat and vulnerability assessment
The analysis part of CRAMM is completed by identifying and estimating level of
threats and vulnerabilities. Threats and vulnerabilities are investigated against se-
lected asset groups. Some mapping between threats and assets and between threats
and impacts is provided. Concerning vulnerabilities, as usual in ISSRM methods,
CRAMM is targeting high-level vulnerabilities. Technical or system specific vulnera-
bilities, which may be identified for example by vulnerability scanners, are thus not
addressed by the method. Threats and vulnerabilities are assessed with the help of
scales of values: threats on the five points scale Very Low, Low, Medium, High or
Very High and Low, Medium or High for vulnerabilities. Finally, CRAMM calcu-
lates risks with the information provided for assets, threats and vulnerabilities. Risks
are estimated on a scale from 1 to 7, with the help of a risk matrix.
3. Countermeasure selection and recommendation
The management part of CRAMM starts with countermeasure selection and recom-
mendation. With the results of the preceding step, CRAMM produces a set of counter-
measures applicable to the IS that are considered as necessary to manage the identified
risks. CRAMM has a large set of countermeasures (over 3000) organised in logical
groups and sub-groups. The countermeasures in each sub-groups have a hierarchical
structure, from high-level security objectives to security functions until implementa-
tion examples.
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2.5.5 CORAS
The CORAS consortium consists of three commercial companies: Intracom (Greece),
Solinet (Germany) and Telenor (Norway); seven research institutes: CLRC/RAL
(UK), CTI (Greece), FORTH (Greece), IFE (Norway), NCT (Norway), NR (Norway),
and SINTEF (Norway); as well as one university college: Queen Mary University of
London (UK). The CORAS project ran from January 2001 to July 2003. CORAS
(Risk Assessment of Security Critical Systems) was a European project (FP5 - Fifth
Framework Project) developing a tool-supported framework, exploiting methods for
risk analysis, semi-formal methods for object-oriented modelling, and computerised
tools, for a precise, unambiguous, and efficient risk assessment of security critical sys-
tems [FKG+02]. Two security critical application domains identified were telemedecine
and e-commerce. Since the end of the project, several other uses of the CORAS frame-
work have been made [VLM+05, VdBLS05, HS05].
CORAS is one of the rare method originating from scientific research. A lot of
scientific articles are available, proposing an in-depth presentation of method. We
selected it also because our interest is motivated by the fact that the method is based
on modelling. CORAS could thereby be presented in the section dedicated to security-
oriented modelling languages (Section 3.2). However, CORAS remains an ISSRM
method and thus we chose to present it in this section.
The main focus of CORAS is security critical systems in general, but CORAS puts
more emphasis on IT security. IT security includes all aspects related to defining,
achieving, and maintaining confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, ac-
countability, authenticity, and reliability of IT systems [ISO04b]. An IT system in the
sense of CORAS is not just technology, but is also including the humans interacting
with the technology and all relevant aspects of the surrounding organisation. The
scope of CORAS is therefore equivalent to the one we have defined in Section 1.4.
CORAS is generally used for the assessment of existing IS, as seen in the case stud-
ies [RDGS02, SSH+03]. However, its integration with the Rationale Unified Process
(RUP) [JBR99] should allow CORAS to be suited for IS development or system im-
provement. Unfortunately this aspect has not been extensively studied in the research
work.
The main output of the CORAS project is a framework for model-based risk as-
sessment having four anchor points:
• A risk management process based on the AS/NZS 4360 [AS/04].
• A risk documentation framework based on the ISO/IEC standard RM-ODP
[ISO98].
• An integrated risk management and development process based on the RUP
[JBR99].
• A platform for tool-inclusion based on XML.
During the CORAS project, two case studies were carried out:
• A case study about a B2C commerce platform and particularly the authentication
mechanism and the Secure Payment mechanism [RDGS02].
• A case study about a telemedecine application [SSH+03].
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A risk management process based on the AS/NZS 4360
AS/NZS 4360 [AS/04] provides a process for RM composed of context identification,
risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, and risk treatment. Two continous
sub-processes are played throughout this main process: risk communication and risk
monitor and review, giving rise to an iterative risk management process (cf. Section
2.2.2). The CORAS methodology proposes guidelines about models to be used for
each sub-process, and how they should be expressed. CORAS proposes also several
existing methods to perform risk assessment, mainly in the safety domain (HAZard
OPerability study (HAZOP), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode and Effect
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Markov analysis methods, etc.) but also in the security
domain (CRAMM [Ins03] or Misuse cases [SO05]).
Models supporting the different risk management steps
Figure 2.11: The CORAS modelling framework
Semi-formal modelling is used for three different purposes:
• To describe the target of evaluation at the right level of abstraction;
• To facilitate communication and interaction between different groups of stake-
holders;
• To document risk assessment results and the assumptions on which these results
depend to support reuse and maintenance.
CORAS has developed its own modelling framework (Figure 2.11) with its own con-
cepts. The concepts proposed by CORAS are the following [VML+07] (an in-depth
study is shown in Section 4.3.3):
Assets: Assets are the parts or features of the target which have value to the client
of the analysis, such as physical objects, know-how, services, software and hardware,
and so on.
Stakeholders: those people and organisations who may affect, be affected by, or per-
ceive themselves to be affected by a decision, activity or risk.
Vulnerability: A vulnerability is a weakness of the system or organisation.
Threat: A threat may exploit a vulnerability and cause an unwanted incident.
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Figure 2.12: An example of use of the CORAS modelling framework
Threat scenario: A sequence of events or activities leading to an unwanted incident.
Unwanted incident: An unwanted incident is an event which reduces the value of
one or more of the assets.
Risk: A risk is an unwanted incident along with its estimated likelihood and conse-
quence values.
Treatment: Treatments represent various options for reducing risk.
An example of use of the framework (Figure 2.12), illustrated on our running ex-
ample, is a hacker (threat) that may exploit the insufficiency of physical access control
(vulnerability). Then could the hacker steal confidential information (threat scenario)
leading to confidential information disclosed to competitors (unwanted incident). The
asset targeted is confidential information (asset) owned by the clients (stakeholders).
This risk is called 'R1'. The risk could be reduced by constraining the visitors to
be always accompanied by an employee. More examples are provided in the CORAS
literature [VML+07, RDGS02, VLM+05, HS05, SSH+03, FKG+02, VdBLS05].
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the process and the tasks underlying ISSRM are first explained (Section
2.1). ISSRM standards and methods are then discussed (Section 2.2 to 2.5). The first
conclusion we can draw from ISSRM standards and methods is that they provide
different tools and techniques for reaching generally the same goal: protecting an IS
by defining suited security requirements/controls with the help of a RM approach.
However, the ISSRM approaches perform their tasks in different manners (based on
interviews [AD01b], based on knowledge bases [DCS04b], based on a software tool
[Ins03], etc.) and have different coverage level of the generic ISSRM process (some
methods are not concerned by control selection and implementation [DCS04b, ISO08],
some are high-level and just providing guidelines [SGF02], etc.). Each method thus
has its own strengths and weaknesses, and the users may potentially need to resort
to two (or more) complementary approaches. The conceptual differences and the
lack of interoperability between the methods is thus a gap in the ISSRM domain.
Moreover, for standard compliance purposes, some methods may need to prove their
alignment with a standard [ISO05b] and show that the tasks required by the standard
are effectively performed by the method. The lack of interoperability between the
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approaches and the difficulty to manage the different terminologies used are in this
case once again a weakness. This problem of lack of interoperability between ISSRM
approaches is discussed in Chapter 4.
Table 2.2: Summary of the ISSRM standards and methods state of the art
Reference
Security oriented Risk-based RE approach Model-based
approach approach
ISO/IEC Guide 73 - ++ - -
AS/NZS 4360 - ++ - -
ISO/IEC 13335 ++ + - -
Common Criteria ++ + - -
ISO/IEC 2700x ++ ++ - -
NIST 800-27 RevA
++ ++ - -
NIST 800-30
The IT-Grundschutz ++ ++ - -
EBIOS ++ ++ - -
MEHARI ++ ++ - -
OCTAVE ++ ++ - -
CRAMM ++ ++ - -
CORAS ++ ++ - ++
Legend:
++: Completely covered and at the core of the document
+: Partially covered or not playing a central role
-: Not covered
Coming back to our objectives fixed in Section 1.1, most of the standards and
methods studied cover the two first, that are delivering secure IS and using a risk-
based approach (Table 2.24). However, these approaches are generally designed to be
used on an existing IS: they are not well suited to be used during IS development. De-
spite sometimes proposing additional guidelines to use the method for IS development,
current ISSRM methods are not really connected to RE activities and reasoning from
the early phases of IS development. We claim that one can benefit from performing
RM tasks and IS development in parallel (Section 1.3). Another drawback of current
ISSRM methods is that the documents produced as output are generally informal,
most often in natural language, sometimes only structured with the help of tables.
This leads to gaps in automation, at the level of reasoning, evolution, monitoring or
traceability. CORAS [FKG+02] is the only exception, proposing models as product
of the different risk-related tasks. However, CORAS is not clearly connected to RE
activities: the relation between CORAS and the RUP has not been a major focus
area. Moreover, the risk management process proposed by CORAS remains the one
from AS/NZS 4360 [AS/04], not dedicated to IS development. Another weak point
of CORAS is that it is clearly disconnected from standard terminology (cf. Section
4.3.3).
4By Completely covered for Risk-based approach, we don't mean the concept of risk is only considered
in the approach, but really that the underlying process/method is based on a risk management approach.
For example, the concept of risk is mentioned in CC, but the underlying proposed approach doesn't propose
any risk analysis/assessment/management process to define the security requirements.
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For a long time, the RE community has used models as a way to achieve a better
formality and quality. To allow a better integration of RM tasks throughout the IS
development life cycle, we have decided to also study security RE engineering, and
more specifically modelling languages concerned by security aspects. They are the
topics of the next chapter.
2.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter, an overview of the ISSRM process was proposed and each task needed
to be performed was presented. The core of this chapter was dedicated to a survey of
the different RM standards, security standards, security RM standards, and security
RM methods. A conclusion was finally drawn with regards to this survey.
In the next chapter, we investigate security RE, and particularly security RE frame-
works and security-oriented modelling languages.
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Chapter 3
Security Requirements Engineering
T he importance of addressing security concerns from the very beginning of IS de-velopment is now widely acknowledged [LYM03, DS00]. Early consideration of
security allows IS developers to envisage threats, their consequences and countermea-
sures before a system is in place, rather than as a reaction to a possibly disastrous
attack. To cope with these issues, researchers have recently proposed various frame-
works to deal with security during RE (Section 3.1). In parallel, conceptual modelling
languages supporting security with dedicated constructs have been developed. Those
languages are actually security-oriented extensions of preexisting general-purpose RE
modelling languages: Misuse cases [SO05] and Abuse cases [MF99] extend Use cases
[Obj04, Coc01, Fow03] complementarily with Mal-activity diagrams [Sin07] which ex-
tend Activity diagrams [Obj04, Fow03]; Abuse frames [LNI+03b, LNIJ04, LNI+03a]
derive from Problem frames [Jac01]; Secure Tropos [MG09, MGMP02, GMZ05] orig-
inates from Tropos [BGG+04] and i* [Yu96]; and KAOS [vLL00] was also extended
[vL04]. Moreover, a generic risk-based modelling framework has also been developed:
the Tropos Goal-Risk framework [AG06] (Section 3.2). It is necessary to note that
in this chapter, for each described approach, we use the terminology proposed by the
approach. The different frameworks and modelling languages are not presented with
a unified terminology.
3.1 Security requirements engineering frameworks
This section introduces RE approaches focused on security. They are approaches intro-
ducing methods and concepts that are security-specific and thus of primary importance
regarding our research works.
3.1.1 Information security and safety models by Firesmith
In December 2003, Firesmith published a technical report entitled Common Con-
cepts Underlying Safety, Security, and Survivability Engineering, that presents a set
of interrelated information models that provide the conceptual foundation underlying
safety, security, and survivability engineering [Fir03]. He then published various pub-
lications extending the former, focussed on safety [Fir04] and security [Fir05]. These
publications are finally reinforced by some recent tutorials [Fir07a, Fir07b], presenting
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his work in-depth about security and safety engineering, which are part of defensibility
engineering.
The work of Firesmith relies on the so called information models, i.e. UML class
diagrams defining key concepts and relationships between them, for identifying and
defining the foundational concepts underlying (mainly) safety and security engineering.
Precise definitions of each concept come with the graphical models. The objective of
this work is to make clear what are the conceptual similarities and particularities of
safety and security, and how they are related. In a tutorial [Fir07a], he also proposes
a process to effectively deal with both safety and security engineering. However the
proposed process does not rely on a risk-based approach.
Firesmith defines these domains in [Fir07a]:
Safety engineering as the engineering discipline within systems engineering con-
cerned with lowering the risk of unintentional unauthorized harm to valuable assets
to a level that is acceptable to the system's stakeholders by preventing, detecting,
and reacting to such harm, mishaps (i.e., accidents and incidents), hazards, and safety
risks.
Security engineering as the engineering discipline within systems engineering con-
cerned with lowering the risk of intentional unauthorized harm to valuable assets to
a level that is acceptable to the system's stakeholders by preventing, detecting, and
reacting to such harm, misuses (i.e., attacks and incidents), threats, and security risks.
Firesmith distinguishes particularly harm coming from intentional and uninten-
tional source. He then introduces the concept of defensibility that is defined as the
composition of both safety and security (also with survivability, which protects valu-
able military assets [Fir05]), and that is therefore closely related to the scope of our
work (cf. Section 1.4).
3.1.2 A framework for representation and analysis of security require-
ments engineering by Haley et al. and Moffet and Nuseibeh
This research work is based on several research papers and technical reports from the
Open University [HLMN08, HMLN06a, MHN04], also in collaboration with University
of York [MN03]. The aim of this research work is to define a framework to determine
adequate security requirements, i.e. leading to IS security goals being satisfied. The
framework emphasises three aspects:
• definitions : the framework must rely on clear definitions, mainly for the concept
of security requirement;
• assumptions : the framework must consider the assumptions made by the analyst
on the IS and its environment for defining security requirements;
• satisfaction: the framework must provide ways to determine if the security re-
quirements satisfy the security goals and if the IS satisfies the security require-
ments.
The framework implements those requirements through three contributions [HLMN08]:
• A practical definition of the concept of security requirement helping to define
precisely if the requirements are satisfied by the IS,
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• An explicit role for assumptions in the process of security requirements definition
and their satisfaction in the IS,
• The use of formal and informal proofs to validate that a system can satisfy its
security requirements.
Coming back to the definition part of the framework, it was published in [MHN04]
and later refined in [HMLN06a]. These research papers are focussed on the definition
of security requirement and some closely related concepts. The background of this
work is presented in [MN03] that is an earlier research work. It introduces more con-
cepts that are considered and studied for the definition of the framework. The concept
of risk is, for example, not introduced within the final framework [HLMN08], because
the outcome of the framework is not to define another risk management approach.
However, the concept of risk is considered during the framework elicitation and ex-
plained in [MHN04]. The framework so defined could be part of an ISSRM method,
helping to determine the security requirements in a more structured way.
On the other hand, trust assumptions were defined in [HLMN04, HLMN06]. Finally
the research work on security satisfaction arguments was published in [HMLN06b,
HMLN05]. Problem Frames [Jac01] are used within the framework as the notation for
modelling the IS and its related assumptions and then the chosen security requirements
(cf. Section 3.2.4). The whole framework was successfully applied on an air traffic
control system [HLMN08].
3.1.3 The Department of Defense Information Technology Security Cer-
tification and Accreditation Process automation framework
The DITSCAP (Department of Defense Information Technology Security Certification
and Accreditation Process) is the standard certification and accreditation process for
the Department of Defense of the USA. It proposes a process and a management
structure to certify and accredit IS, with regards to information security.
The basis statement of this research work is that this certification and accreditation
process generally provides not comparable and inconstant results [GL07]. Moreover,
the information provided is usually inadequate, and it is thus difficult for the stake-
holders to understand security risks and take the right decisions. Finally, the process is
generally long and needs many resources to conduct the different necessary activities.
The objective of this research work is therefore to improve this process of certification
and accrediation.
The result is the DITSCAP automation framework. Its objective is to be integrated,
well-defined and comprehensive with respect to the DITSCAP [LGA05]. A key compo-
nent of the framework is a problem domain ontology, built from regulatory documents,
aiming at explicating the requirements with the help of DITSCAP domain concepts.
Each requirement is explicated based on attributes that capture the goals, scenarios,
viewpoints and other domain-specific concepts. A model is proposed to explain the
relationships between security requirements and risk components, for certification and
accreditation purpose. It is used for identifying the risk components, and map them to
concepts in domain-specific taxonomies (e.g., of threats, assets, vulnerabilities, coun-
termeasures) defined within the approach. This model is an extension of the Common
54 CHAPTER 3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING
Criteria model [Com06a], including security requirements and its relationships with
the risk factors required to be considered in risk assessment [LGA05, GL07].
3.1.4 The SQUARE methodology
The SQUARE (Security Quality Requirements Engineering) methodology was pub-
lished in 2005 [MHI05, MS05] by the Networked Systems Survivability program at the
Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. It is defined as a stepwise
methodology for eliciting, categorising, and prioritising security requirements for in-
formation technology systems and applications. A lighter version of SQUARE called
SQUARE-Lite was also developed. A CASE tool to support the SQUARE process is
also currently developed.
SQUARE is based on the assumption that, in software engineering, it is largely
more costly to recover errors once the system is implemented compared to tackling
them during RE phases. Errors in requirements lead generally to increase the bud-
get of projects, to delay the project schedule, to deliver poor-quality or non-relevant
products, and even sometimes to cancel the project. Naturally, security requirements
are concerned by these assumptions. Moreover, security requirements are often ig-
nored during the requirements elicitation process and added later, incurring higher
costs. SQUARE proposes to carry out security during the early stages of software
engineering and specify security requirements in similar ways as system functional
requirements.
The SQUARE methodology is based on 9 steps summarised in Table 3.1. They
are generally performed by a RE team with security expertise in conjunction with
stakeholders of the project:
Step (1) Agree on definitions: the RE team and the stakeholders agree on the
terminology and on the definitions to be used during the whole process.
Step (2) Identify security goals: based on business goals, the security goals
to be reached are defined; they are required to identify the priority and relevance of
security requirements.
Step (3) Develop artifacts: it is necessary to collect or create some artifacts
to support the next steps and mainly the security requirements definition, like system
architecture diagrams, use/misuse cases, attack trees, etc.
Step (4) Assess risks: risks are assessed, mainly by identifying threats and vul-
nerabilities of the system and evaluating the likelihood of their occurrence.
Step (5) Select elicitation technique(s): a security requirements elicitation
technique should be selected, taking into account the number and expertise of stake-
holders.
Step (6) Elicit security requirements: the security requirements are elicited
by using the chosen elicitation technique(s); this step is considered to be the heart of
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the SQUARE process.
Table 3.1: The nine steps of the SQUARE process (as they appear in [MHI05])
Num.
Step Input Techniques Participant Output
1 Agree on definitions
Candidate definitions
from IEEE and other
standards
Structured interviews,
focus group
Stakeholders, require-
ments team
Agreed-to definitions
2
Identify security
goals
Definitions, candi-
date goals, business
drivers, policies and
procedures, examples
Facilitated work ses-
sion, surveys, inter-
views
Stakeholders, require-
ments engineer
Goals
3
Develop artifacts to
support security re-
quirements definition
Potential artifacts (e.g.,
scenarios, misuse
cases, templates,
forms)
Work session
Requirements engi-
neer
Needed artifacts: sce-
narios, misuse cases,
models, templates,
forms
4
Perform risk assess-
ment
Misuse cases, scenar-
ios, security goals
Risk assessment
method, analysis of
anticipated risk against
organisational risk tol-
erance, including threat
analysis
Requirements en-
gineer, risk expert,
stakeholders
Risk assessment re-
sults
5
Select elicitation
techniques
Goals, definitions,
candidate techniques,
expertise of stakehold-
ers, organisational style,
culture, level of security
needed, cost benefit
analysis, etc.
Work session
Requirements engi-
neer
Selected elicitation
techniques
6
Elicit security re-
quirements
Artifacts, risk assess-
ment results, selected
techniques
Joint Application De-
velopment (JAD),
interviews, surveys,
model-based analy-
sis, checklists, lists
of reusable require-
ments types, document
reviews
Stakeholders facili-
tated by requirements
engineer
Initial cut at security
requirements
7
Categorize require-
ments as to level
(system, software,
etc.) and whether
they are require-
ments or other kinds
of constraints
Initial requirements, ar-
chitecture
Work session using a
standard set of cate-
gories
Requirements engi-
neer, other specialists
as needed
Categorized require-
ments
8
Prioritize require-
ments
Categorized require-
ments and risk assess-
ment results
Prioritization methods
such as Triage, Win-Win
Stakeholders facili-
tated by requirements
engineer
Prioritized require-
ments
9
Requirements in-
spection
Prioritized require-
ments, candidate formal
inspection technique
Inspection method such
as Fagan, peer reviews
Inspection team
Initial selected re-
quirements, docu-
mentation of decision
making process and
rationale
Step (7) Categorize requirements: the elicited security requirements are clas-
sified based on a standard set of categories.
Step (8) Prioritize requirements: using a prioritisation technique, priorities
are defined for the security requirements, that could be based on a cost-benefit anal-
ysis.
Step (9) Inspect requirements: the security requirements are inspected to
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obtain accurate and verifiable security requirements.
3.2 Security-oriented modelling languages
Tackling security during the early phases of RE has been motivated in Section 1.3.
This study of security-oriented modelling languages thus focuses on approaches dealing
with early requirements. Some existing security-oriented modelling languages are thus
explicitly not considered in this work. SecureUML [LBD02] is a modelling language
helping to define access control policies. UMLsec [J04, J02] introduces a UML profile
for security, including activity diagrams, statecharts, sequence diagrams, static struc-
ture diagrams, deployment diagrams, and subsystems. Both of these UML extensions
are dedicated to late-RE and mainly design phase, and hence they are out of our scope.
This study is mainly focused on the modelling language part of the approaches. The
process aspects are quickly overviewed, with respect to the modelling parts that are
explained in greater details. As an illustration, each modelling language is presented
based on (part of) the running example (Section 1.6).
3.2.1 KAOS and its security extension
The KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification) approach consists of
a modelling language, a method, and a software environment [vLL00]. It starts in
1990 from a joint project between University of Louvain (Belgium) and University of
Oregon (USA). The objectives of KAOS are [CED03]:
• to fit problem descriptions by allowing to define and manipulate concepts relevant
to problem description,
• to improve the problem analysis process by providing a systematic approach for
discovering and structuring requirements,
• to clarify the responsibilities of all the project stakeholders,
• to let the stakeholders communicate easily and efficiently about the requirements.
The main purpose of KAOS is to ensure that high-level goals are identified and
progressively refined into precise operational statements [vL03, Let01]. These are then
assigned to component agents of the software-to-be and its environment, both forming
the so-called (composite) system-to-be. Along this process, various alternative goals
and responsibility assignments are considered until the most satisfactory solution is
chosen (Figure 3.1).
The KAOS modelling language
A global KAOS model includes four models: goal, object, agent and operation models.
The goal model is the driver of the language and it defines and refines the goals of the
system-to-be until requirements attributable to agents are found. The object model
declares the objects of interest in the application domain. It plays the same role as the
class diagram in UML [Obj04]. Then the responsibilities of agents for goals are defined
in the agent responsibility model. Complementary to the preceding model, the agent
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Figure 3.1: The goal-driven requirement elaboration process (as appears in [Let01])
interface model declares which objects are monitored and controlled by each agent.
Finally, the operation model defines the state transitions in the application domain
[Let01]. We illustrate KAOS goal and operation model through some snapshots relative
to @rchimed (Figure 3.2). We focus on the goal model, since it is the most relevant
for early requirements, and complement it with the operation model to have a more
complete view of our example. On these two diagrams, we also introduce some key
elements of the agent and object models. More information about the different kinds
of models in KAOS can be found in [Let01].
Figure 3.2 illustrates the different concepts of the KAOS modelling language on
the running example and more specifically on the establishment of structure calcu-
lation by the study office. In KAOS a goal is a prescriptive assertion that cap-
tures an objective that the system-to-be should meet. In Figure 3.2, examples of
goals are Achieve[BuildingValidated], Avoid[StructureCalculationModified-
ByCrook], and Avoid[LoginInformationKnownByCrook]. A goal can belong to one
of four patterns: maintain, avoid, achieve and cease, which declare the temporal be-
haviour categories corresponding of a goal change [Let01]:
• Achieve goals: goals requiring that some property eventually holds
• Cease goals: goals requiring that some property eventually stops to hold
• Maintain goals: goals requiring that some property always holds
• Avoid goals: goals requiring that some property never holds
In addition, goal categories provide a further goal classification helping in goal acqui-
sition, definition and refinement (e.g., Satisfaction goals are Achieve goals concerned
with satisfying agent wishes; Safety goals are Maintain goals concerned with avoiding
hazardous states; Security goals are Maintain goals concerned with avoiding threats
to the system, etc.).
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Figure 3.2: Fragment of the goal and operation model for the study office of @rchimed
A goal can be refined through G-refinement, which relates it to a set of subgoals
whose conjunction, possibly together with domain properties, contributes to the satis-
faction of the goal. For example, in Figure 3.2 the goal Achieve[BuildingValidated]
is refined to two subgoals PerformStructureCalculation, Avoid[StructureCalculation-
ModifiedByCrook], and one domain property ParametersAreReliable. A goal can
have alternative G-refinements (e.g., Avoid[StructureCalculationModifiedByCrook]),
which result in different designs of the system-to-be.
An object (e.g., DatabaseOfParameters) is a (kind of) thing(s) of interest in the
system1. Its instances can be distinctly identified and may evolve from state to state.
Objects have attributes (e.g., Materials, Surfaces, etc.), which characterise the states
of the system-to-be.
An agent (e.g., Engineer) plays a role towards a goal's satisfaction by control-
ling object behaviour. Goals are refined until they are assigned to individual agents.
A goal effectively assigned to a software agent (in Figure 3.2: PerformStructure-
Calculation) is called a requirement. A goal effectively assigned to an environment
agent is called an expectation.
1The notions of object and class seem to be merged in KAOS [vL03, Let01].
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An operation (in Figure 3.2: EnterBuildingInformation, LaunchCalculation,
and SelectContextParameters) is an input-output relation over objects. Operations
are characterised textually by domain (DomPre, DomPost) and required (RegPre, Re-
qTrig, and ReqPost) conditions [MHO06]. Whenever the required conditions hold,
performing the operations satisfies the goal. If a goal is operationalised and has a
responsible agent (e.g., PerformStructureCalculation), the latter performs the op-
erations.
KAOS extended to security
Figure 3.3: Fragment of the anti-goal and attack method model for the study office of
@rchimed
In KAOS, the concept of obstacle was first introduced [vLL00]. An obstacle to
some goal is defined as a condition whose satisfaction may prevent the goal from
being achieved. However standard obstacle analysis approach has been assessed as too
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limited to deal with malicious obstacles [vL04]. An interest has been highlighted to
clearly show the goals underlying malicious obstacle, and to model attacker agents,
their capabilities, and the vulnerabilities of the system-to-be. The reasoning behind
building such intentional models about malicious goals has also been evaluated as
relevant in order to be more exhaustive in the analysis [vL04].
KAOS extended to Security (KeS) has thus been introduced in [vL04]. Security of
the system-to-be is defined in the traditional goal model using security goals, which
concern sensitive objects. In the example (Figure 3.2) Avoid[LoginInformation-
KnownByCrook] concerns DatabaseOfParameters that could be threatened if the goal
is not respected. To identify the goals of the attacker, an anti-model composed of anti-
goals is built showing the attacker's own goals (Figure 3.3). An attacker is defined
as a malicious agent in the environment. Examples of anti-goals are Achieve[Login-
InformationKnownByCrook] and Achieve[PasswordLearntByTheUser]. Anti-requi-
rements which are terminal anti-goals assigned to the attacker (e.g., Achieve[UseSocial-
EngineeringToFindThePassword]) and vulnerabilities (represented as domain proper-
ties) assigned to the attackee (e.g., EmployeesNotSecurityAware) are also identified.
Associated object and agent anti-models can be built too.
Once the intentional anti-goal model has been built, the next step is to consider
countermeasures to the identified anti-requirements and vulnerabilities. Categories of
countermeasures are for example goal substitution, agent substitution, goal weakening,
goal restoration, anti-goal mitigation, anti-goal prevention, vulnerability protection, or
vulnerability avoidance [vL04]. The selected countermeasure decisions yield new se-
curity goals to be integrated in the models. For example, countermeasures for the
example in Figure 3.3 include vulnerability avoidance: the following security goals
Avoid[EmployeesAreNotSecurityAware] shall be added (not represented in Figure
3.2). The new security goals need to be refined until requirements and expectations are
reached. A new anti-model may be further created for new emerging security goals, if
necessary.
3.2.2 Misuse cases and Abuse cases extending Use case diagrams
Presentation of use case diagrams
Use case diagrams are part of the standard object modelling language UML defined
by the Object Management Group2 (OMG). The objective of this kind of diagram is
to capture the functional requirements of an IS, by describing the typical interactions
between the users of the system and the system itself [Fow03]. Use case diagrams are
a notation suited for early requirements, because they can be used before defining any
internal structure of the IS. It represents external behavior of the system-to-be. In
a nutshell, a use case diagram describes what the system should do and it does not
specify how it carries it out.
A use case diagram represents a set of scenarios tied together by a common goal,
like in Figure 3.4 about the running example. The figure illustrates an excerpt of the
production of construction plan. Within a use case diagram, the first concept is the
one of actor. An actor is a role that a user plays with respect to the IS. Two actors are
represented in Figure 3.4: Engineer and Drawer. Actors are related to use cases with
2http://www.uml.org
3.2 Security-oriented modelling languages 61
Figure 3.4: Use case diagram representing a fragment of the production of construction plan
association relationships, showing an interaction between an actor and a use case in
which (s)he participates. A use case is a set of actions performed by the system and
requested by the actors. It represents an objective to be fulfilled by the system-to-be,
motivated by the need of one (or several) actors. Examples of use cases are Design
3D mock-ups, Design technical plans and Establish structure calculation.
A use case can be related to another use case by an include relationship. It indicates
that the source use case is composed among other things of the destination use case.
Establish structure calculation is related in this way to Update parameters
and Collect context information. Two other relationships between use cases exist
[Pen03] (not represented in Figure 3.4). First, the extend relationship proposes an
alternative use case (end of the graphical link) of an initial one (start of the graphical
link). Its selection depends on a condition needed to be expressed. This relationship is
equivalent to the extensions of the textual descriptions of use cases, as depicted below.
Second, the generalisation relationship identifies an inheritance relationship between
actors or between use cases.
Figure 3.5: Example of use case textual description on the structure calculation establishment
(inspired from [Fow03])
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Textual descriptions are associated with a use case diagram3. They are meant
to further describe the use cases and therefore the system functionalities, but also
the interaction with the actors [Coc01]. Various textual formats exist and a typical
one is proposed in Figure 3.5, inspired from [Fow03]. It illustrates the Establish
structure calculation use case. The information provided is the goal level and the
typical steps to follow for the main success scenario. Other alternative scenarios can
be considered and are written in the extensions part. An extension within a use case
names a condition (Engineer is not on the building site) resulting, if satisfied,
in different steps from those described in the main success scenario to be performed
sequentially (Third party collects context information and Engineer inserts
the information in the application should be performed instead of Engineer
collects context information). Finally, the include relationship represented in
the graphical use case is expressed in the textual description by underlined words,
which suggest a hyperlink4.
Misuse cases
Use cases are as suited for identifying functional requirements. However, they are
generally neglect non-functional requirements, like security requirements. In such a
context, Misuse cases is introduced in 2000 [SO00, SO01], aiming at extending `tra-
ditional' use cases with negative use cases specifying the behaviors not wanted in the
proposed IS. A misuse cases diagram can be seen as a use case from the point of view
of an actor hostile to the system [Ale02]. It also has two representations: a graphi-
cal diagram (Figure 3.6) and a textual specification (Figure 3.7). Misuse cases come
with a security requirements process, which outcome is the elicitation of suited security
requirements. The process consists of the 5 following steps [SO05]:
1. Identify critical assets
2. Define security goal
3. Identify threats
4. Identify and analyse risks
5. Define security requirements
Graphical misuse cases
Misuse cases reuse the main concepts existing in use cases diagrams: actors and use
cases, coming with the associated relationships: association relationship, includes re-
lationship and extends relationship. Figure 3.6, representing a misuse cases diagram,
is therefore built on the same basis as the use case diagram from Figure 3.4. Mis-
use cases introduces new concepts related to security. The main one is misuse case
(e.g., Steal login information) which describes a sequence of actions, including
variants, which a system or other entity can perform, interacting with misusers of the
entity and causing harm to some stakeholder if the sequence is allowed to complete
3Use cases are also often complemented with other (behavioural) models in addition to text.
4In many tools it is really a hyperlink
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Figure 3.6: Example of misuse cases diagram
[SO05]. A misuser (e.g., Crook) is an actor that initiates misuse cases, either inten-
tionally or inadvertently [SO05]. Two relationships may be defined between use cases
and misuse cases. A threatens relationship targets a use case (Establish structure
calculation) that a misuse case (Steal login information) wants to harm. A mit-
igates relationship characterises how some security use cases (e.g., Perform awareness
training) can be defined as countermeasures against the misuse cases.
Textual template
Textual descriptions also play an important part when representing misuse cases [SO01,
SO05]. Two ways of expressing misuse cases textually are suggested: a lightweight
description and an extensive description. A lightweight description is an embedded
description of a textual use case (such as suggested in [KG00, Coc01, BDG05]) by
extending them with an entry called Threats. An extensive description supports a de-
tailed determination and analysis of security threats [SO01, SO05] based on a template
of fields. Figure 3.7 is an example of the entries of the extensive template as proposed
and described in [SO05].
Abuse cases
Abuse case models were proposed in 1999, motivated by the gap existing between
security specialists and software developers, having both their own supporting models
[MF99]. Like Misuse cases, it is an adaptation of the use case modeling technique
aiming at capturing and analysing security requirements in a simple way. As use cases,
abuse cases are described using use case diagrams and use case textual descriptions.
They are considered as helpful during the requirements, design and testing phases of
a security engineering process and have been used in the context of building security
assurance arguments [McD01].
Abuse case models and misuse cases diagrams are very close approaches. However,
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Figure 3.7: Example of the misuse cases template on the `Steal login information' misuse
case
abuse case is considered as complementary to misuse cases because [SO05]:
• Abuse case models focus specifically on security requirements and their relation
to design and testing (not illustrated in Figure 3.8 and 3.9), whereas misuse
cases diagrams focus on elicitation of security requirements in relation to other
requirements.
• Abuse cases do not show use cases and abuse cases in the same diagram,
contrarily to Misuse cases which also show the relations between misuse cases
and use cases.
• Abuse cases provide more details concerning actors in their textual descriptions,
whereas misuse cases descriptions are more complete than abuse case description.
The proposed process for building an abuse case model is:
1. Identify the actors
2. Identify the abuse cases
3. Define abuse cases
4. Check granularity (to be sure to have neither too many nor too few abuse cases)
5. Check completeness and minimality (to be sure each abuse case results effectively
in harm to the system and none of the critical abuse cases has been omitted)
Graphical abuse cases
An abuse case is defined as a specification of a type of complete interaction between a
system and one or more actors, where the results of the interaction are harmful to the
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Figure 3.8: Example of abuse case model
system, one of the actors, or one of the stakeholders in the system [MF99]. Exam-
ples of abuse cases are Browse building plans with hacking tools, Remote DoS5
attack and Modify structure calculation (Figure 3.8). An abuse case model thus
represents (one or more) interactions between an actor (e.g., Malicious engineer or
Crook) and the system resulting in harm to a resource associated with one of the
actors, one of the stakeholders, or the system itself. About the representation of ac-
tor and related abuse cases, the standard UML notation of actor and use case is used,
in the aim to be compliant with the existing software supporting UML (cf. Figure 3.8).
Figure 3.9: Example of textual descriptions for the Crook actor and the `Browse building
plans with hacking tools' abuse case
5Denial of Service
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Textual description
Abuse case models are completed by two textual description: actor description and
abuse case description. Concerning actors, three key characteristics have been defined
as relevant to correctly understand the abuse case model: resources (e.g., hardware
and software, available time, financial resources, etc.), skills (e.g., technical skills re-
lated to network protocols, cryptography, operating systems, etc.) and objectives (e.g.,
vandalism, theft, terrorism, etc.). An example of textual description is proposed for
Crook in Figure 3.9. Concerning abuse cases textual description, it provides infor-
mation about potential harm that will occur as a result of the abuse, privilege range
allowing the attacker to carry out this abuse, and abuse interaction proposing the
scenario underlying the abuse case. The textual description of the abuse case Browse
building plans with hacking tools is presented in Figure 3.9. This description
could also come with a diagram illustrating the path to be used by the actor to fulfil
the abuse case [MF99].
3.2.3 Mal-activity diagrams extending Activity diagrams
Presentation of Activity diagrams
Activity diagrams are also part of the UML language. The objective of this kind of di-
agram is to describe procedural logic, business process, and workflow [Obj04, Fow03].
They can be used at different stages of the IS development process, including early
requirements. Activity diagrams are often compared to flowcharts, although activity
diagrams support the modelling of parallel behavior. A complete introduction to the
syntax and semantics of activity diagrams is not necessary as a background to present
mal-activity diagrams. Figure 3.10 is a simple activity diagram introducing the basics
components.
An initial node indicates the initial state of each activity diagram. An activity is
shown as a box with round corner containing the description of the activity. Find
client, Evaluate costs and Design 3D mock-ups are examples of activities per-
formed during the process of estimates definition. The activity following a completed
activity is shown by an arrow. The arrows thus represent the flow of activities. Each
activity can be assigned to his owner, like done in Figure 3.10. Three actors are playing
a role in this process: the Sales department, the Study office and the Management.
Amerge diamond with multiple incoming arrows is used when only one of the incoming
activities shall be completed to go to the next activity. When activities shall be played
in parallel, a fork with several outgoing arrows is inserted. A join with several incom-
ing arrows shows the end of parallel activities and all of them shall be completed before
leaving the merge. In our example, if a client is found by the Sales department, then
Evaluate costs and Design 3D mock-ups should be done in parallel. The Validate
costs and mock-ups activity could only be started once both of these activities are
completed. A diamond with multiple labeled outgoing arrows represents a choice. The
expression on each arrow is the condition that should be true to be able to select this
arrow as the outgoing one. Considering the Validate costs and mock-ups activity
performed by the Management, if it is considered as satisfactory, the next activity
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Figure 3.10: Activity diagram representing a fragment of the estimates definition
will be Send to client. Otherwise, activities of Evaluate costs and Design 3D
mock-ups will be revised. Finally, the end of an activity diagram is represented by an
End node. It is necessary to note that generally, textual descriptions are provided in
activity diagrams to complete the graphical notation.
Mal-activity diagrams
Mal(icious)-activity diagrams were proposed in 2007, completing the Misuse cases
notations, by a way of modelling the behavioral aspects of security problems [Sin07].
The general way of building a mal-activity diagram is to build the normal process
and then to add the potential mal-activities against this process. It is also possible to
further add defensive processes (i.e. mitigation activity) to the diagram (cf. Figure
3.11). The syntax and semantics of ordinary activity diagrams is kept, and some
extra-concepts are added:
• Malicious activities, represented with black filled activity icons;
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Figure 3.11: Mal-activity diagram illustrating a Trojan horse attack
• Malicious actors, represented as the inverse of normal actors (i.e. white text
on black background);
• Malicious decision boxes, shown as black diamonds and used when a decision
is made with a malicious purpose.
Figure 3.11 is an example of a mal-activity diagram inspired by those of [Sin07].
It represents the process performed for a Crook (i.e. the malicious actor) to attack
the organisation with the help of a Trojan horse. The first malicious activity of the
attacker is to Send Trojan horse by e-mail. Then an Employee will Receive the
malicious mail and based on his decision to open or to delete the e-mail, the malware
will be installed if the latter is chosen. The Crook is then able to Browse employee's
computer. Depending on the presence of confidential data on the employee's computer,
the malicious decision indicates the ability of the Crook to Collect confidential
data. A way of representing mitigation options is also proposed in the mal-activity
approach. On the right hand side of Figure 3.11, the mitigations are shown in a column
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separated from the mal-activity process by a dotted line and inserted into the attack
process with dashed arrows. A new actor, the security officer, is added, and the
proposed mitigation activities are to Enable mail filtering before Receive the
malicious e-mail and to Enable anti-malware before Run silent installation.
3.2.4 Abuse frames extending Problem frames
Problem frames were introduced in 1995 in the book Software Requirements & Spec-
ifications [Jac95]. The purpose of the problem frames is to provide an approach to
understand and describe real world software-intensive problems [CHR05]. It empha-
sises problems over solutions and provides tools that support the understanding of a
problem. This graphical notation is used for structuring a system development prob-
lem as a set of sub-problems with each sub-problem represented as a problem frames
diagram. Through the problem frames notation, each sub-problem can be analysed
individually. Problem frames are especially used within the framework of Haley et al.
and Moffett and Nuseibeh, presented in Section 3.1.2. A complete description of the
problem frames approach and its notation is provided in [Jac01].
The Problem frames modelling language
A context diagram represents the context of a problem by capturing the character-
istics and interconnections of the parts of the world the problem is concerned with
[CHR05]. Context diagrams typically include domain descriptions (the world) that
describe the environment of the system to be built, and descriptions of their shared
phenomena. Problem domains are represented by plain rectangles and phenomena
shared between two domains are represented by an annotated line connecting the two
domains. Phenomena can be, for instance, events, states or commands. Domains are
generally (but not necessarily directly) in contact with the machine to be built, and
shared phenomena may exist between domains and the machine. A rectangle with
two double vertical stripes represents the machine to be developed. The machine to
be built in Figure 3.12 is a Mock-ups displayer. Maps and Monitor are part of the
problem domain. The Maps share with the Mock-ups displayer the data necessary
to build a movie, played on the Monitor.
A problem frames diagram is built by the addition of a requirement to the context
diagram, represented by a dashed oval. Figure 3.12 gives a simple example of a prob-
lem frame diagram by adding the requirement Display mock-ups. The dashed lines
connecting the oval to a problem domain represent a requirement reference; that is,
the requirement refers to certain phenomena of the problem domain. It is necessary
to note that no distinction is made between a problem frame expressing a security
requirement and those expressing other kinds of requirements.
Abuse frames
The Abuse frames approach emerged from the observation that most of the techniques
developed by the security engineering community have mainly focused on design and
implementation issues. However it seems to be as important to precisely define and
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Figure 3.12: Problem frames diagram representing a Maps displayer
analyse the security requirements, coming with a systematic approach to define suit-
able problem boundaries in order to provide a focus for early security threat analysis
[LNI+03b]. Abuse frames aim at supporting the reasoning on security during the early
stages of the development process, mainly by correctly defining the system boundaries.
This helps in 1) finding non-trivial security vulnerabilities and 2) analysing security
threats and derive security requirements [LNIJ04].
Abuse frames build on the principles of Problem frames to analyse security threats
and vulnerabilities and derive security requirements in a bounded context. This ap-
proach introduces two new concepts: anti-requirements [CILN02] and abuse frames.
An anti-requirement is defined as the requirements of users with malicious intent,
that is, an anti-requirement specifies the undesirable phenomena in the system that
must be prevented from happening. The concept of anti-requirement is thus close to
the one of anti-goal in KAOS. Anti-requirements are incorporated into abuse frames
to represent the notion of a security threat imposed by malicious users in a particular
problem context [LNI+03b, LNI+03a, LNIJ04]. The notation of Problem frames is
adopted in the abuse frames, although each domain is now associated with a different
meaning (Figure 3.13):
• The Machine domain contains the vulnerabilities that the malicious user exploits
to achieve the attack (although, of course, other kinds of attacks on other domains
are possible).
• The Asset domain identifies the asset under attack.
• The Malicious user domain having an anti-requirement defines the threat agent.
• The phenomenon represented by the dashed arrow describes the undesirable phe-
nomenon in the asset domain during an attack [LNI+03b].
In Figure 3.13, the example shows a Trojan horse used by an Attacker harming the
Mock-ups displayer. The anti-requirement Movie interception indicated by the
dashed oval, specifies the observable and undesirable phenomena acting on the asset as
the result of the interaction between the Trojan horse and the Mock-ups displayer.
3.2 Security-oriented modelling languages 71
In cases where the threat is realised without the active participation of a malicious
user, the malicious user domain may be omitted in the diagram. To show that a threat
is realisable, an abuse frame argument is constructed. It should demonstrate that the
anti-requirement is satisfied by a sequence of interactions of domain phenomena.
Figure 3.13: Example of abuse frames diagram
The process applied for abuse frames elaboration is composed of four main steps
[LNIJ04]:
1. Scoping the problem and identify the subproblems: from the initial problem
statement, identify the sub-problems and define their problem frames diagrams.
The security concerns are described as security constraints on the functionality
to be achieved in each problem frame diagram.
2. Identifying the threats and constructing abuse frames: the initial anti-requirements
can be obtained by negating the security constraints on the problem frames. The
identified anti-requirements are then captured in abuse frames to represent the
threat to the system context bounded by the problem frame diagram.
3. Identifying security vulnerabilities: from the abuse frame diagram, identify the
security vulnerabilities as the properties in terms of the behaviours of the do-
mains for which the anti-requirement can be `existentially' satisfied. An anti-
requirement only needs to occur once for the system to be insecure.
4. Addressing security vulnerabilities: security vulnerabilities identified will need to
be addressed appropriately by design decisions that should preserve the security
properties.
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It is recommended to play this process in a twin-peaks style [Nus01], i.e. to iteratively
review vulnerabilities of the architecture emerging from new security requirements pro-
posed (and hence provide new problem descriptions), thereby progressively increasing
the requirements and architectures level of detail.
3.2.5 Secure Tropos and Tropos Goal-Risk framework
The i* framework
Work on the i* framework started in the first half of the 90's at the University of
Toronto. Its motivation came from the observation that most of the existing modelling
framework tend to focus on processes, and thus concentrate on answering the what
or the how of the processes (e.g., what are the different steps of the process, how to
perform them, etc.). The objective of the i* framework is to have an understanding
of the why questions underlying the IS requirements. It provides a view of the
organisational environment, helping to make tradeoffs among the alternatives based
on the motivations and interests of process participants, before going further in detailed
specification of what the system should do. i* is thus meant to support early phases
of RE [Yu96, Yu97]. It is necessary to note that, according to [LSS+08, ACC+05],
several definitions of the language have been formulated. For example, we can cite
GRL (Goal-oriented Requirement Language) [LY01] influenced by the NFR framework
[CNYM00], or Tropos (summarised in the next section) that are both strongly based
on i* , but varying in the modelling language. The i* framework defined in this section
is the one proposed by Yu [Yu96, Yu97]. Not all of the existing i* modelling constructs
are presented, but only these that are necessary to have a global understanding of the
framework and that are relevant with regards to our work.
Two modelling components are part of i* . The first one, called Strategic Depen-
dency (SD) model, describes a process in terms of intentional dependency relation-
ships among agents [Yu96]. Note that the i* models are usually incomplete; only
items of strategic interest regarding the concern of the model are included. The top
part of Figure 3.14 shows first a SD model illustrating the estimates definition ac-
tivity. The different departments playing a role in estimates definition (i.e. Study
office, Administration, Sales department and Management) are represented as
actors. Moreover, the Clients, even external to the company, are represented in
the model because playing a role in terms of dependency relationships for the repre-
sented activity. These actors have dependencies between them, in terms of goals to
be achieved, tasks to be performed, and resources to be provided. For example, the
Sales department (depender) depends on the Study office (dependee) for achiev-
ing Calculate structure, and furnishing Technical plans and 3D mock-ups. On
the other hand, the Study office depends on the Sales department for Manage
project. Note that a task is selected (and not a goal) only when the depender has
already made decisions about how the task is to be performed. The last type of de-
pendency is the softgoal dependency. It differs from the goal dependency because a
softgoal does not have clear-cut criteria of satisfaction (goals are said to be satisfied
while softgoals are said to be satisficed according to the terminology introduced in
[MCY99, CNYM00]). Here the Management depends on the Study office to have
Documents of quality that is a non-functional goal requested by the management.
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Figure 3.14: Example of i* models illustrating the estimates definition
The second modelling component of i* is called Strategic Rationale (SR) model
[Yu96]. It describes the reasoning that each (inside) actor makes about its goals and
its relationships with other actors. The bottom part of Figure 3.14 shows the internal
activities of the Study office to achieve the Calculate structure goal (that is
only part of the complete associated SR model). First, two different means of achieving
this goal are proposed: to perform calculation By hand or By a tool. They are linked
to the parent goal by means-end links, expressing the multiple and alternative ways of
achieving it. For the second proposal, the task is further decomposed into sub-tasks
with task decomposition links. Finally contribution links (which can be negative or
positive) describe the impact that one element has on another. In our example, we
claim that structure calculation performed by a tool will improve the quality of the
documents.
With regards to security, Liu et al. propose to analyse security and privacy with i*
models [LYM02, LYM03]. First, security concerns are represented through softgoals,
attacker through actors and their attacks through tasks. Then, countermeasures are
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represented through tasks.
The Tropos methodology
The motivation behind Tropos was that no work had been done on requirements
analysis for agent-oriented systems. Tropos has proposed a software development
methodology aiming at bridging this gap and helping to describe both the organisa-
tional environment of a multi-agent system and the system-to-be. It builds on the i*
framework for modelling early and late requirements, architectural and detailed de-
sign. Tropos brings also a formal specification language called Formal Tropos. Formal
verification and validation techniques, such as model checking, are used to validate the
adequacy and accuracy of i* models [FMPT01].
The proposed methodology covers the four steps below [BGG+04, CKM02]. The
implementation stage can then take place, generally (but not necessarily) based on an
agent-oriented programming platform:
• Early requirements, concerned with the understanding of a problem by study-
ing its organisational setting. The output of this phase is an organisational model
which includes relevant actors, their respective goals and their interdependencies.
• Late requirements, where the system-to-be is described within its operational
environment, along with relevant functions and qualities. The system is repre-
sented as an actor which has dependencies with the actors identified during the
previous step.
• Architectural design, where the system's global architecture is defined in terms
of sub-systems, interconnected through data, control and other dependencies.
Sub-systems are represented as actors and data/control relationships as depen-
dencies.
• Detailed design, where behavior of each architectural component is defined in
further detail. In this step, elements of the Agent UML formalism [BMO00] are
used to complement the i* features.
It is necessary to note that some concepts are modified or added to the initial i*
modelling language (e.g., task is sometimes called plan; capability of the actors and
belief, which represents actor knowledge of the world, are added; etc.). For further
details the reader can refer to [LSS+08, ACC+05].
Secure Tropos
Although the Tropos methodology partially allows to tackle security by modelling
non-functional requirements (like security requirements) as softgoals, some limitations
have been highlighted regarding the support of security by Tropos [Mou04]:
• The concepts available in Tropos have been considered as not suited to capture
constraints imposed to some actors of the organisation, like security constraints.
Moreover, the use of softgoals for representing all of the non-functional require-
ments does not allow to distinguish the security requirements from other types
of requirements of the system.
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• The Tropos process remains vague regarding the definition of security require-
ments and how they influence the steps of the process. Moreover, the relations
between security requirements definition and the modelling activities are not
expressed.
• Tropos fails to provide a process that allows developers to evaluate the proposed
design regarding security.
Figure 3.15: Example of Secure Tropos diagrams illustrating the Estimates definition
Considering these limitations, some concepts and modelling activities related to
security have been added to Tropos under the form of an extension called Secure Tro-
pos [GMZ07, MG09, MG04, MGMP02, MGM03a, MG07a]. Regarding the modelling
language, Figure 3.15 summarises the main extensions brought by Secure Tropos in
the strategic dependency and strategic rationale models, called now security-enhanced
actor model and security-enhanced goal model. For simplicity, we have restricted our
example to the analysis of the Study office, Sales department and Client actors
and their respective dependencies identified in Figure 3.14.
The first concept added is security constraint. A security constraint is defined as a
restriction related to security issues, such as privacy, integrity and availability, which
can influence the analysis and design of the system under development by restricting
some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the requirements of the
system, or by refining some of the system's objective [MGM05]. As examples, we
have proposed in Figure 3.15 two security constraints related to our running example.
The first one is for the Sales department to Keep the estimates private. The
second one states that the Study office should Keep integrity of calculation
(related to structure calculation). A secure dependency is defined as a dependency
involving a security constraint between two actors. The security constraint must be
satisfied either by the depender, the dependee, or both of them (in this case we speak
about double secure dependency). In our example, Keep the estimates private
must be satisfied by the Sales department and Keep integrity of calculation
by the Study office.
During further actor analysis, the security constraints internal to each actor are
related to these goals/tasks/resources by the use of constraint link. In the example,
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during the analysis of the Study office actor, we have related to this actor the secu-
rity constraint Keep integrity of calculation (cf. right part of Figure 3.15). It is
a security constraint that restricts the task By tool, specialising the goal Calculate
structure. To satisfy security constraints, we use secure entities. Secure entities
are secure goals, tasks or resources of the system that can be defined as traditional
goals, tasks and resources, but related to the security of the IS [MG09]. In the ex-
ample, we have introduced the secure task Perform manual verification, that has
a positive contribution to the identified security constraint. Regarding the modelling
framework, security constraints and secure entities are specified by a (S) label before
the name of the entity (Figure 3.15). Finally, secure capabilities can be identified for
each actor/agent to achieve a secure goal, carry out a secure task and/or deliver a se-
cure resource. In our example, the study office should have someone able to manually
check the structure calculations to perform the secure task.
Figure 3.16: Example of security reference diagram
Identifying the security requirements during the early phases of RE being a difficult
task, the security reference diagram has also been introduced to help the developers.
First of all, the security features or protection properties of the system-to-be are con-
sidered. In our example (Figure 3.16), we select the Confidentiality security feature.
The security features are represented under the form of softgoals. Then the protection
objectives are identified as goals. They are defined as a set of principles or rules that
contributes towards the achievement of the security features [MG09, MG07a]. Access
control is a protection objective having a positive contribution to Confidentiality.
The protection objectives are further satisfied through security mechanisms. For ex-
ample, Authentication and Authorisation help to fulfill the Access control ob-
jective. Finally, threats represent circumstances that have the potential to cause loss
or problems related to the security features of the system-to-be. Remote spying is an
instance of threat, associated to Confidentiality by a negative contribution.
Considering the process provided by Tropos, security constraints and secure entities
modelling are generally done during the early requirements phase for the actors, and
during late requirements for the system-to-be [MG09]. However, the designer can
decide himself which activity must be employed at which stage of the IS development
[MG07a]. The security reference diagram is also constructed during the initial stages
of the IS development [MG07a]. However, it can be used as a reference throughout
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the development process proposed by Tropos.
Within Secure Tropos, a last relation called attacks link is introduced in the mod-
elling framework. This relation is not used during the RE phases of Tropos, but used
during the design phase of the system under development, within the Security attack
scenario diagram. It is a kind of model representing the actors of the IS with possible
attackers. The attacks link starts from an attacker's goal and ends to the attacked
entity. Finally, Secure Tropos also introduces a set of concepts related to trust (e.g.,
delegation, ownership, etc.) [MG07a, GMZ07] but they are not studied in depth in
our research work.
Tropos Goal-Risk framework
The Tropos Goal-Risk (GR) framework is another Tropos extension that considers the
concept of `risk' [AG06, AGMZ07, AGMS07, ABG07]. Its objective is to assess the
risk of uncertain events over organisation strategies and to evaluate the effectiveness
of treatments [AMSZ08]. Regarding our scope, it is necessary to note that the range
of risks supported by Tropos GR framework is not focused on IS security. It is open
to risk in general, taking place in different domains at the level of an organisation, like
risk in project management or financial risk. Compared to risk management processes
proposed by standards [AS/04, ISO08], the Tropos GR framework mainly focusses on
risk assessment and treatment steps [AMSZ08].
Figure 3.17: Example of Goal-Risk model
The framework first adds three layers to the Tropos modelling framework: goal,
event and treatment [AGMZ07, AMSZ08]:
• The Strategy (or Goal) layer analyses strategic interests of the stakeholders;
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• The Event layer analyses uncertain events along with their impacts to the
strategy layer;
• The Treatment layer analyses treatments to be adopted in order to mitigate
risks.
Two new entities are also proposed in the Tropos GR models: event and treatment.
Events (depicted as pentagons) are used in the event layer to model uncertain circum-
stances that can affect goals or tasks in the strategy layer. Treatments are represented
under the form of tasks and aim at mitigating such events, in order to make risks
acceptable to all actors. Goals, events and treatments are decomposed by AND/OR
relationships. They are also related with the help of four different kinds of contribu-
tion relations: strong positive (++), positive (+), strong negative () and negative (-)
contribution.
With this framework, risk analyses can be performed at the level of an organisation,
with its set of actors, and also further, beyond the rationale of single actors. The ex-
ample of Figure 3.17 illustrates part of the global organisation of the running example,
without specifying the actors (for simplicity), as it is allowed in GR models [AG06,
ABG07]. In the Strategy layer, the root goal is Define estimates. This goal is com-
posed of three sub-goals that should all be performed (AND-relationship): Calculate
structure, Evaluate costs and Draw technical plans and 3D mock-ups. Two
different and alternative manners (OR-relationship) of performing costs evaluation
are proposed: Perform a global evaluation or Perform a precise evaluation.
Two events are proposed in our example: Error in evaluation impacting Perform a
global evaluation (strong negative) and Inaccurate plans impacting Draw technical
plans and 3D mock-ups (negative). Finally two treatments are proposed (Figure
3.17): Validate costs evaluation by managementmitigating Error in evaluation
and Use standard tool for plans drawing strongly mitigating Inaccurate plans.
The outcome of a Tropos GR model is the assessment of the level of satisfaction or
denial of goals. Each of the constructs of a model can have two attributes, SAT and
DEN, representing respectively their satisfaction and denial value (not evaluated on
our example). These values are qualitatively represented in the range of Full, Partial,
None. Contribution relations represent the impact of a construct over another and
propagate the SAT or DEN attribute (or both of them).
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter summarises contributions in software and security engineering related
to our research work. First, we have investigated several frameworks dealing with
security engineering during RE phases (Section 3.1). These frameworks introduce
security concepts and terminology or are built upon a risk-based approach. In a
second step, we have presented the set of security-oriented modelling languages, our
focus being on the early phases of RE (Section 3.2).
The main conclusion is that the use of a risk-based approach for defining suited
security requirements during IS development is still an open research question. Risk-
based approaches have been introduced in computer science for a while [Boe91], but the
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Table 3.2: Summary of the software and security engineering state of the art
Reference
Security oriented Risk-based RE approach Model-based
approach approach
Firesmith ++ + ++ -
Haley et al. and Moffet and
Nuseibeh
++ + ++ -
DITSCAP automation
framework
++ ++ ++ -
SQUARE ++ ++ ++ -
KAOS extended to security ++ - ++ ++
Misuse cases ++ - ++ ++
Abuse cases ++ - ++ ++
Mal-activity diagrams ++ - ++ ++
Abuse Frames ++ - ++ ++
Secure Tropos ++ - ++ ++
Tropos Goal-Risk Frame-
work
- ++ ++ ++
Legend:
++: Completely covered and at the core of the document
+: Partially covered or not playing a central role
-: Not covered
connection between security risk management methods or standards and IS develop-
ment is still an emerging domain. Some research work proposes conceptual frameworks
that help to deal with security risk during RE [Fir03, HLMN08, GL07]. Others propose
a RE process taking care of RM [MHI05]. Finally, many modelling languages are sup-
porting security during the RE stages [SO05, MF99, Sin07, LNIJ04, MGMP02, vL04]
but are not connected to RM. Tropos GR framework [AG06] is the only one that
clearly considers the concept of risk. However, it remains a generic framework, not
dedicated to security and its conceptual specificities. Our summary table (Table 3.26)
shows thus that no existing approach is tackling all of our four objectives (Section
1.1).
Moreover, security-oriented modelling languages generally have their own viewpoint
of IS security and may thus be used in a complementary manner in an IS development
project. However, they are built on different terminologies and conceptual models and
it is thus difficult to switch from one to the other. It can be helpful to have a central
ontology to make the link between all of these languages at the level of security.
The aim of the next chapter of this thesis is therefore to propose a domain model
of ISSRM. It will first determine what are the concepts that should be present in a
modelling language supporting ISSRM. Second it will help to introduce interoperability
between the existing security-oriented modelling language. The domain model will
indeed be used as a reference for aligning the concepts of each language.
6By Completely covered for Risk-based approach, we don't mean the concept of risk is only considered
in the approach, but really that the underlying process/method is based on a risk management approach.
For example, the concept of risk is mentioned in Firesmith's or Haley's works, but the underlying proposed
approach doesn't propose any risk analysis/assessment/management process to define the security require-
ments.
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3.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we studied approaches related to security RE. First, we presented
different security RE frameworks. Second, an overview of security-oriented modelling
languages was proposed. We ended this chapter by conclusions with regards to this
survey.
In the next chapter, we start our contribution on ISSRM modelling. We introduce
a research method, and follow it, to define the ISSRM domain model. This domain
model presents the concepts to be integrated in an ISSRM modelling language.
Part II
An Information System Security Risk
Management Modelling Framework
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Chapter 4
Information System Security Risk
Management Domain Model
T he various approaches related to our objectives have been presented in the previouspart: first the ISSRM standards and methods, and second the RE frameworks and
modelling languages related to security. Based on these sources, we now answer our
first research question: what are the concepts that should be present in a modelling
language supporting ISSRM ? The outcome of this work is the ISSRM domain model.
This domain model will first be used as the syntactic and semantic reference for the
security-oriented modelling languages comparison, with regard to the ISSRM domain.
Moreover, the introduction of an ISSRM domain model will help to provide an unified
terminology between the different ISSRM approaches, and therefore will help to go
towards a common understanding of the domain and its concepts. For example, a
method like SQUARE [MHI05, MS05], needing to agree on ISSRM definitions as a
preliminary work, can use our domain model as the artefact for catching and agreeing
about the concepts of ISSRM and their definitions. Finally, the introduction of a model
to present the concepts of ISSRM will improve the documentation usually provided in
the literature, and will help to catch the different concepts.
Section 4.1 presents the research method applied to define the ISSRM domain
model. The various sources considered relevant to this definition are summarised in
Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the first step of the research method, about concept
alignment, and its results; then Section 4.4 addresses the second step of the research
method, and proposes the ISSRM domain model and its construction. The chapter
ends with Section 4.5 discussing conclusions and limitations of the domain model.
4.1 Research method
In order to answer the research question in a structured way, we suggest a research
method to follow. The research method is presented in Figure 4.1. It is inspired from
the methods of conceptual graph construction, in the sense it is based on syntactic
and semantics analysis [Sow76, LMFGL05, HD05]. Our research method consists of
two steps:
Step 1  Concept alignment. First, we investigate the state of the art in ISSRM.
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Figure 4.1: Research method applied for the ISSRM domain model definition
The main goal is to identify the core concepts of the domain and harmonise the ter-
minology. Basically, we extract the relevant concepts through a systematic analysis of
ISSRM sources, and then align them semantically. By systematic, we mean exhaustive
and reproductible, in the sense we analyse all of the selected sources and in the same
manner. The main results of this step are:
• A concept alignment table that highlights the core concepts of the various ap-
proaches and indicates synonymy or other semantic similarity relationships when
approaches use different terms (cf. Section 4.3);
• Glossaries of the terms as found in the different sources. They are listed in
Appendix A and classified according to the analysed source.
To get a comprehensive view of ISSRM approaches, we base this step on a survey
of the literature (Section 4.2) consisting of five main families of sources:
1. Risk management standards (cf. Section 2.2),
2. Security-related standards (cf. Section 2.3),
3. Security risk management standards (cf. Section 2.4),
4. Security risk management methods (cf. Section 2.5),
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5. Security Requirements Engineering (RE) frameworks (cf. Section 3.1).
Security-oriented modelling languages are not addressed in this step. In Chapter 6,
we will apply our domain model to analyse them.
In each considered source, we only gather the (parts of) sentences that are 1)
interesting regarding the semantic of the concept 2) non-redundant with regards to
elements and information already gathered for this source. The concept alignment
is not a streamlined process. This step is performed in an iterative and incremental
manner with successive refinements of the table coming with deeper understanding of
the semantics of the concepts.
Moreover, the relationships between the identified concepts are identified in this
step too. Based on the survey of the literature, we used the same iterative elicitation
approach as for concepts.
Step 2  Construction of the ISSRM domain model. Based on the outcomes of
step 1, we define a conceptual model of the ISSRM domain as a UML class diagram
presented in Section 4.4. UML class diagram [Obj04] is chosen to represent our con-
ceptual model, because this notation is widespread and expressive enough to represent
the concepts and the relationships (with their properties) of our model. First, we
choose a name for each identified concept. Then, for each concept is given a definition
in a separate glossary. The definitions are obtained by reusing and, if needed, improv-
ing the most relevant definitions found in step 1. Last activity was the definition of
the relationships between the concepts, derived from those observed in the analysed
literature.
If a new source is needed to be taken into account, or in case of comments/feedbacks
on the domain model, the process is started again from the survey of the literature.
The concept alignment is thereby completed or revised, leading to potential updates
of the ISSRM domain model.
4.2 Survey of the literature
The first step of the research method is grounded in a literature survey, including five
families of sources that fully support our research scope  IS security risk management.
All of them are presented in the first part of this thesis (Part I) and their studied version
is the one presented in this state of the art. We quickly recall them in this section.
The first family is that of RM standards. They are high-level references presenting
general RM upon which are built domain specific RM approaches.
• ISO/IEC Guide 73 [ISO02b]: This guide defines the RM vocabulary and guide-
lines for use in ISO standards. It mainly focuses on terminology, which is of great
interest with respect to our research method.
• AS/NZS 4360 [AS/04]: This joint Australian/New-Zealand standard provides a
generic guide for RM. The document proposes an overview of RM terminology
and process.
The second family of sources consists of (IS/IT) security-related standards. The se-
lected documents often contain a section that concerns security-specific terminology.
Sometimes some RM concepts are also mentioned.
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• ISO/IEC 13335-1 [ISO04b]: This standard is the first of the ISO/IEC 13335
guidelines series that deals with the planning, management and implementation
of IT security. This part is about concepts and models of IT security that may
be applicable to different organisations.
• Common Criteria [Com06a]: The Common Criteria (standardised in version 2.3
by ISO/IEC 15408) provides a common set of requirements for the security func-
tions of IT products and systems and for assurance measures applied to them
during a security evaluation. The first part entitled Introduction and general
model is important with respect to our research scope.
The third family concerns security RM standards, thus dealing with standards precisely
in our scope.
• ISO/IEC 27001 [ISO05b]: The objective of this standard is to provide a model
for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining
and improving an ISMS, that is the part of the overall management system of an
organisation concerned by information security. The terminology related to an
ISMS is provided in this reference.
• ISO/IEC 27005 [ISO08]: This standard is a guideline associated to the ISO/IEC
27001 standard, explaining how to perform information security risk management
with regards to the ISO/IEC 27001 requirements.
• NIST 800-27 Rev A [SHF04] / NIST 800-30 [SGF02]: Within the series of pub-
lications proposed by the NIST, the 800-series is about computer security. In
this series of publications, NIST 800-27 and NIST 800-30 are relevant to the
scope proposed in Section 1.4. Terminology and concepts are provided by these
standards and are compliant with one another.
• The IT-Grundschutz [Bun05b, Bun05d]: This German standard is composed of
several complementary documents aiming at managing security, from a stan-
dard security level to a more fine-tuned security management based on risks.
Security RM methods is the fourth family of sources. As explained in Section 2.5, we
select a representative subset of ISSRM methods. Most of the methods are supported
by a software tool, but we will focus only on their methodological part.
• EBIOS [DCS04b]: The EBIOS method is developed and maintained by the DC-
SSI in France.
• MEHARI [CLU07b]: MEHARI is a RM methodology developed by the CLUSIF
and built on the top of two other RM methods: MARION [CLU98] and MELISA
[Dir89], not maintained anymore.
• OCTAVE [AD01b]: OCTAVE is an approach to information security risk evalu-
ations developed by the SEI at the Carnegie Mellon University.
• CRAMM [Ins03]: CRAMM is a RM method from UK originally developed by
CCTA in 1985 and currently maintained by Insight Consulting.
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• CORAS [VML+07]: CORAS is the result of a European project developing a tool-
supported framework, exploiting methods for risk analysis and risk assessment
of security critical systems.
Finally, the last family concerns security frameworks proposed in research publications.
These publications are extracted from the RE domain, with a focus on safety and
security.
• Firesmith [Fir03, Fir07b] presents a set of related information models that pro-
vides the theoretical foundation underlying mainly safety and security engineer-
ing. A process to effectively deal with both safety and security engineering is
proposed.
• Haley et al. [HMLN06a, HLMN08] and Moffett and Nuseibeh [MN03] propose a
framework for dealing with security requirements.
• The DITSCAP automation framework introduces a conceptual model about se-
curity requirements and risk factors [LGA05, GL07].
A last note is about SQUARE [MHI05], a stepwise methodology for eliciting, categoris-
ing, and prioritising security requirements for IT systems and applications. Although
SQUARE is focussed on security RE and suggests to use an ISSRM approach to elicit
security requirements, it is not selected in this research work, because the first step of
SQUARE is about definition by the RE team and the stakeholders of the terminology
to use. SQUARE is thereby not grounded on a pre-defined terminology we could study
in this section.
4.3 ISSRM concept alignment
This section describes the first step of the research method presented in Figure 4.1.
Based on the literature identified in Section 4.2, ISSRM concepts are identified and
aligned in a table. The relationships linking the identified concepts are also identified.
The section ends with conclusions about the concept alignment.
4.3.1 Concepts to consider
The first task of the concept alignment is to define the range of concepts to study. The
core concept to consider is the one of risk, that is analysed in depth in the coming sub-
section. However, risk is dependent on, and related to, (i) security needs associated
with the assets and (ii) risk treatments selected, as seen in Section 2.1. Therefore,
these related concepts are naturally included into the set of concepts to consider. This
range of concepts is only a first boundary for step 1. Note that this first step is
performed iteratively, specifying incrementally the range of concepts to consider and
transform them into a defined set of concepts.
The final set of concepts elicited will be the one listed in the table, which is the
outcome of step 1. Nevertheless, the set of concepts can be reduced or increased
afterwards, in case of specific needs or new concepts needed for consideration. Then
other steps of the research method will be modified incrementally.
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4.3.2 Analysis of the concepts
In this section we illustrate our approach by reporting on the analysis of the central
concept  risk  as extracted from the sources surveyed in Section 4.2. An emphasis is
placed on the definition of risk and the identification of its associated components.
Other characteristics of risk presented in its various definitions [SGF02, DCS04b,
Fir03], like, for example, its value, are not currently considered. At the opposite,
risk sub-components or related concepts are directly involved in this step. In terms of
object modelling [Obj04], the objective of this step is to identify the different `objects'
or `classes' of the ISSRM domain model. The identification of the metrics, that will
be the `properties' or `attributes' of these objects, is done in Chapter 5.
Considering the amount of sources and concepts to study, it is unrealistic to describe
in a detailed manner the concept alignment, and every iteration performed for step 1.
In this section, we present only the first iteration of step 1. Further activities involve
other iterations, in order to review and improve the results.
Risk management standards
ISO Guide 73 gives the following definition of risk:
Risk: combination of the probability of an event and its consequence. [ISO02b, p. 2]
The AS/NZS 4360 source proposes a very close definition in its glossary:
Risk: the chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives.
NOTE 1: A risk is often specified in terms of an event or circumstance and the consequences that may
flow from it. [AS/04, p. 4]
Both sources show that a risk is composed of two related elements: a cause, called
event or something happening ; and a consequence, also called impact. This considera-
tion is valid to all the risk domains. Next we compare both definitions with the ones
from the security domain. Our purpose is a further refinement of our analysis.
Security-related standards
In ISO/IEC 13335, risk is defined in the glossary in terms of three involved concepts:
Risk: the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets and
thereby cause harm to the organisation. [ISO04b, p. 2]
The analysis of this definition shows that it is compliant with RM standards be-
cause risk is always composed of a cause and a consequence component. However
the definition introduces some new concepts: the cause of the risk is presented as the
combination of threat and vulnerability, and the consequence is called harm (cf. Table
B.1 in Appendix B).
CC defines risk incrementally:
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- These threats therefore give rise to risks to the assets, based on the likelihood of a threat being
realised and the impact on the assets when that threat is realised. Subsequently countermeasures are
imposed to reduce the risks to assets. These countermeasures may consist of IT countermeasures
(such as firewalls and smart cards) and non-IT countermeasures (such as guards and procedures).
- A threat consists of a threat agent, an asset and an adverse action of that threat agent on that asset.
- Threat agents are entities that can adversely act on assets. Examples of threat agents are hack-
ers, users, computer processes, TOE development personnel, and accidents. Threat agents may be
further described by aspects such as expertise, resources, opportunity and motivation.
- Adverse actions are actions performed by a threat agent on an asset. These actions influence one
or more properties of an asset from which that asset derives its value. [Com06a, p. 35,53]
Here, the emphasis is placed on the concept of threat. It is defined as consisting of
sub-components: threat agent and adverse action acting on assets.
The use of the term risk in security-related standards shows that its definition is
more precise than the one proposed in RM standards, but it is nevertheless compliant
with the ones given in RM standards. Risk in security standards is the specialisation,
in the context of security, of risk in RM standards. The concept of risk is therefore
aligned between RM standards and security-related standards in the alignment table
(Table B.1). With regards to CC, the concepts of asset and countermeasure are also
introduced in the table, because they are related to risk.
Security risk management standards
In ISO/IEC 27001, the concept of risk is not present in the glossary, but in an excerpt
of the standard presenting the risk identification step, we find:
Identify the risks.
1) Identify the assets within the scope of the ISMS, and the owners of these assets.
2) Identify the threats to those assets.
3) Identify the vulnerabilities that might be exploited by the threats.
4) Identify the impacts that losses of confidentiality, integrity and availability may have on the assets.
[ISO05b, p. 4]
Regarding ISO/IEC 27005, the definition of risk, proposed in the glossary, is:
information security risk
potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets and thereby cause
harm to the organisation.
NOTE: It is measured in terms of a combination of the likelihood of an event and its consequence.
[ISO08, p. 1]
These definitions are very close and compliant in terms of concepts involved in
ISO/IEC 13335.
NIST standards also propose a different definition for risk:
Risk: The net mission/business impact considering (1) the likelihood that a particular threat source
will exploit, or trigger, a particular information system vulnerability and (2) the resulting impact if this
should occur. [SHF04, p. A-2]
In terms of involved concepts, risk is once again defined with the help of three
components that are threat source, vulnerability and impact. The concept of threat is
defined as the combination of a threat-source, its motivation (for human threat) and
threat-actions, like hacking, social engineering, or system intrusion [SGF02, p. 14].
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The IT-Grundschutz [Bun05b] is less explicit in terms of concepts involved for risk.
The emphasis is put on the value of risk.
Risk
A risk is the prediction of possible damage, often based on calculation, in a negative case (danger), or
in a positive case a possible advantage (chance). The definition of damage or advantage depends on
the benchmark values.
Risk is also often defined as the combination of the probability of the occurrence of damage and the
extent of this damage. [Bun05d, p. 45]
Like in security-related standards, security RM standards increase the precision of
the components of risk. The consequence of the risk only differs in terms of associated
label or name, sometimes called consequence, impact or harm, but the underlying se-
mantic remains the same. However, the cause of the risk is presented as a composition
of elements, which are different between the sources. We can see differences and equiv-
alences in the alignment table (Table B.1). The concept of asset is often mentioned
in the risk definition of security-related standards. However, it is sometimes asso-
ciated with the threat [ISO05b], sometimes with the vulnerabilities [ISO04b, ISO08]
and sometimes with the impact [Com06a]. A conclusion is that the concept of asset
is playing a role in the definition of a risk and should be linked with it. But more
investigation about asset is necessary to define precisely the relationship among risk,
its components and the concept of asset. At this stage it is, therefore, not included in
the alignment table. A new iteration of step 1 of the research method 4.1, focussed on
asset, will help to understand this concept and its role in the ISSRM domain.
Security risk management methods
EBIOS defines the concept of risk as:
Risk: Combination of a threat and the losses it can cause, i.e.: of the opportunity, for a threat agent
using an attack method, to exploit one or more vulnerabilities of one or more entities and the impact
on the essential elements and on the organisation. [DCS04c, p. 14-15]
This definition in terms of concepts and relationships between them is aligned
with the one of an older version of CC (v.2.3) [Com05]. Here, the cause of the risk
is called threat and it encompasses vulnerability unlike most of the ISO standards
[ISO04b, ISO05b, ISO08] that define them as related, but separate concepts and at the
same level (i.e. both composing risk). The threat in [DCS04b] is therefore composed
of multiple subcomponents like threat agent, attack method, attack, etc. Threat in
these standards has thus not the same sense as threat in EBIOS. Threat from these
standards and threat from [DCS04b] are thus not aligned in Table B.1.
In MEHARI, the absence of a glossary is an obstacle to a clear comprehension
and alignment of concepts. However, clues can be found for risk definition within the
method.
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A risk scenario is the description of a malfunction and the way in which the malfunction can happen.
The malfunction states the potential damage, or the direct deterioration caused by the malfunction,
and any indirect consequences. It is usual to speak of a risk situation, where it is understood that the
organisation is potentially exposed to such a scenario. [...]
Each scenario will therefore be described as follows:
- The type of consequence (sometimes in relation with predefined value scale)
- The type of assets implicated by the scenario (sometimes in relation with the predefined critical
resources)
- The types of causes that can lead to the risk situation. [CLU07b, p. 13-14]
In MEHARI the term risk is used less often than the term risk scenario for ex-
pressing the concept of risk. The cause and the consequence parts of the risk are well
respected. A link between risk and assets is also proposed.
OCTAVE provides the following risk definition:
Risk: [...] Risk refers to a situation where a person could do something undesirable or a natural
occurrence could cause an undesirable outcome, resulting in a negative impact or consequence.
[AD01a, p. 46]
It breaks down into three basic components: asset, threat, and vulnerability. [AD01b, p. 5]
The definition of risk and its components is the same as in CRAMM. In this source,
the risk is defined using the Figure 4.2 and followed with the definition:
Security risk: The likelihood of a system’s inherent vulnerability being exploited by the threats to the
system, leading to the system being penetrated. [Ins03, p. B-29]
Figure 4.2: Risk representation in CRAMM (adapted from [Ins03])
Three components compose the risk for OCTAVE [AD01b] and CRAMM [Ins03]:
threat, vulnerability and the consequence relative to assets. CRAMM gives a clue
in its definition of risk for defining attack with respect to a risk. It is the concrete
instantiation of the threat using the vulnerability on the target system. Attack is
therefore not in the potential domain of RM. Attack is thus not playing a role in
ISSRM. It is not taken into account in the ISSRM concept alignment table. Naturally
this definition of attack may eventually only apply to CRAMM.
Finally, the CORAS RM method proposes a definition of risk, that is highly related
to the concept of unwanted incident :
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Risk: A risk is an unwanted incident along with its estimated likelihood and consequence values.
[VML+07, p. 313-314]
Unwanted incident: An unwanted incident is an event which reduces the value of one or more of the
assets [VML+07, p. 325]
The use of the term event should not be confused with the one used in other
sources like [ISO02b, AS/04, ISO04b] designating the cause of the risk. Here event
actually denotes the impact of the risk on the organisation. Examples of unwanted
incidents are design disclosed to competitor or customer loses trust in [the company]
that is characteristic of an impact. Here, the term incident is not used to depict an
established safety problem, as it is usually the case in the literature [Fir04, Ins03]. A
risk in CORAS is defined as an impact with an associated level of potentiality and
consequence. Naturally the likelihood of the impact to occur is highly dependent on
the cause of the risk. Further analysis of CORAS also introduces elements associated
with the cause of the risk: threat, threat scenario and vulnerability.
Within security RM methods, the concept of risk is once again not universally
agreed. First, the methods reinforce the conclusion obtained from RM standards that
identify a cause and a consequence part in a risk. However a great diversity is provided
in the fine-grained definitions of risk and its components. With the new elements
obtained from the sources of security RM methods and security-related standards, a
tendency is emerging: the cause (or event) part of the risk consists of two elements
most often called threat and vulnerability.
RE security frameworks
The conceptual model introduced in the DITSCAP automation framework is an ex-
tension of the CC [Com06a] model. The concepts related to risk are assets, threats,
vulnerabilities and countermeasures, and only very brief definitions are given [GL07],
as the reader is referred to the CC. Thus, the added conceptual value of this model
with respect to the preceding sources is deemed insubstantial.
In [Fir03], Firesmith proposes a very precise definition of risk, which is split into
safety risk and security risk:
Safety risk is the potential risk of harm to an asset due to accidents. Safety risk is defined as the sum
(over all relevant hazards) of the products of the following two terms: (1) the largest negative impact
of the harm to the asset (i.e., its criticality, severity, or damage) times (2) the likelihood that the hazard
will result in an accident [. . . ] [Fir03, p. 31]
Security risk is the potential risk of harm to an asset due to attacks. Security risk is the sum (over
all relevant threats) of the negative impact of the harm to the asset (i.e., its criticality) multiplied by the
likelihood of the harm occurring [. . . ] [Fir03, p. 35]
In [MN03], Moffet and Nuseibeh were inspired by CRAMM and propose the same
figure to present risk and its components (cf. Figure 4.2) associated with the following
definitions (their proposal is reinforced by Haley et al. [HMLN06a, HLMN08]):
Threat: Harm that can happen to an asset Impact: A measure of the seriousness of a threat
Attack: A threatening event
Attacker: The agent causing the attack (not necessarily human)
Vulnerability: a weakness in the system that makes an attack more likely to succeed [MN03, p. 6]
The combination of these two last definitions of risk makes clear that the two parts
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of a risk are characterised by likelihood for the cause (here, an emphasis is done on the
`value' or `metric' of the cause, but this property is studied in Chapter 5) and impact
or harm for the consequence. Investigation of definitions and associated information
models of Firesmith shows that the likelihood of the risk depends on the likelihood
of a threat (for security domain) or hazard (for safety domain) and the existence of a
(safety or security) vulnerability.
Discussion about the concept of risk
We can draw some conclusions from this iteration of step 1 performed on the concept
of risk. First of all, a risk is composed of a cause part, generally called event, and a
consequence part, generally called impact. Second, an event is composed of a threat
and a vulnerability.
Some other concepts have been identified as related to risk (e.g., asset) . Moreover,
some information about other concepts have already been found in some risk defini-
tions (e.g., in EBIOS [DCS04b], the definition of risk indicates some components of
threat, like threat agent or attack method).
However, these conclusions come from only one iteration of step 1 on the concept
of risk. It is necessary to perform other iterations of step 1 on other concepts, but also
again on the concept of risk, to refine the preceding conclusions and elicit the other
concepts related to risk.
4.3.3 Alignment table of ISSRM concepts
After gathering the different definitions of the ISSRM-related concepts (Appendix A),
as done for the risk concept in the preceding section, alignment tables are defined
iteratively. This means that, based on the definitions of the concepts, the concepts are
semantically analysed and aligned with one another. Very often, during this alignment
work, a new concept is emerging (like the concept of asset in the preceding section),
or the definition of another concept is needed to completely understand the studied
concept (as it is done in ISO/IEC Guide 73, e.g., for event and consequence, to under-
stand what is risk). The new definition is added to the glossaries and the alignment
is incrementally completed/modified based on this new element.
This section proposes the alignment tables for the different ISSRM concepts in-
volved in the studied sources. The results are presented by family of source for clarity.
The complete alignment table is available in Table B.1 in Appendix B. At last, 14
concepts have been identified and are thus proposed here. They are numbered from
(1) to (14), but not labelled for the moment (cf. Section 4.4). The concepts are
classified by category, as in Section 4.3.1: Asset-related concepts, Risk-related concepts
and Risk treatment-related concepts. These categories have been defined with regards
to the ISSRM process, presented in Section 2.1. Asset-related concepts are concepts
focused around the asset concept and expressing what has value for the organisation
and needs to be protected. Risk-related concepts are the set of concepts used to define
the risk. Risk treatment-related concepts are the concepts used for countering the risk,
generally at different level of granularity.
The concepts that are on the same line are concepts semantically equivalent. For
example, in Table 4.1, the concept of source in ISO/IEC Guide 73 is equivalent to the
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concept of hazard in AS/NZS 4360. Source is defined as item or activity having a
potential for a consequence and hazard as a source of potential harm (consequence
and harm being also semantically equivalent). If several concepts are in the same
cell, these concepts are semantically equivalent and from the same source. For ex-
ample, as depicted in Table 4.1 for ISO/IEC Guide 73, risk treatment measure and
risk management decision are two concepts of ISO/IEC Guide 73 that are seman-
tically equivalent. Risk treatment measure is the decision of avoiding, optimizing,
transferring or retaining risk, and risk control is defined as actions implementing risk
management decision.
The reader shall note that the tables proposed in this section are the final ones,
obtained after having performed every iteration of step 1. This explains why 14 lines
are proposed in each table, that is equivalent to the final number of concepts identified
in the ISSRM domain. Sometimes, some concepts have no equivalence in the sources.
For example, in Table 4.1, the concept (1), named later asset (cf. Section 4.4), does
not have any equivalence in ISO/IEC Guide 73 and in AS/NZS 4360.
Risk management standards
In RM standards, the concept of asset is not introduced (Table 4.1). Only risk criterion
(4) is introduced for expressing how the significance of risk is assessed. As already
mentioned, risk is composed of two sub-components in RM standards: an event and a
consequence, differentiating the causal part of risk (6) from its consequence (7). The
origin of the (cause of the) risk (8) is also identified by source or hazard. Finally, two
levels of risk treatment are proposed: the first one for the decision of how to treat the
risk (12) and the second one for the concrete controls applied on the IS (14), coming
from the preceding decision.
Table 4.1: Alignment table for RM standards
Type Concept ISO/IEC Guide 73 AS/NZS 4360
Asset-
related
concepts
(1) / /
(2) / /
(3) / /
(4) Risk criterion Risk criterion
Risk-related
concepts
(5) Risk Risk
(6) Event Event
(7) Consequence
Consequence
Loss
Harm
(8) Source Hazard
(9) / /
(10) / /
(11) / /
Risk
treatment-
related
concepts
(12)
Risk treatment measure
Risk treatment measure
Risk management decision
(13) / /
(14) Risk control Control
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Security-related standards
Some new conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of security-related standards
(Table 4.2). First, the concept of asset (1) is introduced in these security-specific
standards. Then, a finer granularity is provided to define risk, i.e. new risk sub-
components are introduced, like vulnerability (9) or threat agent (10). However, these
risk sub-components are further and better explained in the next families of sources.
Finally, a new granularity level of risk treatment is introduced with CC, that is, as
explained in Section 1.5.2, equivalent to product-oriented requirement (13).
Table 4.2: Alignment table for security-related standards
Type Concept ISO/IEC 13335-1 Common Criteria
Asset-
related
concepts
(1) Asset Asset
(2) / /
(3) / /
(4) ICT security requirement /
Risk-related
concepts
(5) Risk Risk
(6) Event /
(7) Impact Impact
(8) / Threat
(9) Vulnerability Vulnerability
(10) / Threat agent
(11) Threat Adverse action
Risk
treatment-
related
concepts
(12) / /
(13) /
Countermeasure
Security objective
Security (functional) requirement
(14)
Safeguard
/
Control
Security risk management standards
Concepts used in security RM standards (Table 4.3) are better defined and more
complete with respect to security-related standards. In ISO/IEC 27001 [ISO05b] and
ISO/IEC 27005 [ISO08], the general concept of asset is split in two categories: one
related to the business of the studied organisation and the information and processes
that should be protected (2), and the other for the IS components supporting the
business activities (3). Criteria or properties are still applied on assets for allowing
the significance of the assessed risks to be expressed. In general, risk is more precisely
defined in security RM standards. There are still a causal part (6) and a consequence
(7). However, the causal part is composed of what is most often called a threat (8)
and a vulnerability (9). Sometimes, the threat is defined more finely, by differentiating
the origin or source of the threat (10) and the action performed (11). Regarding risk
treatments, two levels are generally proposed, compliant with the levels proposed in
RM standards.
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Table 4.3: Alignment table for security RM standards
Type Concept
ISO/IEC 27001 NIST 800-27 REV A The IT-Grundschutz
ISO/IEC 27005 NIST 800-30
Asset-
related
concepts
(1) Asset / Asset
(2) Primary asset / /
(3) Supporting asset / IT asset
(4)
Property
Security goal
Basic parameter
Criterion Basic IT security parameter
Risk-related
concepts
(5) Risk (IT-related) Risk Risk
(6) Event Threat Applied threat
(7)
Impact Impact
Damage
Consequence Consequence
(8) Threat Threat Basic threat
(9) Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
(10)
Threat source
Threat source /
Origin of threat
(11) / Threat action /
Risk
treatment-
related
concepts
(12) Risk treatment Risk mitigation option Decision
(13) Control / /
(14) Control Control
Safeguard
Security measure
Control
Security risk management methods
There is a great diversity between the methods in terms of number of concepts used
and name of the common concepts (Table 4.4). EBIOS and MEHARI are compliant
with ISO/IEC 27005 at the asset level, with a clear distinction between assets at
the business level and assets at the IS level. Regarding the other methods, their
support of asset is slightly different, and more focused on the IS level for OCTAVE
and CRAMM. Risk is a concept continually involved in the methods and as most of
the preceding sources, a global cause of risk is expressed as wall as a consequence, here
most often labelled impact. In each method, vulnerability is a sub-component of the
cause of the risk. The concept of threat, exploiting the vulnerability for fulfilling the
risk, is also often identified. However, in EBIOS and in some security RM standards
[SHF04, SGF02], threat is used to represent the global cause of the risk, the event
happening (concept (6)). These two meanings of threat are different. It explains the
non-alignment of threat in different sources (i.e. in EBIOS, threat is equivalent to
concept (6) and in OCTAVE or CRAMM, it is equivalent to concept (8)). In security
RM methods, EBIOS also clearly distinguishes the origin of the threat, called threat
agent and the action performed, called attack method. A specificity of security RM
methods observed at the level of risk-treatment is that the emphasis is rather put
at the level of security requirements definition (13) than at the level of decision of
treating risk (12). The control concept (14) as expressed in the different standards
[ISO02b, ISO04b, ISO05b, etc.] is kept, but its name is different, going from very
generic names (e.g., countermeasure, security solution, etc.) to more technical ones
(e.g., mechanism, protection strategic practice, etc.). A concept specific to EBIOS
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(i.e. not mentioned in any other source) has been found during our analysis. It is
called attack and represents the use of an attack method through a vulnerability. This
concept has no equivalence in the other sources and so we have considered it as non-
representative of the domain. It has so been withdrawn from the analysis table.
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RE security frameworks
Finally, the RE security frameworks (Table 4.5) are compliant with the preceding
analysis. At the asset level, the focus is on the business level for Moffet and Nuseibeh
and Haley et al. [HLMN08, HMLN06a, MHN04] and at the general level for Firesmith
[Fir03] and the DITSCAP automation framework [GL07]. Security concerns and qual-
ity subfactors are respectively used in the two former sources to assess the risks. The
global cause of risk is not introduced in these sources, but risk is already split in three
components: threat (or danger, hazard for Firesmith in [Fir03]), vulnerability (split
in safety vulnerability and security vulnerability for Firesmith in [Fir03]) and impact
or harm (not mentioned in the DITSCAP automation framework). For the origin of
risk, the focus is put on human source in the two former frameworks and the so called
attacker [HLMN08, HMLN06a, MHN04]. In Haley et al., attacker performs action.
Finally, these frameworks coming from the RE domain, security (and safety) require-
ments are at the core of these frameworks [HLMN08, HMLN06a, MHN04, GL07].
Firesmith goes further and explains the relationships between the requirements and
what he calls mechanisms, tactics, safeguards or countermeasures helping to fulfill the
requirements. In the DITSCAP automation framework, the concept of countermeasure
is introduced with respect to the CC [Com06a] model.
Discussion about the alignment tables
After identifying the different terms used in each ISSRM source, our assumption that
the terminology in the ISSRM domain is not unified has been validated. Many different
terms are used to depict the same concept. More than a dozen of different names have
been found for some concepts (concept (4), (13), (14), etc.). Sometimes, the same
name is used to depict different concepts. For example, a threat in EBIOS [DCS04b]
is composed of vulnerabilites, while a threat in some other sources composes with
vulnerabilities a concept of higher level, called event [ISO02b, AS/04, ISO04b, etc.],
cause [CLU07b], area of concern [AD01b], etc.
The alignment tables help to connect the different sources with one another. A
practitioner can need to combine several methods in a study, in order to enhance
his results. He can also need to use some methods in parallel to validate his results.
Finally, for compliance purpose, he can use a method for fulfilling the requirements
needed by a standard [ISO05b]. In all these cases, to be able to map the concepts of
two (or more) approaches is necessary. The alignment tables are an artefact providing
this capability.
4.3.4 Extraction of relationships between ISSRM concepts
After identifying and aligning concepts, it is necessary to identify the relationships
existing between them. In this section, the literature (Section 4.2) is analysed to
extract relationships between the concepts. The process used is similar to the one
applied for the elicitation of ISSRM concepts (Section 4.1). Based on the excerpts
of sentences used for concepts identification, and sometimes on some complementary
information about relationships extracted from the documents, we define relationships
between concepts.
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Table 4.5: Alignment table for RE security frameworks
Type Concept
Haley et al. Firesmith The DITSCAP
Moffet and Nuseibeh automation framework
Asset-
related
concepts
(1)
/
Asset Asset
Valuable asset
(2) Asset / /
(3) / / /
(4) Security concern Quality subfactor /
Risk-related
concepts
(5) Risk
Risk
RiskSafety risk
Security risk
(6) / / /
(7)
Impact
Harm /
Harm
(8) Threat
Danger
ThreatHazard
Threat
(9) Vulnerability
Safety vulnerability
Vulnerability
Security vulnerability
(10) Attacker Attacker /
(11) Action / /
Risk
treatment-
related
concepts
(12) / / /
(13) Security requirement
Safety requirement
Security requirement
Security requirement
(14) /
Safety mechanism
Countermeasure
Safety tactic
Safeguard
Security mechanism
Countermeasure
Elicitation of the relationship between two concepts
To illustrate the analysis of relationships, we show the definition of relationships be-
tween the concept (8) (most often called threat in the literature) and (9) (called vul-
nerability). The existence of a relationship between two concepts is not mandatory,
but after the analysis of the definitions for the concept alignment (Section 4.3.3), we
claim that these two concepts are related to one another.
In RM standards [ISO02b, AS/04], the concept of vulnerability does not exist. No
relationship between the two analysed concepts is thus noticed. Regarding security-
related standards, threat and vulnerability are related together in ISO/IEC 13335-1.
A claim is found in the definition of vulnerability :
Vulnerability: a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one or more threats.
[ISO04b, p. 3]
However, threat in this standard is not equivalent to concept (8) but to concept
(11). CC also mentions vulnerability, but this concept is not clearly related to the one
of threat (cf. Figure A.1).
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The relation between the two concepts is clearer in security RM standards. ISO/IEC
27001 and ISO/IEC 27005 relate them together respectively:
Identify the vulnerabilities that might be exploited by the threats. [ISO05b, p. 4]
Vulnerabilities that can be exploited by threats to cause harm to assets or to the organisation should
be identified (relates to ISO/IEC 27001, Clause 4.2.1 d) 3)). [ISO08, p. 12]
In NIST 800-27, it is threat source (concept (10)) that is related with vulnerability:
IT-related risk / Risk: The net mission/business impact considering (1) the likelihood that a particular
threat source will exploit, or trigger, a particular information system vulnerability and [...] [SHF04, p.
A-2]
At last for the security RM standards, in the IT-Grundschutz, vulnerability is de-
fined as:
A vulnerability can result in the manifestation of a basic threat [...] [Bun05b, p.
46]
This last definition is quite different in terms of existing relationship to the ones
already collected: it is the only one not mentioning the exploitation of vulnerabilities
by a threat.
Regarding security RM methods, EBIOS relates attack and vulnerability :
Attack: Exploiting one or more vulnerabilities using an attack method with a given opportunity.
[DCS04b, p. 11]
In MEHARI [CLU07b], no equivalence to concept (8) has been identified and more-
over, no binary relationship between any risk-related concept and vulnerability is found.
The same applies for CRAMM [Ins03], in which threat and vulnerability are only linked
by their aggregation in the risk concept (cf. Figure A.2).
OCTAVE proposes a definition for vulnerability that reinforces the link mainly
identified in security RM standards:
Vulnerability: a weakness in an information system, system security practices and procedures, admin-
istrative controls, internal controls, implementation, or physical layout that could be exploited by a
threat to gain unauthorized access to information or disrupt processing. There are two basic types of
vulnerabilities (organisational and technology). [AD01a, p. 126]
In CORAS, vulnerability is not related to concept (8), but to threat being consid-
ered as equivalent to concept (10):
A threat may exploit a vulnerability and cause an unwanted incident. [AD01a, p. 313]
In the last family of sources, RE security frameworks, Firesmith relates through his
information models [Fir03] (safety and security) vulnerability with danger/hazard/threat
(that are considered as equivalent to concept (10)). They may exploit vulnerability
to result in accident/attack. In [MN03], Moffett and Nuseibeh provide the same idea:
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For each threat, the baseline is analysed in order to identify the vulnerabilities, i.e. the means of
exploiting a threat successfully. [MN03, p. 8]
Finally, the link between threats and vulnerabilities in the conceptual model of
DITSCAP automation framework is called exploit .
As a conclusion, the final tendency is that the vulnerability is generally exploited by
one of the following concepts: (8), (10) or (11). Iterative reviews of relationships bring
up that concept (10) and (11) are in fact aggregated in concept (8) (cf. Figure 4.4).
This explains that they can all be related to vulnerability by an exploit relationship, as
it is most often the case. Considering this aggregation, the most relevant to us appears
to link concept (8) (called threat in Figure 4.4) and vulnerability with an exploit link.
Summary of the relationship elicitation
It is theoretically possible to define the same kind of alignment table for relationships
between concepts, as it has been done for concepts (Section 4.3.3). The definition of
such a table should indicate the multiplicities of each relationship. However, a first try
of such a work [Gen07] highlights some limitations. The set of possible relationships
between the concepts is huge. As seen in the preceding section, each source has its
own point of view of the relationships existing between the concepts. This point is
sometimes reinforced by the difficulty to interpret natural language. It was already
a weakness for concept alignment, but even more for relationship elicitation between
concepts. The experience [Gen07] has also shown that the utility of such a table is
severely limited, because it is really difficult to read (concept alignment is more explicit
than relationship alignment). The multiplicity introduction in such an alignment is
complex too. The main problem remains the lack of sufficient information available
regarding multiplicities. Finally, such a table is not considered as necessary for the
definition of relationships. Most of the needed information can be found in the collected
definitions, provided in Appendix A. Sometimes, it is necessary to collect some more
information (like in Firesmith's information models [Fir03]), but this case remains
rare.
In this context, a review of existing relationships has been considered as suited
to define the relationships between the concepts of the ISSRM domain model. The
review is done by analysing each source one by one and identifying every relationship
existing between the concepts of the source. Based on the definitions of the source,
every concept is analysed to see if it is linked (and how) with other concepts. The
multiplicities are defined too. This review is done iteratively, for each source of the
selected literature (cf. Section 4.2).
4.3.5 Conclusion about concept alignment and relationship identification
Regarding the outcome of the identification and the alignment of ISSRM concepts and
relationships, this research work provides a bit more formality than the different in-
formal sources studied. For each source, a conceptual model can now be defined based
on the identified concepts and relationships. Figure 4.3 shows an example of such a
model for ISO/IEC Guide 73. It represents the different concepts involved and relates
them by the identified relationships. Appendix C presents the information allowing
to define the relationships between the concepts. Since defining a conceptual model
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for each ISSRM source is neither an objective of our research work, nor a step toward
the achievement of our objectives, the models are not built for each sources. How-
ever, based on the identified concepts (Section 4.3.3) and their associated relationships
(Section 4.3.4), the different conceptual models can easily be built.
Figure 4.3: Conceptual model of ISO/IEC Guide 73
4.4 ISSRM domain model
Based on the survey performed, the first step of the research method (Figure 4.1) has
resulted with the alignment of the ISSRM concepts and the elicitation of their relation-
ships. The second step of the method includes the construction of the ISSRM domain
model. It is a conceptual model represented under the form of a UML class diagram
[Obj04], composed by the concepts identified and presented in the alignment table (Ta-
ble B.1). For each of them, a name is chosen, inspired from their name in the literature
(Section 4.4.1). A glossary is then provided with the model, giving a definition for
each concept of the conceptual model (Section 4.4.2). Finally, the concepts are linked
together based on the relationships identified (Section 4.4.3). This domain model is
further the syntactic and semantic reference for the assessment of security-oriented
modelling languages, with regards to their support of ISSRM (Chapter 6).
4.4.1 Names of the concepts
Each concept is currently represented by a number (and a line) of the alignment table
(Table B.1). We now need to define a name for each of these concepts. The proposed
names are given in Table 4.6.
The choice of names is based on different criteria. First of all, the number of
occurrences of a name for a concept in the different sources is taken into account.
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Table 4.6: Name of the concepts included in the ISSRM domain model
Type Concept Name
Asset-related
concepts
(1) Asset
(2) Business asset
(3) IS asset
(4) Security criterion
Risk-related
concepts
(5) Risk
(6) Event
(7) Impact
(8) Threat
(9) Vulnerability
(10) Threat agent
(11) Attack method
Risk
treatment-related
concepts
(12) Risk treatment
(13) Security requirement
(14) Control
Then, the terminology coming from ISO standards [ISO02b, ISO05b, ISO08] has been
considered as the most important, because it is generally the most accepted and used
vocabulary. We have also considered the coming ISO/IEC 2700x series of standards
and most specifically the ISO/IEC 27000 standard, bringing out the general tendency
in terms of ISSRM terminology. Once published, it will indeed be one of the main
reference regarding the domain and also naturally the most recent and up-to-date
standard. Finally, when sometimes existing names are considered as insufficiently
relevant or improvable, we have proposed original names. However, this case remains
rare (concept (2) and (3)).
In the next section, these concepts are ordered and related to one another under
the form of a UML class diagram. A precise definition is provided.
4.4.2 Concept definitions
The ISSRM domain model and concept definitions are ordered, as the alignment tables,
following the three major groups of concepts: (i) asset-related concepts ; (ii) risk-related
concepts ; and (iii) risk treatment-related concepts. Each concept is illustrated with the
help of examples related to the running example (Section 1.6).
Asset-related concepts describe what are the assets important to protect, and
what are the criteria to guarantee asset security. The concepts are:
Asset  anything that has value to the organisation and is necessary for achieving its
objectives.
Examples: technical plans; project management process; architectural competences;
operating system; SPOT software; Ethernet network; people encoding data; system ad-
ministrator; air conditioning of server room.
NOTE: This concept is the generalisation of the business asset and IS asset concepts.
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Figure 4.4: The ISSRM domain model
Business asset  information, process, skill inherent to the business of the organisa-
tion, that has value to the organisation in terms of its business model and is necessary
for achieving its objectives.
Examples: technical plans; structure calculation process; architectural competences.
NOTE: Business assets are immaterial.
IS asset  a component or part of the IS that has value to the organisation and is
necessary for achieving its objectives and supporting business assets. An IS asset can
be a component of the IT system, like hardware, software or network, but also people
or facilities playing a role in the IS and therefore in its security.
Examples: operating system; SPOT software; Ethernet network; people encoding data;
system administrator; air conditioning of server room.
NOTE 1: IS assets are (except software) material.
NOTE 2: Sometimes, for conducting a macroscopic analysis, it is relevant to define
as an IS asset a system composed of various IS assets, belonging to the other types
described above (e.g., a computer (hardware) with its software).
Security criterion (also called security property)  property or constraint on busi-
ness assets characterising their security needs. Security criteria act as an indicator to
assess the significance of risk. Security criteria are most often confidentiality, integrity
and availability, but sometimes, depending on the context, some other specific criteria
might be added, like authenticity, non-repudiation or accountability.
Examples: confidentiality; integrity; availability.
NOTE: The security objectives of an IS are defined by using security criteria on busi-
ness assets (e.g., confidentiality of the technical plans; integrity of the structure calcu-
lation process).
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Risk-related concepts present how the risk itself and its components are defined,
what are the major principles that should be taken into account when defining the
possible risks. The concepts are:
Risk  the combination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities leading to a neg-
ative impact harming one or more of the assets. Threat and vulnerabilities are part
of the risk event and impact is the consequence of the risk.
Examples: a cracker using social engineering on a member of the company, because of
weak awareness of the staff, leading to non-authorised access on personal computers
and loss of integrity of the structure calculation process; a thief penetrating the com-
pany's building because of lack of physical access control, stealing documents containing
sensitive information and thereby provoking loss of confidentiality of technical plans.
Impact  the potential negative consequence of a risk that may harm assets of a sys-
tem or an organisation, when a threat (or an event) is accomplished. The impact can
be described at the level of IS asset (data destruction, failure of a component, etc.) or
at the level of business assets, where it negates security criteria, like for example: loss
of confidentiality of an information, loss of integrity of a process, etc.
Examples: password discovery (IS level); loss of confidentiality of technical plans (busi-
ness level).
NOTE: An impact can provoke a chain reaction of impacts (or indirect impacts), like
for example a loss of confidentiality on sensitive information leads to a loss of customer
confidence.
Event  the combination of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities.
Examples: a cracker using social engineering on a member of the company, because of
weak awareness of the staff; a thief penetrating the company's building because of lack
of physical access control.
NOTE: Event is a generic term, used in every risk management domain, defined as
occurrence of a particular set of circumstances [ISO02b]. The definition provided in
this glossary is specific to IS security.
Vulnerability  characteristic of an IS asset or group of IS assets that can constitute
a weakness or a flaw in terms of IS security. It could be accidentally or intentionally
exploited by a threat.
Examples: weak awareness of the staff; lack of physical access control; lack of fire de-
tection.
Threat  potential attack or incident, carried out by an agent, that targets one or
more IS assets and that may lead to harm to assets. A threat is usually composed of
a threat agent and an attack method.
Examples: a cracker using social engineering on a member of the company; a thief
penetrating the company's building and stealing media or document.
NOTE: Sometimes, it is more relevant to describe a risk with a global threat, without
refining it into threat agent and attack method, like for a flood or a component failure.
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Threat agent  an agent that can potentially cause harm to assets of the IS. A threat
agent triggers a threat and is thus the source of a risk.
Examples: member of the personnel with little technical ability and time but possibly
a strong motivation to carry out an attack; cracker with considerable technical ability,
well equipped and strongly motivated by the money he could make.
NOTE: It can be characterised by its type (usually human or natural/environmental)
and by the way in which it acts (accidental or deliberate). In the case of an accidental
cause, it can also be characterised by exposure and available resources and in the case
of a deliberate cause, it can also be characterised by expertise, available resources and
motivation.
Attack method  standard means by which a threat agent carries out a threat.
Examples: system intrusion; theft of media or documents.
Risk treatment-related concepts describe what decisions, requirements and
controls should be defined and implemented in order to mitigate possible risks. The
different risk treatment-related concepts are different levels of design decisions on the
IS. The concepts are:
Risk treatment  the decision of how to treat identified risks. A treatment satisfies
a security need, expressed in generic and functional terms, and can lead to security
requirements. Categories of risk treatment decisions include:
• Avoiding risk (risk avoidance decision)  decision not to become involved in, or
to withdraw from, a risk. Functionalities of the IS are modified or discarded for
avoiding the risk;
• Reducing risk (risk reduction decision)  action to lessen the probability, negative
consequences, or both, associated with a risk. Security requirements are selected
for reducing the risk;
• Transferring risk (risk transfer decision)  sharing with another party the burden
of loss from a risk. A third party is thus related to the (or part of the) IS, ensuing
sometimes some additional security requirements about third parties;
• Retaining risk (risk retention decision)  accepting the burden of loss from a risk.
No design decision is necessary in this case.
Examples: do not connect the IS to the Internet (risk avoidance); take measures to
avoid network intrusions (risk reduction); take an insurance for covering the loss of
service (risk transfer); accept that the service could be unavailable for 1 hour (risk
retention).
NOTE: Risk treatment is basically a shortcut for risk treatment decision, according
to the state of the art.
Security requirement  a condition over the phenomena of the environment that
we wish to make true by installing the IS, in order to mitigate risks.
Examples: appropriate authentication methods shall be used to control access by remote
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users; system documentation shall be protected against unauthorised access.
NOTE 1: Risk reduction decisions lead to security requirements. Sometimes, risk
transfer decisions need some security requirements about third parties. Avoiding risk
and retaining risk do not need any security requirement.
NOTE 2: Each security requirement contributes to cover one or more risk treatments
for the target IS.
Control (also called countermeasure or safeguard)  a designed means to improve
security, specified by a security requirement, and implemented to comply with it.
Security controls can be processes, policies, devices, practices or other actions or com-
ponents of the IS and its organisation that act to reduce risk.
Examples: firewall; backup procedure; building guard.
4.4.3 Relationships and multiplicities of the ISSRM domain model
In this section, we highlight the relationships between the concepts of the ISSRM
domain model (Figure 4.4).
A risk is composed of an event and one or more impacts. The same impact can be
part of several risks, but an event identifies a given risk. A given event leads to zero (if
no relevant impact is found; in this case the event does not produce a risk) to several
impacts; an impact can be caused by many different events. Sometimes, a relevant
impact can be caused by no relevant events of risk and thereby contained in none
of the risks. For example, the disclosure of private information about users could be
seen as a relevant impact for an organisation, but because of the absence of personal
information gathering, no event leading to this impact could be realistic. Moreover, one
or several impacts can provoke some other (indirect) impacts. For instance, an impact
at the IS level of unauthorised access to a database, provokes confidential information
disclosure at the business level, leading then to loss of customer confidence and legal
penalties. In the context of IS security, the event is composed of a threat and one or
more vulnerabilities. A given threat can only be related to a given event. The threat
exploits zero to several vulnerabilities. If a threat is identified, but has no relevant
associated vulnerability (e.g., attack by network on an oine IS), it will neither be
part of an event nor a risk. A given vulnerability can be exploited by many different
threats and therefore related to many different events, or be not exploited by any of
them, if no relevant threat is found. A threat is defined in terms of a threat agent who
uses an attack method. Each threat agent (respectively attack method) identified as
relevant can be involved in several threats, or sometimes in none of them, if no relevant
corresponding attack method (respectively threat agent) is found. For example remote
spying (attack method) has no relevant corresponding threat agent in the context of a
local network neither connected to Internet nor having other external access point. A
given threat agent could thus use from zero to several attack methods, and an attack
method can be used by zero to several threat agents.
Assets can be specialised in two different kinds: business assets and IS assets. The
specialisation is disjoint and complete. An IS asset can support one or more business
assets, but a business asset can have no support in the IS (e.g., the selling skills of
the sales department are an asset of the company, but they are not part of the IS).
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However, a usual situation is that a business asset is supported by several IS assets. A
vulnerability is a characteristic of an IS asset or group of IS assets, and an IS asset can
have from zero to several vulnerabilities (an IS asset can potentially always include a
vulnerability, but at the level of a study, some IS assets can be considered as exempt
from vulnerability). A threat targets one or more IS assets and an IS asset can be
targeted by zero to several threats. The IS asset targeted by a threat is not necessarily
the same as the one linked to the vulnerability exploited by this threat. For example,
a vulnerability of employees who are not enough security-aware can allow a threat
on a server. Each business asset can be constrained from zero (e.g., if the business
asset has no support in the IS) to several security criteria. A security criterion can
constrain several different business assets, or not constrain any of them. Impacts harm
assets, at the business and also at the IS level. An asset can be harmed by zero (if no
impact is considered as relevant) or several impacts, and an impact harms at least an
IS asset and a business asset, but more than two assets are often harmed by an impact.
At the level of business assets, an impact negates one or more security criteria, and
a given security criteria can be negated by zero (if no relevant impact is concerned
by this security criterion) or several impacts. One or several security criteria can be
taken into account to assess the significance of a risk, but a security criterion can be
concerned by none of the risks, in the case where there is no relevant impact for this
criterion.
A risk treatment expresses the decision to treat one or more risk. Each identified
risk has a risk treatment (even if the decision is to accept the risk) and sometimes
several of them can be combined (they are not mutually exclusive). Risk treatments
lead to one or more security requirements. However, the risk treatments of acceptance
and avoidance lead to no security requirement. Each security requirement comes from
one or many risk treatments. A security requirement mitigates one or more risks;
a given risk can well not be mitigated by any security requirement (for example,
when the risk is accepted), or mitigated by several of them, if they are necessary to
reach an acceptable level of risk. Finally, a control implements one or more security
requirements, and the same security requirement may be implemented by one or several
control(s).
4.4.4 Validation of the ISSRM domain model
The validation of the domain model was performed through expert review, that led
to iterations of the research method depicted in Figure 4.1, and incremental improve-
ments of the domain model. The validation was already carried out by practitioners,
scientists and standardisation experts. Three practitioners, three scientists and two
standardisation experts were involved in this review. Each review was performed in
a face to face workshop with the expert. They challenged the domain model with
regards to their view of ISSRM and their knowledge of the ISSRM sources. First, the
context of the project and the research method were presented to them. Second, the
domain model was presented and explained. The evaluation was then based on open
discussions and questions about the domain model. The discussions and questions
were not based on a template, but focused on the issues highlighted by each reviewer.
All of their comments were analysed and discussed together based on the information
collected in the glossaries of Appendix A. The process ended once a consensus was
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reached on the domain model. The time spent for each interview was different from
one person to the other, ranging from half an hour to several hours of presentation and
discussion, stretching over several days by mail. The main comments of the review-
ers were that 1) the research method is reliable and 2) the domain model is easy to
validate, because of the glossaries and the alignment tables. From this validation, we
did not have to reconsider the concepts and their relationships, but only their names,
their definitions and the multiplicities.
The validation was completed by the application of the domain model on the as-
sessment of a real IS, in the frame of an ISO/IEC 27001 certification [ISO05b]. This
assessment is reported in Chapter 7. The domain model was used in this frame to
introduce the ISSRM to the employees of the company. It was the central artefact
to catch the different concepts taking place in the different steps of the performed
approach. Despite most of the employees did not have any IS security background,
they learned quickly the different concepts. Moreover, to present and explain the dif-
ferent concepts with the help of a model, instead of only text in natural language, was
considered by them as efficient. By the way, the company has kept the domain model,
to integrate it in their security training they should provide to every new employee,
as required by the certification.
Finally, the domain model was used with master students, in order to teach them
the ISSRM domain. The process of learning was faster and easier with the domain
model, compared to the experience of preceding years where the lecture was based on
methods and documents in natural language. The conceptual model helps to have an
exhaustive view of the domain and to catch quickly the concepts.
The validation performed has some limits. First, eight experts were involved in
the expert review. This only represents a limited set of advices on the domain model
and the conclusions can therefore not be generalized. Moreover, expert review is
subjective, dependent on her experience, knowledge, etc. Regarding the application of
the domain model to the assessment of a real IS, this experiment was performed in the
context of an ISO/IEC 27001 certification and with the guidance of the developers of
the domain model. These limitations are further explained in Section 7.6. Finally, no
fixed conclusion can be drawn from the use of the domain model with the students.
Regarding future work, a controlled experiment is currently built with the aim of
further validating the domain model with master students. The controlled experiment
will consist in comparing the effort needed and the success obtained in understanding
the domain by two groups of students, one having to learn the domain through the
domain model, and the other through documents in natural language.
4.5 Conclusions about the ISSRM domain model
This section highlights the benefits and the limitations of the ISSRM domain model.
4.5.1 Benefits of the domain model
The ISSRM domain model provides several benefits for different users: for ISSRM
practitioners, for researchers, or for both of them.
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General/terminological level
The ISSRM domain model contributes to establish a standard terminology for the
ISSRM community. As shown in Section 2.4.1, there are several efforts run by stan-
dardisation bodies, but today they are still work in progress. Our work has raised
the interest of the national body of Luxembourg and has actually been selected as a
reference for the review of the coming ISO/IEC 27000 standard, about the fundamen-
tals and vocabulary of ISMS. It has also been considered in the revision of the EBIOS
method [DCS04b].
ISSRM approaches are also increasingly introduced and learnt in different academic
and professional curricula. Due to the absence of a global terminology, each teacher
has to reinvent her/his own or use a specific one. As a consequence, we observed that
students, when they become risk managers, experience communication problems when
discussing about risk-related concepts. We think that the results of our research can
help in a desired harmonisation at this level.
Finally, some approaches, like SQUARE [MHI05, MS05], require as a preliminary
work to define the terminology to be used. The domain model provides such a termi-
nology.
Practitioner level
Although we have constructed the ISSRM domain model based on the existing litera-
ture on RM and security frameworks, the developed model can serve as the guidelines
to investigate new emerging references, e.g., a new method or standard. The ISSRM
domain model might suggest the contextual information, which should be screened
in the new sources. Further, the ISSRM domain model itself might evolve when new
important sources are determined. In this case, a new iteration of the research method
(Figure 4.1) should be performed, taking the new source into account.
However, the multitude of existing ISSRM methods leads often to confusion con-
cerning their scope and their strengths. They have generally a different coverage of
the RM process, as discussed in Section 2.6, and thus of the underlying concepts. The
alignment tables provided in Section 4.3.3 help us to provide interoperability between
the different sources. It shows the equivalence of concepts between sources. The def-
inition of the ISSRM domain model with its associated glossary is one step further
toward interoperability between ISSRM sources. It could be used as the common ref-
erence between several sources, with a traceability provided by the alignment table
between the ISSRM domain model and the sources.
Research level
We hope that the proposed ISSRM domain model can help the scientific community
to better understand the scope of ISSRM and therefore achieve a better integration
of security risk-related concepts in security-oriented modelling languages. Also, in
case where several languages are put together in order to cover the IS lifecycle, the
domain model can be used as the basis for the traceability framework that will support
the mapping between the different models produced (as, for example, the traceability
needed between a business and an IS model).
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Moreover, the ISSRM domain model is used as an input to Chapter 6 for the
assessment of security-oriented modelling languages. The ISSRM domain model serves
as guidelines to find out about the support for ISSRM provided by the existing security-
oriented modelling languages [MMM+08, MMH08]. In Chapter 6, we will illustrate
this comparison between the ISSRM domain model and the following security-oriented
modelling languages: KAOS extended to security [vL04], Misuse cases [SO05] and
Secure Tropos [MGMP02].
4.5.2 Limitations of the domain model
Successful experiences have been reported in using formal and ontology-based ap-
proaches to define and compare the semantics of modelling constructs [MHO07, HST+07,
SHTB07, SHTB06]. In the current context and based on the feedback of these experi-
ences, we have decided to first follow an approach based on conceptual models, natural
language descriptions and common sense to analyse ISSRM sources. The reasons are
the following:
• the analysed sources are neither simple, nor already sufficiently formalised (in
the sense of what is discussed in [HR04]), to let us apply a formal comparative
semantics method in a realistic timeframe;
• similarly, the core concepts of the ISSRM domain can realistically be formalised
as a conceptual model complemented with natural language definitions. How-
ever, further formalisation of semantics [HR04], although eventually desirable
(cf. Chapter 6), has been currently deemed too risky. Indeed, complete seman-
tics would require a significant effort that might just be a waste of time, regarding
our objectives, if consensus on the partial formalisation is not reached first;
• automated semantic similarity analysis (see e.g., [RB01]) pays off when domains
are too complex to be handled by domain experts or the amount of information
to be compared is unmanageable by humans. We do not meet these conditions
here.
Regarding the construction of a domain model, several techniques are proposed
in software product lines and feature-oriented system development. These techniques
are generally the domain analysis part of domain engineering. Domain analysis should
specify the basic elements of the domain, organise an understanding of the relationships
among these elements, and represent this understanding in a useful way [RBSS05].
In this context, we find approaches like FODA (Feature-Oriented Domain Analysis)
[KCH+90], DARE (Domain Analysis and Reuse Environment) [FDF98] or ADOM
(Application-based Domain Modeling) [RBSS05]. Although we are not directly using
these techniques (our objective is not to develop product lines), the method we used
for defining the ISSRM domain model is actually compliant with these approaches. In
particular, we have produced the three main artefacts required for domain analysis: a
domain definition, a domain lexicon and a concept model.
As discussed in Section 4.4.4, the validation can still be improved. Although our
validation through expert review and teaching results observation has some limitations,
it has been assessed as the most efficient and relevant regarding our objectives (Section
4.6 Chapter summary 113
1.1). The validation by other experts is still open. Moreover, an experiment is currently
built, to assess with students the efficiency of the domain model for teaching purpose.
4.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter, the ISSRM domain model was defined, composed of a conceptual
model, represented under the form of a UML class diagram, and the definitions of its
different concepts and relationships.
First, a research method was presented, which aimed at defining in a structured way
the domain model. This research method relied on a survey of the ISSRM literature.
The application of the first step of the research method leaded to an ISSRM concept
alignment. Definitions of terms, as found in the sources studied, were collected, and an
alignment table was built, indicating synonymy or semantic similarity when approaches
use different terms. Once concepts were identified, relationships between the concepts
are also elicited in the same manner. The ISSRM domain model was then build, first
by assigning a name to each concept, and second by defining each concept and each
relationship. The chapter ended by conclusions and limitations of the domain model.
This chapter was focussed on definition and identification of concepts and relation-
ships pertaining to ISSRM, as made clear in Section 4.3.2. However, estimation and
evaluation are also at the core of ISSRM approaches. The topic of the next chapter
is therefore to improve the domain model with various metrics commonly used in se-
curity risk estimation and evaluation, and often found in the literature, like the risk
level or the event likelihood.
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Chapter 5
Definition of the Information System
Security Risk Management Metrics
I n the preceding chapter, we have defined the ISSRM domain model, through aconceptual model and an associated glossary. The conceptual model is represented
under the form of a UML class diagram, composed of a set of classes (the concepts of
the ISSRM domain) and their relationships. However, no attributes (or properties) of
these classes have currently been defined [Pen03]. By the way, a core of our concerns
is to link business security needs and security measures applied on the IS. ISSRM
approaches are usually considered as a tool for managing this business/IT (or IS)
alignment [SGF02]. To help in this alignment, a core part of ISSRM approaches is
risk measurement, coming with an evaluation of the different concepts of ISSRM.
In the literature, different sets of metrics are proposed in the existing approaches
[ISO08, DCS04b, CLU07b, AD01b, Ins03]. However, they are generally different with
one another. Moreover, they are difficult to catch by the users, because presented
within a documentation in natural language. The objective of this chapter is to add
to the domain model, as its attributes, the metrics of ISSRM.
It is generally agreed that the two main factors of ISSRM, with respect to the busi-
ness/IS security alignment, are the security level and the value of the assets, as shown,
for example, in the definition extracted from the CISA Review Manual [ISA06]: Risk
management is the process of identifying vulnerabilities and threats to the information
resources used by an organisation in achieving business objectives, and deciding what
countermeasures, if any, to take in reducing risk to an acceptable level, based on the
value of the information resource to the organisation. We therefore aim to improve
and automate ISSRM for reaching the best Return On Security Investment (ROSI).
The underlying research question addressed here is: what are the metrics relevant to
perform ISSRM and to reason about ROSI ? The domain model improved with metrics
is, first, a guideline helping anyone to understand which concepts need to be measured
in ISSRM, and using which metric. As for ISSRM concepts, the introduction of a model
to present the different metrics will improve the documentation generally provided in
the literature, and will help to catch the different metrics. Second, anyone wanting to
define his/her own set of concrete metrics in order to include in his/her method or tool
can use the domain model as a guideline to do so. It is necessary to notice that, at this
time, we do not want to define directly a new concrete risk assessment framework with
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precise metrics, as done in existing ISSRMmethods [DCS04b, CLU07b, AD01b, Ins03].
Our objective is limited to the identification of what are, at the abstract level, the rel-
evant metrics for ISSRM. This is mainly motivated by the fact that each user may
still want to choose his/her own concrete approach for risk estimation, as depicted in
the next section, adapted to his/her organisation and its context.
First, Section 5.1 describes the research method in order to define the ISSRM met-
rics. Then, Section 5.2 introduces the different concepts and methods used within this
chapter. It presents the risk estimation, the Goal-Question-Metric (GQM) approach
and the ROSI concept. Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 are the application of the two steps
of the research method, respectively for what we call metrics elicitation and metrics
validation. Finally, Section 5.5 presents the improvement of our domain model with
the metrics. The paper ends with conclusion and future work in Section 5.6.
5.1 Research method
To achieve the objective of defining relevant ISSRM metrics, we propose a research
method based on a combination of approaches (Figure 5.1). The outcome of this
research method is the introduction of ISSRM metrics as attributes to the ISSRM
conceptual model, coming with their explanation .
The first approach, used during Step 1 of the research method, is the GQM
paradigm [BCR94]. This approach is used for eliciting metrics in a top-down man-
ner, from general objectives to achieve, to suited metrics to be used for achieving the
objectives. Thus, the benefit of using GQM is that we focus on the main objectives
of ISSRM to define the metrics. GQM is applied on the ISSRM domain. Therefore,
the domain model presented in Section 4.4 is an input for this step. The application
results in GQM models, leading to the set of ISSRM metrics. However, this elicitation
work remains subjective and potentially incomplete.
The second approach, used as a validation1/improvement of the first step, and
appearing in Step 2 of the research method, is based on a survey of ISSRM stan-
dards and methods. This approach is bottom-up, being an analysis of existing ISSRM
sources to identify the metrics currently used. The sources are all those surveyed in
Chapter 4 (cf. Section 4.2) that contain a process description and perform concept
measurement. Sources dealing only with vocabulary are not considered here. We first
gather and summarise the steps related to measurement. In general, this task is not
only done by copying a set of sentences from the source document. It is sometimes
necessary to rephrase and clarify what are the measured concepts, and what are the
associated metrics, for having a relevant information. We thus obtain an overview
of the underlying estimation process of each studied ISSRM source. The outcomes
of this step, for each source, are a) the set of its metrics, b) an analysis table of the
metrics c) some conclusions for the source with regards to our final set of metrics.
The set of metrics identified for each source are presented as attributes of the ISSRM
conceptual model, for clarity and comparison purpose. Then, we compare the metrics
of the studied source to those defined through GQM. This comparison is summarised
1The term `validation' may appear to be used improperly, because real validation generally implies direct
empirical evidence. In our case, evidence is only gathered through the literature, which is assumed to reflect
current practice.
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Figure 5.1: Research method for the ISSRM metrics elicitation
in an analysis table. This table recalls the measured concepts of the source and the
associated metrics. They are aligned with the concepts of the ISSRM domain model
and the metrics obtained during the GQM study. If a metric not identified with the
GQM framework is found, it is necessary to evaluate its relevance. Sometimes, it can
highlight a deficiency in the GQM study, and thus the GQM models are reviewed and
improved considering this new issue, or a justification for the exclusion of the metric
shall be given. Conclusions about the metrics of the source and their difference with
regards to our metrics are finally provided. The tasks composing Step 2 of the research
method are performed iteratively for every selected source of the literature.
Once the literature is completely surveyed, leading to the GQM models in their
last version, the final set of metrics is introduced in the ISSRM domain model as at-
tributes of the classes. Some complementary explanations are also provided, proposing
definitions for each metric, and an example of their use is proposed.
5.2 Theory
In this section, we introduce some theoretical concepts and methods used in this
chapter. First, risk estimation is presented, showing the different categories of risk
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estimation in ISSRM. Second, the GQM approach, used in Step 1 of the research
method, is introduced. Finally, the ROSI notion is explained, in the aim of identifying
the underlying objectives to be used for the application of GQM on the ISSRM domain.
5.2.1 Introduction to risk estimation
As discussed in Section 2.1, risk analysis consists in identifying and estimating the dif-
ferent risk components. Regarding risk estimation, various approaches exist [ISO08,
AS/04]. The same approaches are adopted for measuring the asset- and risk treatment-
related concepts. They can be classified in the following categories: qualitative, quan-
titative, or a combination of both, commonly called semi-quantitative estimation:
• Qualitative risk estimation
Qualitative risk estimation approaches are currently the most widespread in the
industry [ENI06, DCS04b, CLU07b, AD01b]. They propose a scale of levels for
qualitatively describing the concepts to measure. These scales are ordinal scales
[FP97]. An advantage of qualitative estimation is its ease of understanding by
the staff involved in the estimation task, while a disadvantage is the dependence
on the subjective choice of the scale [ISO08]. Examples of qualitative scales, for
a financial cost or an unavailability length, are shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Examples of qualitative scales
Level Financial cost Unavailability length
1 Low Short
2 Moderate Moderate
3 Important Long
4 Very important Very long
• Quantitative risk estimation
Quantitative risk management approaches propose to `precisely' measure each
concept of ISSRM. By `precisely', we mean through ratio or absolute scales2 in
terms of the scales provided in [FP97]. The quality of estimation depends on the
accuracy and completeness of the numerical measures and the validity of the used
models [ISO08]. For example, a financial cost will be estimated in terms of 
[Ins03] or an unavailability length will be reported in hours, as depicted in Table
5.2. Most often, historical incident data of an organisation or of a sector, like
provided by the CERT3, is used to provide quantitative indications. Naturally,
an advantage of such an approach is its accuracy, but its cost and the lack of
useful data are the main disadvantages [ISO08].
• Semi-quantitative risk estimation
In semi-quantitative estimations, ordinal scales are also given to estimate con-
cepts, but based this time on quantitative values. In other words, a quantitative
2No examples of interval scales have been found for the ISSRM domain, but they may theoretically be
relevant quantitative scales.
3http://www.cert.org/cert/
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Table 5.2: Examples of quantitative scales
Financial cost Unavailability length
Amount of money in € Length in hours
scale is reduced to a discrete scale, to become an ordinal scale [FP97]. The
objective is naturally to produce in a cost-effective manner more precise results
than those obtained by qualitative approaches. However, the estimation remains
naturally less accurate than quantitative estimation. A particular care should be
given to the definition of the scales, to keep relevance in the equivalent levels and
to obtain useful information about the relative criticality of the studied concepts.
Examples of semi-quantitative scales are proposed in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Examples of semi-quantitative scales
Level Financial cost Unavailability length
1 Loss < 1000$ Unavailability > 1 week
2 1000$ < Loss < 5000$ 1 day < Unavailability < 1 week
3 5000$ < Loss < 10000$ 1 day < Unavailability < 1 hour
4 Loss > 10000$ Unavailability < 1 hour
In a given method, existing or defined by an user, the different approaches can
be mixed, depending on the concepts analysed and the objective to be reached. For
example, qualitative estimation could be first used to obtain a coarse grained estima-
tion of risks, and later, a quantitative estimation could provide further information on
major identified risks. Finally, it is interesting to note that some approaches focus on
concept identification, whereas they provide very few guidelines for risk estimation all
along their process [Bun05c, AD01b]. These approaches are more directing towards
reaching a `reasonable' security level and a complete identification, understanding, and
coverage of risks.
Regarding the preceding approaches, it is also important to distinguish the scope
of the metrics we identify. In our context, a metric indicates the magnitude of a con-
cept, according to a given dimension (security, cost, etc.), as appears in the definition
proposed in [ISO05a]. A metric should thus be differentiated from what we call in-
dicators, which in our context, are variables that can be set to a prescribed state
based on the results of a process or the occurrence of a specified condition [ISO05a].
The main difference between a metric and an indicator is that the first one is ordered
and the second one not. Indicators are based on nominal scales [FP97], proposing a
non-ordered classification scheme. An indicator is something that gives information
about a particular situation, but does not estimate the magnitude of a concept (e.g.,
Is the motivation of an attacker based on the financial interest or on the challenging
aspect? Is the attack method accidental or intentional?). In our context, indicators
generally help to estimate the different metrics.
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5.2.2 The GQM approach
GQM's basic idea is deriving metrics from measurement questions and goals. The
GQM method was originated by V.Basili and D.Weis, as a result of both practical
experience and academic research [SB99]. By now, it is widely used in a number of
contexts, like in the aeronautics or telephony industry [BCR94, Kil01].
In the GQM approach, measurement is defined in a top-down fashion [BCR94].
GQM is based upon the assumption that, for an organisation to measure in an efficient
way, it must specify the goals for itself and its projects first, then it must trace those
goals to the data intended to operationalise them. Finally, it must provide a framework
for interpreting the data with respect to the stated goals [BCR94]. The result of the
application of the GQM approach is the definition of the measurement system targeting
a particular set of issues. The outcome is a GQM model that has three levels:
1. Conceptual level, called GOAL level: A goal is defined for an object (like a
product, a process or a resource).
2. Operational level, called QUESTION level: A set of questions is used to char-
acterize the way the assessment/achievement of a specific goal is going to be
performed.
3. Quantitative level, called METRIC level: A set of data is associated with every
question in order to answer it in a quantitative way.
Therefore, a GQM model is a hierarchical structure (Figure 5.2) starting with a goal.
The goal is refined into several questions. Each question is then refined into metrics.
The same metric can be used in order to answer different questions. More information
about GQM can be found in [BCR94, GC87].
Figure 5.2: Example of GQM model (extracted from [BCR94])
5.2.3 The ROSI concept
The main outcome of the ISSRM process, and one of the main motivations, is to obtain
the best ROSI [ISA06, SGF02]. CLUSIF proposes a state of the art around the notion
of ROSI [CLU04b]. There is no clear consensus about the definition of ROSI, but
two proposals are the most used. The first one relates security costs to the expected
5.3 Application of the GQM framework on the ISSRM domain 121
benefits [CLU04b, SAS05]:
ROSI =
Expected Returns− Cost of Investments
Cost of Investments
(1)
The second proposal is focused on incidents and calculates the ROSI with the help
of the notion of ALE (Annual Loss Expectancy) [CLU04b, Mic04]. ALE expresses the
monetary loss that can be expected for an asset due to security incidents (designated
by i in the following equation) over a one year period:
ALE =
∑
Costsi ∗ Frequencyi
ROSI = ALE1− ALE2− CS (2)
With:
ALE1 = ALE before security solutions
ALE 2 = ALE after security solutions
CS = Cost of Security solutions
These two definitions differ on two points:
(a) Definition (2) fixes the time period for the calculatin of ROSI to 1 year, while
definition (1) can be used on any period of time, to be defined by the user.
(b) Definition (1) involves expected returns while definition (2) involves the loss
expectancy before and after security solutions.
Therefore, if we want to compare both definitions, we first need to fix the time
period. We propose to bind definition (1) to a 1 year period, to be compliant with
definition (2). Second, expected returns of definition (1) may be defined, over a given
time period, in terms of a difference of loss. The expected returns are in fact the loss
expectancy before security solution minus the loss expectancy after security solution.
Over a 1 year period, definition (1) is in fact equivalent to:
ROSI =
ALE1− ALE2− Cost of Investments
Cost of Investments
(1′)
As a conclusion, both definitions are proportional, differentiating by a coefficient
1
Cost of Investments
(or 1
Cost of Security solutions
).
5.3 Application of the GQM framework on the ISSRM domain
As discussed in Section 5.2.3, whichever definition of ROSI is chosen, to reach the best
ROSI (which is the highest value of ROSI) means to:
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1. Maximise the difference between the loss expectancy before security solution and
the loss expectancy after security solution;
2. Minimise the cost of investment.
Coming back to the ISSRM domain, the difference between the loss expectancies is
related to the risk reduction while the cost of investment is related to the risk treatment
cost (including the concepts of risk treatment, security requirement and control). This
assumption thus provides two objectives for the GQM study, which are respectively
the two roots of the GQM models (Figure 5.3 and 5.4):
1. Maximise the risk reduction
2. Minimise the risk treatment cost
Figure 5.3: GQM model for the first goal
With regards to the concepts of the ISSRM domain model, to maximise the risk
reduction involves first knowing what is the level of risk, depending on its occurrence
frequency and its importance regarding the business. Second, it is necessary to know
what is the risk reduction level. From these questions and based on the set of ISSRM
concepts (Figure 4.4), related metrics are proposed. All of the elicited metrics are
represented in the GQM model (Figure 5.3), at the metric level, with the following
notation: Class of the ISSRM model.Metric. The first metric is the Risk level and is
naturally associated with the concept of risk. Occurrence frequency of risk is depicted
in the causal part of risk in the domain model. It is summarised in the Potentiality
metric of the event concept, depending on the Likelihood of threat and Vulnerability
level of vulnerability. The risk importance is depicted in the consequence part of risk,
represented by the concept of impact. The Impact level is the metric measuring the
importance of impact. The risk importance is also related to the intrinsic Value of
business assets. To correctly describe the risk importance, a new concept, motivated
by the need of a metric, is introduced in the domain model. This concept is Security
objective. It expresses the application of a security criterion on a business asset. For
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example, the confidentiality of technical plans or the integrity of the structure calcu-
lation process are security objectives. This concept is needed because, to completely
describe the risk importance, it is necessary to estimate the Security need associated
to each security objective. This metric is a key indicator to estimate the real impact
on the organisation and thus the risk importance regarding the business. Finally, re-
garding risk reduction, Risk reduction level shall be estimated for each risk treatment
and each security requirement. The control concept cannot be estimated in terms of
risk reduction. The explanation is obvious when illustrated with an example. Let
us consider that the security requirement Perform network filtering is implemented
by the controls Firewall (the IT element) and Perform firewall maintenance. It is
not possible to allocate a risk reduction level to the control Perform firewall main-
tenance taken alone. The risk reduction estimation is only viable on risk treatment
and security requirement.
Figure 5.4: GQM model for the second goal
The second goal of minimising the risk treatment4 cost involves less concepts and
thus less questions. Only one related question is necessary: what is the risk treatment
cost? Regarding the associated metrics, we know from the domain model that three
risk treatment-related concepts are involved. A Cost metric is thus proposed for each
of them to know their respective cost (Fig. 5.4).
It is necessary to note that, for clarity purpose, the GQM models presented in
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 are those obtained after the last iteration of Step 2 (Figure 5.1).
They thus represent the final set of metrics. Further explanations about each metric
is provided in Section 5.5.
5.4 Survey of ISSRM methods for metrics validation
The sources surveyed for the metrics validation are all ISSRM sources containing a pro-
cess description. RM standards [ISO02b, AS/04], security standards [ISO04b, Com06a]
and RE security frameworks [Fir03, HLMN08] are therefore not studied in this part,
4Here, it is necessary to distinguish the elicited concept of Risk treatment, depicting the choice among one
of the four risk treatment proposals (Section 4.4), and the risk treatment in its general sense, as it should be
understood in this question, covering the entire set of risk treatment-related concepts of the ISSRM domain
model.
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because mainly focused on the terminological and conceptual aspects of ISSRM. In-
stead, we retain security RM standards [ISO08, SGF02, Bun05c] and security RM
methods [DCS04b, CLU07b, AD01b, Ins03, VML+07]. Study of each such source re-
sults first in the metric-related elements gathered in the source. Then, (1) the metric
analysis table, (2) the ISSRM domain model enriched with the metrics proposed fol-
lowing the source, and (3) some conclusions regarding its compliance with the GQM
study (Section 5.3) are provided.
5.4.1 Security RM standards
The three security RM standards studied are: ISO/IEC 27005 [ISO08], NIST 800-30
[SGF02] and the IT Grundschutz [Bun05c]. We first present the artefacts produced
for ISO/IEC 27005. For the other two standards, only the metric analysis tables and
the conclusions are presented. Their respective metric-related steps and the enriched
ISSRM domain model are provided in Appendix D.
ISO/IEC 27005
As depicted in the research method (Section 5.1), we first gather all metrics used
throughout the standard [ISO08]. The steps of the standard involving concept mea-
surement are described below. The following conventions are used: metrics are in
italic and associated concepts in bold. The page number of the standard, providing
information about the metric, is mentioned for traceability purpose.
• Assign values to the assets under review. [ISO08, p. 15]
• Express the business impact value for the consequence. [ISO08, p. 15]
• Assess the likelihood of the incident scenarios, or event. [ISO08, p. 15]
• Take into account how often the threats occur. [ISO08, p. 15]
• Take into account how easily the vulnerabilities may be exploited. [ISO08, p.
15]
• Estimate how effectively controls reduce vulnerabilities. [ISO08, p. 16]
• Estimate the level of risk, which is a combination of the likelihood of an incident
and its consequence. [ISO08, p. 16]
The various metrics used are analysed in a table. The two first columns are for
the concepts of the ISSRM domain model and the concepts of the studied approach.
This alignment is a reminder of the one of Table B.1 in Appendix B. The concepts
are ordered by category, respectively standing in the asset-, risk- and risk treatment-
related categories. The categories are delimited by a double line in the table. The two
following columns depict the associated metric(s) of the studied approach, as called
in the approach, and the associated metric(s) of the ISSRM domain model. Next, a
Definition column indicates how this metric is defined or calculated. For example,
if a level has only to be chosen by the user in a scale, this column indicates User
defined for this metric. At the opposite, if the metric depends, to be calculated,
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on other metrics or on some tools (matrix, software tools), this is mentioned in this
column. Finally, the last column is the Unit column. If the metric is quantitative,
its unit is displayed (e.g., , hours, etc.). Otherwise, the proposed scale is reported.
The only asset-related concept measured in ISO/IEC 27005 is the concept of asset
(in general) (Table 5.4). The related metric is the value of assets. Primary asset
and supporting asset, being specialisations of asset in general, are also measured with
this metric. Then, the business impact value associated to each asset is estimated,
based on the value of the asset. Risk estimation is based on the successive consider-
ations of threat and vulnerability, leading to event likelihood. Combining it with the
business impact value, it is possible to estimate the risk level. Finally, controls from
ISO/IEC 27005, which can be aligned with both security requirement and control from
our domain model, are estimated according to their effectiveness, mainly in reducing
vulnerabilities. The standard, as opposed to most of the methods, only provides a gen-
eral guideline to ISSRM. As a consequence, it is generally up to the user to define if
the concepts are qualitatively or quantitatively estimated (cf. Unit and Definition
column).
Table 5.4: Metrics analysis table for ISO/IEC 27005
ISO/IEC 27005 [ISO08]
ISSRM concept ISO/IEC 27005 concept ISO/IEC 27005 metric ISSRM metric Definition Unit
Asset Asset Value / User defined User defined
Business asset Primary asset Value Value User defined User defined
IS asset Supporting asset Value / User defined User defined
Risk Risk Risk level Risk level f(Event,Consequence) User defined
Event Event Likelihood Potentiality f(Threat,Vulnerability) User defined
Impact Consequence Business impact value Impact level f(Asset) User defined
Threat Threat Frequency of occurrence Likelihood User defined User defined
Vulnerability Vulnerability Easiness of exploitation Vulnerability level User defined User defined
Security requirement
Control Effectiveness Risk reduction User defined User defined
Control
In ISO/IEC 27005, as said above, the value of asset in general is estimated for
asset-related concepts. In the GQM study (and after the complete review of the
ISSRM sources), the focus is rather put on the value of business assets, which is more
relevant. IS assets being only the support of business assets, it is worth to consider the
value of only business assets. Moreover, in IS security, the value of IS assets (e.g., the
replacement cost of a computer) is generally considered as negligible compared to the
value of the processed information at the business level (e.g., the client information,
the estimates, etc.). Finally, it is necessary to consider the value of business assets for
estimating the security objectives and assess the significance of risks, as depicted in the
ISSRM domain model (cf. Figure 4.4). IS assets are not involved in this process. For
risk-related concepts, the metrics are very close to those proposed in Section 5.3. Risk,
event, consequence, threat and vulnerability of ISO/IEC 27005 have all an associated
metric. Moreover, ISO/IEC 27005 proposes additional characteristics for threat source
(equivalent to threat agent in the ISSRM model). For example, it is possible to define
the motivation, the capabilities and the resources available of a threat source for a
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deliberate threat, or some factors that could influence the threat source in the case
the threat is accidental. However, such characteristics are not included in the metric
analysis table, because they are indicators helping to define frequency of occurrence
and the risk level in general, rather than metrics themselves (cf. Section 5.2.1. For the
risk-treatment related concepts, the effectiveness of controls is estimated, which has the
same objective as risk reduction of security requirements in the ISSRM domain model.
The concept of risk treatment is not estimated in terms of effectiveness. Finally, the
cost dimension is not needed to be measured in ISO/IEC 27005.
Figure 5.5 summarises the metrics proposal of ISO/IEC 27005 from the point of
view of the ISSRM domain model. The reader should note the introduction of the
Security objective class, compared to the preceding domain model of Figure 4.4.
Figure 5.5: ISSRM domain model enriched with the metrics proposed by ISO/IEC 27005
NIST 800-30
Estimation in NIST 800-30 focuses on the concept of risk (Table 5.5). First, the user
defines the likelihood of the threat and then the magnitude of impact. Based on these
two estimations, the risk level is defined with the help of a matrix. NIST 800-30
proposes three-level qualitative scales for each metric: High, Medium, Low.
The metrics proposed by NIST 800-30 (or semantically-equivalent metrics) have all
already been identified with the GQM approach.
The IT-Grundschutz
For this standard, we study the third part entitled Risk analysis based on IT-Grundschutz 
[Bun05c]. Although the name of the document mentions risk analysis, the scope of
the standard is RM, going from asset identification to control selection, as described
in Section 2.1.
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Table 5.5: Metrics analysis table for NIST 800-30
NIST 800-30 [SGF02]
ISSRM concept NIST 800-30 concept NIST 800-30 metric ISSRM metric Definition Unit
Risk Risk Risk level Risk level
Defined with a risk-level
matrix
High, Medium, Low
Event
Threat (vulnerability
exercised by a given
threat-source)
Likelihood Potentiality User defined High, Medium, Low
Impact Impact Magnitude Impact level User defined High, Medium, Low
The part of the IT-Grundschutz dealing with risk analysis, like the part called
Methodology, is mainly devoted to binary checks of adequate protection provided
by (implemented or envisaged) security measures. The concepts are not valued qual-
itatively5 or quantitatively. The only exception is the security requirement concept,
which is estimated at the beginning of the process on the scale normal/high/very high,
in the aim of identifying the assets that need a higher level of security (Table 5.6).
When applying GQM, we also propose to estimate the security need of security
objectives, which are equivalent to the security requirements in the IT-Grundschutz.
Table 5.6: Metrics analysis table for the IT-Grundschutz
The IT-Grundschutz [Bun05c]
ISSRM concept IT-Grundschutz concept IT-Grundschutz metric ISSRM metric Definition Unit
Security objective Security requirement Security requirement level Security need User defined Normal, High, Very high
5.4.2 Security RM methods
There are five security RM methods studied: EBIOS [DCS04b], MEHARI [CLU07b],
OCTAVE [AD01b], CRAMM [Ins03] and CORAS [VML+07]. As for security RM
standards, first we present all artefacts produced for EBIOS. The metric analysis table
and the conclusions are then presented for the other methods, their measurement-
related steps and their enriched ISSRM domain model being proposed in Appendix
D.
EBIOS
The measurement-related steps of the EBIOS method are:
• Define security needs of essential elements with security criteria constraining
them. [DCS04b, p. 24]
• Define attack potential of relevant threat agents combined with attack meth-
ods. [DCS04b, p. 26]
5The binary check can in a sense be seen as a special case of qualitative estimation. However it is not
standing in `traditional' qualitative estimation, like the other presented standards and methods.
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• Define the level of vulnerabilities associated to selected threat agents. [DCS04b,
p. 28]
• Define the threat opportunity based on the level of associated vulnerabilities or
directly. [DCS04b, p. 29]
• Define the impacts of the risks equal to the maximum of the security needs
concerned. [DCS04b, p. 31]
• Define the risk level, composed by the opportunity, the attack potential and the
maximum of the security needs concerned. [DCS04b, p. 31]
• Define risk coverage by selected security objectives. [DCS04b, p. 34]
• Define security objectives coverage by selected security requirements. [DCS04b,
p. 40]
Table 5.7 summarises the different concepts measured and their associated metrics.
EBIOS starts by asking the user to value the security needs of essential elements for
each security criterion. Then, the risk level is defined incrementally. First, the attack
potential is defined , characterising a threat agent using an attack method. Second,
the opportunity of the threats is estimated, based on the vulnerabilities level. Third,
the impact is defined, being equivalent to the maximum of elicited security needs for
the assets concerned by the impact. The level of risk is defined as the set of the three
previous metrics. As for ISO/IEC 27005 [ISO08], EBIOS proposes to identify some
characteristics of threat agents and attack methods, like motivation or type. Regarding
risk-treatment related concepts, security objectives are estimated in terms of their risk
coverage. Then, security requirements are estimated in terms of their security objective
coverage. The various concepts in EBIOS are estimated by qualitative values. Table
5.7 recapitulates these scales, which the method recommends to adapt depending on
the context.
Table 5.7: Metrics analysis table for EBIOS
EBIOS [DCS04b]
ISSRM concept EBIOS concept EBIOS metric ISSRM metric Definition Unit
Security objective
Security criterion on
Essential element
Security need Security need User defined 0-4
Risk Risk
{Security needs con-
cerned ; Opportunity
; Attack potential}
Risk level / {0-4 ; 0-4 ; 1-3}
Event Threat Opportunity Potentiality f(Vulnerability level) 0-4
Impact Impact
Security needs con-
cerned
Impact level
max(Security needs) for
each Business asset
0-4
Threat
Threat agent and At-
tack method
Attack potential Likelihood User defined 1-3
Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability level Vulnerability level User defined 0-4
Security requirement Security objective (risk) Coverage / User defined 0-2
Security requirement
Security (functional)
requirement
(security objective)
Coverage
/ User defined 0-2
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The set of metrics proposed by EBIOS is close to the one defined in the GQM
study. At the level of asset- and risk-related concepts, we do not notice any important
difference compared to the metrics of the GQM models. Only some minor differences
are observed. For example, the risk metric is decomposed into three metrics (security
needs concerned, opportunity and attack potential) instead of a single element (risk
level). Another example is that the value of the business assets is not estimated in
the aim of defining the security needs. Security needs are directly defined by the user.
The main difference resides at the level of risk treatment-related concepts. EBIOS
proposes a metric for assessing the coverage of risk by security objectives and another
one for the coverage of security objectives by security requirements. This can be
explained by the main objective of the EBIOS method, which rather than reaching
the best ROSI, is to cover the identified risks completely. These two metrics do not
represent first class metrics regarding our objectives and are therefore not included in
our set of metrics represented in the GQM models. However, they remain relevant
and potentially implementable, mainly as additional information showing that no risk
has been forgotten. Moreover, these two metrics can help in the implementation of
the risk reduction, because they indicate the current state of considered risk (treated
or not) at any time. Figure 5.6 summarises the metrics proposal of EBIOS from the
viewpoint of the ISSRM domain model.
Figure 5.6: ISSRM domain model enriched with the metrics proposed by EBIOS
MEHARI
First, MEHARI defines the classification value of each asset for each classification
criterion on a proposed scale from 1 to 4 (Table 5.8). The second step is the estimation,
based on various criteria, of the quality of each implemented security service. This
quality level helps for the determination of the (so called) seriousness of the risk
and its components. Based on this quality level, the user of the method estimates
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various factors playing a role in the risk measurement. First, factors related to the
cause of the risk are estimated. The factors (so called) are natural exposure to risk,
effectiveness of dissuasive measures and effectiveness of preventive measures. Then,
with the help of these factors, the potentiality of the cause of the risk is estimated.
Second, factors related to the consequence of the risk are estimated. They include the
so called effectiveness of protective or confinement measures, effectiveness of palliative
measures, effectiveness of recuperative measures. They are used as a mitigator of the
estimated intrinsic impact (i.e. impact without any measure) to determine the real
impact. Finally, the seriousness of the risk is deduced based on the potentiality metric
of the cause and on the impact metric of the consequence.
Table 5.8: Metrics analysis table for MEHARI
MEHARI [CLU07b]
ISSRM concept MEHARI concept MEHARI metric ISSRM metric Definition Unit
Security objective
Classification crite-
rion on Asset
Classification value Security need User defined 1-4
Risk Risk Seriousness Risk level
Seriousness = f(Potentiality,
Impact) defined with tables
Tolerable risk,
Inadmissible
risk, Unsup-
portable risk
Event Cause Potentiality Potentiality
Potentiality=f(Natural expo-
sure to risk, Effectiveness
of dissuasive measures,
Effectiveness of preventive
measures) defined directly or
with tables
1-4
Impact Consequence Intrinsic impact Impact level
Intrinsic impact=classification
value
1-4
Impact Consequence Impact Impact level
Impact=f(Intrinsic impact, Ef-
fectiveness of protective or
confinement measures, Ef-
fectiveness of palliative mea-
sures, Effectiveness of re-
cuperative measures) defined
directly or with tables
1-4
Security require-
ment
Security service Quality /
Questionnaire or user defined
with guidelines, f(efficiency,
robustness, permanency)
1-4
Security require-
ment
Security measure
Effectiveness of dis-
suasive measures
Risk reduction
f(quality security service) with
tool or user defined
1-4
Security require-
ment
Security measure
Effectiveness of pre-
ventive measures
Risk reduction
f(quality security service) with
tool or user defined
1-4
Security require-
ment
Security measure
Effectiveness of
protective or confine-
ment measures
Risk reduction
f(quality security service) with
tool or user defined
1-4
Security require-
ment
Security measure
Effectiveness of pal-
liative measures
Risk reduction
f(quality security service) with
tool or user defined
1-4
Security require-
ment
Security measure
Effectiveness of re-
cuperative measures
Risk reduction
f(quality security service) with
tool or user defined
1-4
/ /
Natural exposure to
risk
/
f(quality security service) with
tool or user defined
1-4
As already seen in other ISSRM standards and methods like [DCS04b, Bun05c], at
the asset-related concepts level, the security need is directly estimated. It is the only
asset-related concept estimated. For risk-related concepts, our set of metrics does not
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take into account such precise factors mitigating the risk level. MEHARI is designed to
assess a running IS. In this case, defining risk mitigating factors coming from already
implemented security measures is suited. In our case, our set of metrics should be
usable for existing IS assessment, but also for IS in development. We, thus, do not
propose to use pre-defined mitigating factors. Instead, the risk reduction metric used
once a risk treatment and/or a security requirement is defined plays the role of risk
mitigator. First, it is more generic, so the user can determine himself how he will
use this metric. Second, in the case of IS assessment based on our ISSRM model,
the risk reduction metrics can be used in the same way as the mitigating factors of
MEHARI. It is also necessary to note that the metric of natural exposure to risk is not
associated to any concept of the ISSRM domain. It is indeed related to the context
of the organisation defined during the first step of the ISSRM process (Figure 2.1).
Quality of security services has also no direct semantically equivalent concept, but
regarding the set of metrics of Figure 5.3, it is directly dependent on the total risk
reduction of each security requirement.
OCTAVE
Like the IT-Grundschutz [Bun05c], OCTAVE is poor in terms of estimation (Table
5.9). The method proposes to estimate the impact of the risk on a qualitative scale.
This estimation provides information supporting risk ranking and countermeasures
prioritisation.
As already mentioned, the impact level is taken into account in the GQM set of
metrics.
Table 5.9: Metrics analysis table for OCTAVE
OCTAVE [AD01b]
ISSRM concept OCTAVE concept OCTAVE metric ISSRM metric Definition Unit
Impact Impact Impact level Impact level User defined High, Medium, Low
CRAMM
CRAMM is one of the few methods suggesting quantitative estimation (Table 5.10).
For example, the severity of impacts is estimated on a scale from 1 to 10, but their cost
in financial figures. Then, the value of assets is determined based on both previous
metrics. For threat and vulnerability, CRAMM proposes a qualitative estimation based
on pre-defined scales. The measure of risk is further defined with the help of a matrix
combining asset value, threat level and vulnerability level. Based on the different
risks levels obtained, the method proposes suited countermeasures, each having its
own security level. Their priority is finally assessed with the help of various factors,
determining the theoretical implementation rank of each countermeasure. Some of
them are the cost of the countermeasure and its effectiveness.
Compared to the set of metrics elicited with GQM in Section 5.3, the metrics of
CRAMM are all covered by equivalent metrics, except for security level, effectiveness
and priority, that are associated to the security requirement concept. For the two
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Table 5.10: Metrics analysis table for CRAMM
CRAMM [Ins03]
ISSRM concept CRAMM concept CRAMM metric ISSRM metric Definition Unit
IS asset Asset Value Value f(Severity, Cost) 1-10; $
Risk Risk Measure of risk Risk level
Measure of risk=f(Threat level,
Vulnerability level, Asset value)
using risk matrix
1-7
Impact Impact Severity Impact level User defined 1-10
Impact Impact Cost Impact level
User defined (only for Unavail-
ability and Physical Destruction
impacts)
$
Threat Threat Threat level Likelihood
User directly defined or with the
help of a questionnaire
Very Low, Low,
Medium, High,
Very High
Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability level Vulnerability level
User directly defined or with the
help of a questionnaire
Low, Medium,
High
Security requirement
Countermeasures Security level /
Provided in the
countermeasure library
1-7
Control
Security requirement
Countermeasures Priority /
Priority=f(cost, effectiveness,
various characteristics)
Rank
Control
Security requirement
Countermeasures Cost Cost Provided by tool
Low, Medium,
HighControl
Security requirement
Countermeasures Effectiveness / Provided by tool
Low, Medium,
HighControl
first, they are close to, and redundant with, the risk reduction. Instead of measuring
an intrinsic effectiveness leading to a security level, we estimate the risk reduction
level that is more explicit considering our objective of maximising risk reduction.
Regarding the priority of security requirement, it is not mandatory regarding the ROSI
optimisation. However, it is sometimes interesting, like for defining a risk treatment
plan [ISO05b], to schedule the control implementation.
CORAS
Table 5.11: Metrics analysis table for CORAS
CORAS [VML+07]
ISSRM concept CORAS concept CORAS metric ISSRM metric Definition Unit
Asset Asset Asset value Value User defined
Very low, Low, Medium, High,
Very high
Risk Risk Likelihood Potentiality User defined
Rare, Unlikely, Possible, Likely,
Certain
Risk Risk Consequence Impact level User defined
Insignifiant, Minor, Moderate,
Major, Catastrophic
Risk Risk Risk level Risk level Defined with tables Low, Moderate, Major, Extreme
Security requirement Treatment Risk reduction Risk reduction User defined
{Low, Mod., Maj., Ext.} => {Low,
Mod., Maj., Ext.}
Security requirement Treatment Cost Cost User defined Low, Medium, High
The first concept estimated in CORAS is the asset one through the asset value
(Table 5.11). It is estimated on a qualitative scale having five levels. Risk level is then
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defined, based on its likelihood and consequence estimation (qualitative scale with five
levels too). Finally, for treatments, their risk reduction (showing the final risk level
compared to the initial risk level, e.g., a major risk becomes moderate) and their cost
are estimated.
Compared to our set of metrics, the set of CORAS is included and well suited,
mainly at the level of risk treatment-related concepts, where it also considers both
the risk reduction and the cost of security requirements. No metric not having a
semantically equivalent one in our set of metrics (presented in the GQM models of
Section 5.3) is identified.
5.5 Enrichment of the ISSRM domain model with metrics
Elicitation (Section 5.3) and validation (Section 5.4) of the metrics result in the en-
richment of the ISSRM domain model, by completing it with the ISSRM metrics. The
metrics are reported in the domain model under the form of class attributes, as already
done for each studied standard and method in the preceding section. The resulting
ISSRM domain model is presented in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7: ISSRM domain model enriched with metrics
The first modification of the ISSRM domain model is the introduction of a new
concept, necessary to the metric of security need. This concept is security objective and
it represents the application of a security criterion on a business asset. For example,
the confidentiality of the technical plans or the integrity of the structure calculation
process are security objectives of the running example. The security need metric
expresses the importance level of the security objective concept. It is also interesting
to determine the value of business assets. Only business assets are estimated in terms
of value. First, business assets are involved to define and estimate security objectives
and to assess the significance of risks (Figure 4.4). IS assets are only the support
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of business assets and are not involved in this process. Moreover, the value of IS
asset (e.g., the replacement value of a computer) is generally considered as negligible
compared to the value of the information supported (e.g., the client information, the
estimates, etc.). Finally, the same IS asset may support different business assets,
having different values and different associated security needs. For example, a server
can support two different processes, or store both public and private information. The
value of business assets is used as input to estimate the security need of each business
asset, e.g., in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability. An asset with a great
value may generally have a greater security need than an asset with a low value in the
business of the organisation. For example, new technical plans are estimated to have a
greater value than the file of clients of the organisation. Both need to be confidential.
As a consequence, the security objective confidentiality of new technical plans has a
greater security need than confidentiality of the file of clients.
Example: The process of technical plans design has been identified as a business asset.
Its value is considered as very high, regarding the context of @rchimed. Now the security
need of this asset is estimated for each selected security criterion. On a scale from 1 to
4, its confidentiality is estimated as 4, its integrity as 2 and its availability as 2. Not
to disclose confidential plans to competitors is seen as major, compared respectively to
the integrity of plans and their availability, that can be both recovered in our context.
However, although they are less important, they are also to be considered.
For risk-related concepts, risk is estimated by its level. The risk level depends
on the event potentiality and the impact level, these two concepts composing the one
of risk. Event is composed of threat and vulnerability. Their respective levels are
estimated through likelihood and vulnerability level. It is necessary to note that threat
agent and attack method do not have their own metric representing their level. Only
their composition is estimated and this assumption has been confirmed during metrics
validation. Some characteristics of threat agents and attack methods can be identified
independently, like the motivation and the competence of the threat agent or the
kind of attack method (natural, human, etc.), as seen, for example, in ISO/IEC 27005
[ISO08] and EBIOS [DCS04b]. However, they can be used as indicators to well estimate
the risk-related concepts and mainly the likelihood of a threat.
Example: A thief can penetrate the organisation's building, in the aim to steal a copy
of some technical plans. Regarding the context (motivation of plans theft, exposition of
the building, etc.), the likelihood of such a threat is estimated as 2 on a scale going from
1 to 3, i.e., this threat can happen sometimes6. A set of vulnerabilities is highlighted,
regarding this threat, like the lack of physical access control. The total vulnerability
level is estimated at 2 on a scale from 0 to 3, i.e. the vulnerability is high because no
effective measure is in place. Based on these two levels, the potentiality of the event
is estimated at 3 on a scale from 0 to 5. The impact coming from this event, directly
related to the security objective of confidentiality of technical plans, has a level of 4.
Finally the risk level is estimated at 12, based on the potentiality of the event and the
impact level.
In risk treatment-related concepts, risk treatment and security requirements are
estimated in terms of risk reduction performed and in terms of cost incurred. As
6Every level of the qualitative scales are not described here, the objective of this example being only to
show an instance of each metric on our running example. The reader wanting to see a complete description
of what can be concrete scales shall refer to Chapter 7 about an experiment report.
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discussed in Section 5.3, controls can be only estimated in terms of cost (cost of
buying a firewall, cost of maintaining it by a security officer, etc.). The risk reduction
of some controls taken alone has no sense. For example, the risk reduction of the
security officer maintaining the firewall can not be estimated alone, without considering
the global effectiveness of the firewall (described at the security requirement level
by, e.g., Perform network filtering). To come back to the risk reduction metric, it
applies obviously for the risk reduction treatment but also to the other risk treatment
decisions, except for risk avoidance (Section 2.1). First, if the risk is transferred, a
residual risk, that is the risk level remaining after its treatment, can remain. This
leads to a risk reduction level of the risk transfer treatment and of the associated
requirements. For risk acceptance, the risk reduction is equal to 0, the risk being
accepted as is. Finally, for risk avoidance, the risk is withdrawn (except maybe for
traceability purpose) and so the risk reduction metric can no more apply. It is necessary
to note that the risk reduction and cost metrics are not directly derived one from
the others. One can think that the cost of a risk treatment is the total cost of the
related security requirements, and analogously that the cost of a security requirement
is equal to the total cost of the related controls. However, as seen in the domain
model, a security requirement can be used in several risk treatments. For example, a
security requirement like Access to information by users shall be restricted according
to the access control policy can be used to reduce a risk involving a threat agent
external to the company and a risk involving an employee of the company. The same
applies for controls, that can be used to implement several security requirements.
For example, a firewall can provide data filtering and access control capabilities, and
thus implement several security requirements. Defining such a function, relating the
cost of risk treatment to the cost of security requirements, and the cost of security
requirements to the cost of controls, is not the topic of this chapter. Each user defining
his/her own set of concrete metric, will define his/her function relating the different
risk treatment-related metrics. For example, if the cost is estimated quantitatively,
the cost of a security requirement composed of two controls could be the sum of the
cost of the two controls. At the opposite, if the cost is estimated on the qualitative
scale low/medium/high, and if the two controls have a medium cost, the security
requirement cost could be medium. The same reasoning applies for the risk reduction
metric.
Example: The decision of reducing the risk by some controls is chosen. The security
requirement Secure areas shall be protected by appropriate entry controls to ensure
that only authorized personnel are allowed access is selected and implemented through
doors equipped with detectors, each employee having his own access badge. The total
cost of the controls implemented and so of the security requirement is 8000$. The
risk treatment needing only this requirement, the total risk treatment cost is also of
8000$. Regarding the risk reduction, for both the security requirement and the risk
treatment, it has the level of 8, because the new risk level, reviewed considering the
new vulnerability level defined now to 0, is 4.
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5.6 Conclusion of the ISSRM metric elicitation
The objective of this chapter is to identify and define a set of metrics for the ISSRM
domain, with a systematic and scientific approach. The research method we defined
provides this capability through the combination of two complementary approaches.
First, the GQM approach is used to elicit the different metrics through a focus on the
objectives of the ISSRM domain, i.e. reaching the best ROSI. Then, a review of the
metrics proposed in the literature helps to be exhaustive in our metric elicitation, with
regards to what is currently used in security RM standards and methods.
It is necessary to note that this set of metrics is proposed at an abstract level. The
metrics can be implemented differently within a method (qualitatively, quantitatively,
etc.), or through several metrics, depending on the aim of the method. For example,
the likelihood metric of a threat can be implemented through several attributes of
the threat class, the first one being the statistic probability of occurrence of natural
threats (in %) and the second one being based on a qualitative level evaluation of
human threats. Before implementing these metrics in a method or a tool, it is neces-
sary to think about the best way of using them, depending on the objective and the
granularity level wanted. Therefore, this set of metrics has to be considered with an
implementation variability.
Although the elicited metrics are validated through literature analysis, their testing
in a real case would provide a concrete instantiation and validation of their relevance.
Chapter 7 is about the feedback of their use in an organisation in the frame of an
ISO/IEC 27001 certification, where ISSRM is at the core of the standard. A concrete
instantiation of these metrics is proposed and a feedback is given with regards to their
use.
5.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter, the ISSRM domain model was completed by the metrics used in
ISSRM, in order to reach the best ROSI. They were represented through attributes of
the conceptual model and defined through a glossary.
A research method was first presented, in order to define the metrics. Then, a
section dedicated to the theory of the different concepts and techniques used in this
chapter was proposed. It presented an introduction of the risk estimation, an overview
of the GQM method and a definition of the ROSI concept. The research method relied
on two steps, which were then performed through the rest of the chapter. The first
one was the application of the GQM method on the ISSRM domain model. This
method produced as output the set of metrics needed to perform ISSRM and reach
the best ROSI. The second step of the research method was the validation of the
GQM study performed during the first step. This validation relied on a survey of the
literature, focussed on the standards and methods allowing concept measurement. For
each approach, its ISSRM metrics were identified. The GQM study was thus reviewed
iteratively, based on the results obtained for each approach surveyed. Finally, the
domain model was enriched by the final set of metrics, defined through the application
of the research method. Some conclusions ended this chapter.
After defining the ISSRM domain model and its metrics, the objective is now
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to compare it with the existing security-oriented modelling languages. The topic of
the next chapter is the assessment of the support of each security-oriented modelling
languages, with regards to the concepts of the ISSRM domain model.
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Chapter 6
Assessment of ISSRM Support by
Security-oriented Modelling
Languages
T he aim of this section is to confront security-oriented modelling languages of Sec-tion 3.2 with the ISSRM domain model. Those languages are Misuse cases [SO05],
Abuse case [MF99], Mal-activity diagrams [Sin07], Abuse frames [LNI+03b, LNIJ04,
LNI+03a], KAOS extended to security (KeS) [vL04], the Tropos Goal-Risk framework
[AG06] and Secure Tropos [MG09, MGMP02, GMZ05]. Our objective is to improve
them to support the ISSRM activities, as depicted in Section 2.1. The research ques-
tion of this chapter is thus: what is the ISSRM support provided by security-oriented
modelling languages and how it can be improved? The main expected results of this
chapter are:
• the validation of the claim that the studied languages overlook RM,
• the assessment of the coverage that each modelling language has with respect to
ISSRM concepts;
• the identification of the improvements (extensions/revisions) to be made to the
languages to make them suitable for ISSRM.
Although we acknowledge that security and risk are crosscutting concerns that
should also be dealt with at all stages of IS development, we recall that our scope
is limited to ISSRM during early RE (Section 1.2). Hence, we are not considering
languages such as UMLsec [J02] or SecureUML [LBD02], which are languages used
later in the lifecycle, after the scope of the future system has been clarified. Moreover,
in the frame of this thesis, we only give details about the evaluation of KeS, Misuse
cases and Secure-Tropos. The complete assessment of Abuse case, Abuse frames, Mal-
activity diagrams and Tropos Goal-Risk framework remains future work. Furthermore,
Secure Tropos is the only language for which we provide improvements.
Section 6.1 explains the research method applied for language assessment. It is
used from Section 6.2 to 6.4, to report the assessment of Misuse cases, KeS and Se-
cure Tropos. Section 6.5 summarises the results and discussions of the assessment of
languages. Then, a Risk-aware Secure Tropos is presented in Section 6.6. Finally,
conclusions of this chapter are given in Section 6.7.
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6.1 Research method
The outcome of a language assessment is the concept alignment between the security-
oriented modelling language and the ISSRM domain model, showing the concept cov-
erage of ISSRM by the language (Figure 6.1). Our approach is based on the definition
of the language, composed of the language meta-model and the textual documentation
of the language in the literature. The ISSRM domain model is used as a reference for
the language comparison.
Figure 6.1: Research method applied for the assessment of ISSRM support by security mod-
elling languages
For each language, we use the running example to explain the alignment of the
language with regards to the ISSRM domain model. The running example is initially
used to illustrate the use of the language for addressing the security risks, during early
IS development. It follows the ISSRM steps presented in Section 2.1. We then con-
sider how the concepts of the language are used to address ISSRM. The alignment is
performed by focusing on concepts definition and relationships between them. This
step is performed incrementally, by iterative analysis of the textual document(s) and
the meta-model. The artefact produced is a table, highlighting the lack in each ex-
isting modelling languages to support ISSRM. In this table, for each ISSRM concept,
we gather the synonyms found in the literature of the language. Then, we identify
what is the modelling construct (coming from the meta-model of the security-oriented
language) used for representing this concept. Finally, the last column illustrates the
constructs with some examples extracted from the running example.
The reader should note that this alignment does not represent an equivalence be-
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tween the language concept and the ISSRM concept. We highlight only the support
provided by the language to model ISSRM. At the opposite, no information is given
about how a concept of a language is mapped/represented in the ISSRM domain model.
For example, Section 6.2 shows that, in Misuse cases, an actor can be used to represent
an ISSRM threat agent. It does not mean that the concept of actor is strictly equiva-
lent to the concept of threat agent : actors can also represent regular agents performing
a task in the organisation, like an engineer or a drawer in the running example.
6.2 Assessment of ISSRM support by Misuse cases
The assessment of ISSRM support by Misuse cases is done by analysing the Misuse
cases meta-model [SO05] and textual explanations provided in the associated literature
[SO00, SO01, SOB02, SFO03, SO05]. First, an illustration of the use of Misuse cases
for supporting the ISSRM steps is proposed. Then, the constructs of the language are
semantically aligned with the ISSRM domain model. Finally, a discussion is provided
with regards to this alignment.
6.2.1 Modelling ISSRM with Misuse cases
In this section, we illustrate with the running example how Misuse cases can be used
for security RM. Our application follows the steps of the ISSRM process described in
Section 2.1. We adapt the example of Section 3.2.2 and exploit the concepts of Misuses
case, which are presented in the same section.
Figure 6.2: Asset modelling in Misuse cases
• Context and asset identification. In Figure 6.2, a use case diagram for the
@rchimed's IS is presented. We focus on the actors Drawer and Engineer, who
communicate with @rchimed's IS. Engineer is involved in Establish structure
calculation and both actors in Design 3D mock-ups and Design technical
plans. Establish structure calculation includes two use cases: Update
parameters and Collect context information.
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• Determination of security objectives. Determination of security objectives
is not supported by Misuse cases, because no suited construct is proposed. In
our example, we concentrate on the integrity of structure calculation, meaning
that once the structure calculation is done, it cannot be changed by unauthorised
people.
• Risk analysis and assessment. In Figure 6.3, we identify misuse cases, which
involve the misuser Crook. The Crook threatens the integrity of Establish
structure calculation with the misuse case Steal login information. This
misuse case includes another misuse case, which describes certain steps in more
details: Use social engineering. In Figure 6.4, we illustrate the misuse case
Steal login information with an extensive template.
Figure 6.3: Risk modelling in Misuse cases
• Risk treatment. Misuse cases do not suggest any risk treatment. Following
the general ISSRM process, we apply risk reduction by introducing security use
cases.
• Security requirements definition. The use case Perform awareness training
(cf. Figure 6.5) is the security use case, which mitigates the identified misuse case
Use social engineering. It is part of the use case Establish a security
training plan initiated by the Security officer. The template for Steal
login information (cf. Figure 6.4) gives more details about this security use
case.
• Control selection and implementation. Misuse cases do not suggest any
technique to select and implement controls. Thus, one needs to resort to other
means to select between alternative controls.
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Figure 6.4: Example of the misuse cases template
Figure 6.5: Security requirements modelling in Misuse cases
6.2.2 Alignment of Misuse cases with ISSRM domain model
In this section, we analyse how Misuse cases constructs are interpreted with respect
to the ISSRM concepts. Figure 6.6 suggests an alignment between the ISSRM domain
model and Misuse cases. Both Misuse cases diagram and Misuse cases template are
analysed.
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Figure 6.6: Concept alignment between Misuse cases and the ISSRM domain model
Asset-related concepts
Some of the most important assets in the organisation are identified as the knowledge
and the skills of the workers; however, they are only vulnerable indirectly through the
misuse of other more tangible assets [SFO03]. According to [SO05], a use case achieves
something of value for the system owner. This corresponds to the ISSRM notion of
asset. The process guidelines for misuse cases modelling recommend to concentrate
on the normal actors and the main use cases requested by these [SO01] and to identify
the critical assets in the system [SO05]. Here, the notion of critical assets includes
materials, information, locations, activities, knowledge and skills of workers [SFO03],
virtual locations, and computerised activities [SO05]. Thus, in Figure 6.2, we consider
use cases as ISSRM assets. The combination of use cases using relationships (extend,
includes, and generalise) forms new assets. We consider the relationships as the part
of the assets, too.
The literature provides various definitions for a use case:
• a means to understand and describe business processes, where they are called
business use cases [BDG05],
• a means of focusing discussion about requirements of the system to be built. Here
use cases are eventually transformed into lists of typical functional requirements
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[BDG05] , and
• a part of the functional requirements of the system to be build [BDG05].
The first definition suggests to consider business use cases as ISSRM business assets
(e.g., Design 3D mock-ups, Design technical plans in Figure 6.2), whereas the
second and the third definitions suggest to consider use cases as IS assets. However, the
Misuse cases literature does not precisely distinguish business use cases from ordinary
use cases.
In the literature, we also find confusion seeking a correspondence for the notion
of ISSRM security criteria. In [SFO03], Sindre et al. speak about a security goal,
which is specified in terms of (1) who are the potential misusers, (2) the type of
security breaches the asset is vulnerable to and (3) the security level necessary for
that type of breach. Here, the security types are violations of [SFO03] system
integrity, availability and confidentiality, and is identified using security taxonomies.
Elsewhere [SO05], the notion of security goal is different: for each asset preferably
aided by a standard typology of security goals [SO05]. In both cases, no specific
graphical construct is suggested, so security criteria has to be specified using other
modelling means.
Risk-related concepts
The risk is the estimated likelihood of occurrence and cost of the damage if the threat
occurs [SFO03]. This definition corresponds to the definition of risk in the ISSRM
domain model in terms of involved concepts (this definition just put more emphasis on
the level of risk than of the components of risk). The notion of impact in Misuse cases
appears as the cost of the damage. It is claimed that relationships includes, extend,
and generalises, identified between misuse cases can aid risk analysis [SO05]. This
means that misuse cases can be defined at different level of abstraction. If a misuse
case is defined at a high level, it might refer to a risk. However, the literature does not
give any example. Thus, risk remains a concept without a specific graphical notation.
The security threats identified can be described as misuse cases and misusers
[SO05]. This statement corresponds to the definition of the ISSRM threat, which is
composed of a threat agent and an attack method. Thus, we identify correspondences
between the misuser, who is the actor that initiates misuse case [SO05] (e.g., Crook
in Figure 6.3), and ISSRM threat agent. Also we align the misuse case, which is a
sequence of actions [...] interacting with misuser and causing harm to stakeholder
[SO05] (e.g., Steal login information, Use social engineering in Figure 6.3)
and the ISSRM attack method. Finally, the threatens relationship, which indicates
how a use case is exploited or hindered by a misuse case [SO05], can be seen as the
`target' relationship between threat and IS asset.
Risk treatment-related concepts
Sindre et al. recommend for each identified threat and taking its risk into account, [to]
determine requirements to mitigate the threat [SFO03]. This means that appropriate
security requirements must be determined and specified [SFO03] and that the use
case is a countermeasure against a misuse case [SO05]. Further, security requirements
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defined are specified [...] as independent security use cases [SO05] and the security
use case must eventually have a mitigate relationship to a misuse case. This concludes
that security use cases (e.g., Perform awareness training in Figure 6.5) correspond
to the ISSRM security requirements.
The misuse cases mitigates link corresponds to the ISSRM mitigates relationship.
However here, the relationship is used at a lower level indicating how the threat (the
misuse case) is mitigated by the means of the security use cases. Misuse cases do not
indicate anything that would correspond to the ISSRM notions of risk treatment or
control.
6.2.3 Alignment of Misuse cases template and ISSRM
Use case diagrams have to be understood only as a table of content for the textual
templates to be filled for each of the use case. Although we dedicated most of the
discussion to the Misuse cases diagrams, in this subsection we will also consider how
the entries of the Misuse cases template correspond to the concepts of the ISSRM
domain model. The extensive template for Misuse cases is presented in [SO01, SO05]
and an example is given in Figure 6.4.
The analysis of the extensive template [SO05] indicates only one asset-related entry,
called Related business rules as a kind of ISSRM business asset. The extensive template
concentrates on risk-related concepts. For instance, ISSRM risk is addressed by the
entry Stakeholders and risks ; ISSRM vulnerability is specified by the entries Trigger,
Assumption, and Precondition; ISSRM impact is described by the Worst case threat ;
ISSRM attack method by the entries Basic path, Alternative path, and Extension
points. Finally, in the entry Misuser profile, it is possible to give details about the
misuser.
The Misuse cases template depends on the level of detail of the studied misuse
case. For example, if a misuse case is specified at a high level of granularity (e.g.,
Steal login information in Figure 6.3), the precondition would correspond to IS-
SRM vulnerability. But if a misuse case is defined at a lower level of detail (e.g., Use
social engineering in Figure 6.3) the precondition will define a state of the system
(state where the misuse case begins). In this case, the precondition will not have a
correspondence in the ISSRM domain model. Similar issues arise with other entries of
the template.
A Mitigation points entry links a misuse case with security use cases. This means
correspondence between mitigation points and ISSRM security requirements. Other
details of the risk treatment can be specified in the templates of the security use cases.
6.2.4 Discussion
Figure 6.6 gives a clear view of the coverage of Misuse cases with respect to the ISSRM
domain model. Some improvements can be suggested to Misuse cases (both graphical
diagrams and textual template) if used for ISSRM:
• Misuse cases do not distinguish some constructs that represent different concepts
of the ISSRM domain model. For example, IS assets, business assets and security
requirements are represented using the same visual construct for a use case. A
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tag to the use case label could be introduced to differentiate the concepts. For
example, in Figure 6.2, the use case label [BS]  Obtain available dates would
indicate a business asset; [IS]  Store available date would indicate an IS
asset; in Figure 6.5 [SR]  Perform cryptographic procedures would mean
a security requirement. However this might not completely solve the problem.
For example, in Figure 6.2, the use case Establish structure calculation
might be understood as a business asset (the engineer establishes the structure
calculation) and as an IS asset (he uses the software to do it).
• For some concepts (e.g., security criteria, risk, and impact), Misuse cases do
not provide modelling constructs. For instance ISSRM risk is not precisely de-
fined. In [SOB02, SO05], risk is said to be represented using the generalisa-
tion/specialisation, but we did not find sufficient information on this. The only
place where risk is specified is the entry of the textual template called Stake-
holders and risks. Misuse cases do not cover all concepts of the ISSRM domain
model. For example, when using misuse cases diagrams one needs to decide how
to model security criteria, risk, impact, vulnerability, risk treatment decisions,
and controls. Some of these concepts can be defined in the misuse cases template:
for example impact in the entry Worst case threat, vulnerability in the entries
Trigger, Assumption, and Precondition. Other concepts can be defined by ex-
tending the misuse cases template with additional entries. However, extending
template gives a different level of granularity, thus the misuse cases model might
become complex.
• We also observe partial coverage of some concepts. For example, Misuse cases
allow modelling of assets such as workers who have skills and knowledge about the
business, using the actor constructs. However the language excludes modelling
of the threats to the actors.
6.3 Assessment of ISSRM support by KAOS extended to se-
curity
The assessment of ISSRM support by KeS is done by analysing the KAOS meta-
model [MHO06] and textual explanations provided in the associated literature. Several
papers are dedicated to KAOS and its concepts [vL03, Let01]. The concepts specific
to KeS are described in [vL04]. The following sections present the use of KeS on the
running example for supporting the ISSRM process, and, then, the alignment with the
ISSRM domain model and related discussions are provided.
6.3.1 Modelling ISSRM with KAOS extended to security
In this section, the example proposed in Section 3.2.1 is adapted to illustrate ISSRM,
following the steps described in Section 2.1. A summary of KeS concepts is also
proposed in Section 3.2.1.
• Context and asset identification. This step is done through the definition
of goals and their refinement in the KAOS goal model, as depicted in Figure
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6.7. The main goal studied in the exemple is Achieve[BuildingValidated],
which is refined in: the domain property ParametersAreReliable (which is part
of the context) and the subgoals PerformStructureCalculation and Avoid-
[StructureCalculationModifiedByCrook]. More details about the IS are given
in the operation model. The goal PerformStructureCalculation is associated
to the agent Engineer and the operations EnterBuildingInformation, Launch-
Calculation, and SelectContextParameters. Finally, the objects used within
the operations are defined, like DatabaseOfParameters.
Figure 6.7: Asset and security objective modelling in KeS
• Determination of security objectives. As seen in Figure 6.7, the determi-
nation of security objectives is done in the same model and generally in the
same time as the elicitation of other goals. Avoid[StructureCalculation-
ModifiedByCrook] is an example of security objective, meaning that the in-
tegrity of structure calculation should be preserved. This security objective can
be reached through two alternative goals: Avoid[LoginInformationKnownBy-
Crook] and Avoid[ServerConfigurationKnownByCrook].
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• Risk analysis and assessment. Risk analysis is done by building an anti-
model, like in Figure 6.8. In our example, the anti-goal analysed is Achieve-
[LoginInformationKnownByCrook]. This anti-goal is refined in subgoals (e.g.,
Achieve[LoginKnownByCrook], Achieve[PasswordKnownByCrook], Achieve[-
PasswordLearntByTheUser]) until reching anti-requirements (e.g., Achieve[-
UseSocialEngineeringToFindThePassword]) assigned to anti-agent (Attacker
in Figure 6.8). Vulnerabilities are also identified in anti-model, like Employees-
NotSecurityAware. In the operation model, the operations performed to satisfy
the goal Achieve[UseSocialEngineeringToFindThePassword]) are defined.
Figure 6.8: Risk modelling in KeS
• Risk treatment. In KeS, risk treatment is defined through the countermeasure
chosen for handling the anti-model, and its associated vulnerabilities and anti-
goals. In our example, the countermeasure chosen is Vulnerability avoidance,
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in order to avoid that employees are not security aware.
• Security requirements definition. New security goals are emerging from this
countermeasure. A new goal model is thus built, with additional security goal(s),
requirement(s) and/or expectation(s). In Figure 6.9, a new requirement called
PerformAwarenessTraining is added to the goal model presented in Figure 6.7.
This requirement is assigned to the Security officer agent.
Figure 6.9: Security requirements and control modelling in KeS
• Control selection and implementation. The update of the goal model, which
might include the refinement and the operationnalisation of the new added goals,
constitutes the new system-to-be, as in Figure 6.9.
6.3.2 Alignment of KAOS extended to security with ISSRM domain model
In Figure 6.10, we present how KeS covers the ISSRM domain model. We illustrate
the mapping with examples from Figure 6.7 to 6.9.
Asset-related concepts
KeS is mainly focused on the security of the system-to-be, but it does not make a
separation between the IS and business aspects. Thus, we align all three ISSRM
concepts concerning assets with the KAOS goal, requirement and expectation (Figure
6.10). Moreover, their operationalisation in operation and object are also assets. In
KAOS, states of the system-to-be are described using object attributes. The purpose
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Figure 6.10: Concept alignment between KAOS extended to security and the ISSRM domain
model
of the security goals is to protect system states against unauthorised access. In terms
of KAOS, this means that the security goals should define confidentiality, privacy,
integrity, and availability goal, and object attributes, which are concerned by poten-
tial risk events and threats [vL04]. Thus, we align both (security) goals and object
attributes concerned by anti-goal with ISSRM security criteria.
Risk-related concepts
In Figure 6.10, we align together ISSRM event and threat with KAOS anti-goal (also
called malicious obstacle or threat). Anti-goals can be identified at various abstraction
levels, so they might need to be refined until they become anti-requirements or anti-
expectations (assigned to an anti-agent). At higher abstraction levels, an anti-goal
might be considered as the event, which, according to the ISSRM domain model, is
a combination of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities. At lower abstraction (re-
alisation) levels, an anti-goal (anti-requirement or anti-expectation) is a threat, which
is a potential attack or incident to assets. The language concepts for anti-goal, anti-
requirement and anti-expectation remains respectively goal, requirement and expecta-
tion. In Figure 6.10, we align ISSRM vulnerability and the KAOS domain property.
The KAOS domain property is a hypothesis about the domain that holds indepen-
dently of the system-to-be. In correspondence, ISSRM vulnerability is defined as a
characteristic of assets. Following the ISSRM domain model, a threat is composed
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of a threat agent and an attack method. A threat agent can potentially cause harm
to the assets. In KAOS, an anti-agent (e.g., Attacker) monitors or controls objects
and their attributes, and is thereby capable to threaten the system-to-be. In Figure
6.10, we align ISSRM threat agent and KAOS anti-agent. The ISSRM attack method
characterises the means by which a threat agent carries out the attack. In KAOS an
anti-agent performs operations that satisfy an anti-goal. Operations change the state
of the system-to-be using input/output relationships over the objects and their at-
tributes. This means that by performing operations, the anti-agent breaks the security
criteria (related to object attributes). We align ISSRM attack method with the KAOS
constructs used to operationalise the anti-goal, namely operationalisation, domain and
required conditions and operation. KAOS does not address two risk-related concepts
from the ISSRM domain model: risk and impact.
Risk treatment-related concepts
ISSRM risk treatment corresponds to the countermeasures [vL04, vLL00] that are
elaborated after identification of the anti-goals. Countermeasures are not KAOS mod-
elling concepts, but rather modelling idioms or patterns adopted by modellers. In
KAOS, the countermeasures usually result in new security goals, which need to be
further refined into realisable security requirements and expectations. In Figure 6.10,
we align ISSRM security requirements and the KAOS security goals (requirements and
expectations). The refinement and operationalisation of the new security goals, their
concerned objects and attributes, and their assignment to agents, lead to new system-
to-be components realising the necessary security means. With respect to the ISSRM
domain model, these new system components correspond to controls.
6.3.3 Discussion
The alignment of KeS with the ISSRM domain model highlights some limitations. The
coverage of KeS is not perfect and some improvements can be proposed:
• We were not able to find sufficient empirical evidences that would provide to us
a complete model of a secured system (neither security RM of IS) modelled with
KeS. The works we succeeded to identify on the KAOS extensions to security
include [vL04, vLBLJ03]. However they only illustrate the major security mod-
elling principles. The models presented in these works are limited and do not
provide much modelling details. As the conclusion, Figure 6.10 lists only the
primitive language constructs and their correspondences to the ISSRM domain
model. However, we must note that one also can identify construct combinations
in order to model some aspects of the security RM as the modelling patterns. The
models presented in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 are adapted from [vL04]. This model
suggests few simple modelling patterns to address security RM concerns. For
example, we can observe that a threat (e.g., Achieve[UseSocialEngineering-
ToFindThePassword]) will be presented as (anti) requirement or expectation and
always will be assigned to (anti) agent (e.g., Attacker). This combination of con-
structs leads to a simple pattern combining together ISSRM threat, threat agent
and attack method and shown in Figure 6.11. Here, the operationalisation
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relationship combines (at least) two operations corresponding to the attack
method.
Similarly, in Figure 6.12 we can also observe the pattern for risk event. It is a com-
bination of the (anti) goal (e.g., Achieve[PasswordLearntByTheUser]), at least
one (anti) requirement or expectation (e.g., Achieve[UseSocialEngineeringTo-
FindThePassword]) and domain property (e.g., EmployeesNotSecurityAware).
The pattern is shown in Figure 6.12.
• Similar constructs of KeS are used to support different ISSRM concepts. For
example, a goal can be used to model (business or IS) asset, security criteria,
event, threat or security requirement. We can determine that a goal is a threat
or an event whether it is part of an anti-model. However, for the other cases, no
way to distinguish one ISSRM concept to the other is provided. As for Misuse
cases, a solution could be to introduce labels in front of the construct label: e.g.,
[BS]  business assets, [IS]  IS assets, [SR]  security requirements. Another
proposal could be to determine a new concrete syntax for these concepts.
• KAOS does not address two concepts from the ISSRM domain model: risk and
impact. This can be partly explained by the fact that KAOS was not specifically
designed to consider the business context of an IS. However, these concepts might
be derived from the implicit description of the modelled problem. For example,
in Figure 6.8, we present a risk event as the goal Achieve[PasswordKnownBy-
Crook]. Achievement of this goal might lead to the impact called Structure
calculation modified by crook. Further this might form a chain of impacts,
like Construction mistake, Loss of reputation, and so on. The impact
might be characterised both by introducing additional goals and by defining con-
cerns relationships between the goal/anti-goal and object/anti-object models.
However, this requires further theoretical and empirical investigation. Similar
argumentation can also be provided about other ISSRM concepts, like risk.
• Finally, some KeS constructs only provide partial coverage of ISSRM concept.
For example, the countermeasures proposed by KeS only partially cover the IS-
SRM risk treatment. For example, agent substitution is used in KeS to replace
a vulnerable agent assigned to a threatened goal by a less vulnerable one for the
threatening anti-goal. However, it only partially covers the risk treatment of risk
transfer, because the vulnerability is not always on an agent when choosing the
risk transfer treatment.
6.4 Assessment of ISSRM support by Secure Tropos
In this section, we illustrate how we can use the Secure Tropos approach to anal-
yse security risks and how to derive suited countermeasures from these risks. We
summarise the discussion on alignment in Figure 6.17. This alignment is based on
the Secure Tropos literature [MG07a, MGM02, MJF06, MGM03b, Mou04, GMZ07,
MG09, MG04, MGMP02, MGM03a, MGM05], sometimes presenting (part of) the
Secure Tropos meta-model [SPM05].
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Figure 6.11: KeS pattern for ISSRM threat
Figure 6.12: KeS pattern for ISSRM event
6.4.1 Modelling ISSRM with Secure Tropos
In this section, the example proposed in Section 3.2.5 is adapted to illustrate ISSRM,
following the steps described in Section 2.1. A summary of Secure Tropos concepts is
also proposed in Section 3.2.5.
• Context and asset identification. Figure 6.13 shows an actor model, repre-
senting the actors playing a role in the estimate definition, and the associated
dependencies between actors. In our example, the actors are Study office,
Sales department and Client. The dependencies are of two kinds: resource
dependency (Estimates, 3D mock-ups and Technical plans) and goal depen-
dendy (Manage projects and Calculate structure), but can also be softgoal
or plan dependency. More information about the dependencies is provided in the
goal model, making clear how the actors reason about goals to be fulfilled, plans
to be performed and available resources. It completes the actor model with the
reasoning that each actor makes about its internal goals, plans and resources.
In Figure 6.13, the goal model of the Study office shows that, for satisfying
the goal Calculate structure, two different means (i.e. plans) are possible:
By hand or By tool. Plans and resources necessary to perform the structure
calculation with a tool are also defined. The calculation through a tool helps to
obtain documents of quality, as shown by the positive contribution between the
plan By tool and the softgoal Documents of quality.
• Determination of security objectives. The ISSRM security objectives are
expressed in Figure 6.14 through security constraints, restricting some depen-
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Figure 6.13: Asset modelling in Secure Tropos
dencies. For example, the Sales department should Keep estimates private
and the Study office should Keep integrity of calculation. The latter is
related with a constraint link (link with restricts label) to the plan By tool
in the security-enhanced goal model (as explained in Section 3.2.5, by adding
security constraints, the goal model becomes a security-enhanced goal model).
This security constraint also helps to obtain Documents of quality.
Figure 6.14: Security objective modelling in Secure Tropos
• Risk analysis and assessment. Figure 6.15 focuses on a possible risk event. A
Secure Tropos threat to the softgoal Documents of quality is identified in the
attack diagram of Figure 6.15. The attack diagram is an adaptation of a security
reference diagram we introduce, including elements of a security-enhanced goal
model. The threat is about Authentication attack, aiming for an attacker to
authenticate to the tool. This diagram is completed by a security attack scenario.
It shows that the goal of the Attacker is to know the login information of a user
of the tool. To achieve his goal, he uses social engineering. His belief is that the
employees are not security aware, that constitutes a vulnerability in this context.
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His attack targets the resource Information database of the Study office. In
Figure 6.15, the security attack scenario can be seen as the refinement of the
security event identified in the attack diagram.
Figure 6.15: Risk modelling in Secure Tropos
• Risk treatment. In our example, the risk treatment chosen is to reduce the
risk by adding some secure goals/plans/resources. Naturally, other decisions are
possible, like avoiding the risk by modifying the security-enhanded actor and/or
goal models, or adding another actor, as third party, to share the risk.
• Security requirements definition. The risk treatment chosen leads to mod-
ification of the security-enhanced goal model of Figure 6.14. A secure goal
Make users security aware is added, satisfied by the secure plan Perform
awareness training. This plan has a positive contribution to the security con-
straint Keep integrity of calculation, as depicted in Figure 6.16.
Figure 6.16: Security requirements and control modelling in Secure Tropos
• Control selection and implementation. Softgoals can be used to reason on
the differences between control alternatives. This step takes place after controls
are defined, that usually happens during the design phase.
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6.4.2 Alignment of Secure Tropos with ISSRM domain model
To analyse how Secure Tropos can help to solve ISSRM problems at the early stages
of IS development, we have surveyed the existing Secure Tropos literature in order to
understand its major principles and concepts. Next, we have applied Secure Tropos
in the running example. This application strongly follows the process proposed in
Section 2.1 and the concepts suggested by the ISSRM domain model. We result in
the semantic alignment between ISSRM and Secure Tropos as illustrated in Figure
6.17. This table shows how (and if) Secure Tropos can be aligned with the principles
of ISSRM.
Figure 6.17: Concept alignment between Secure Tropos and the ISSRM domain model
Asset-related concepts
In Secure Tropos, we identify that the actor, goal, resource and plan constructs (and
appropriate relationships among them) are used to model both business and IS assets.
For instance, on the one hand, the actors Study Office and Sales department, the
goals Manage projects and Calculate structures (cf. Figure 6.13) describe the
process necessary for the organisation to achieve its objectives. On the other hand, the
resources Technical plans and 3D mock-ups characterise the valuable information.
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All the mentioned examples are identified as business assets with respect to the ISSRM
domain model.
The business processes and information management are mainly supported by the
IS of the Study office. In more details (cf. Figure 6.13), the support for the business
asset Calculate structure is performed through the plans By hand or By tool. By
tool is itself refined by the plans Enter building information, Select context
parameters, Launch calculation and by the resource Information database. The
concepts which describe how a component or part of the IS is necessary in supporting
business assets are called IS assets.
The ISSRM security criteria are properties or constraints on business assets char-
acterising their security needs. In Secure Tropos, softgoals can help to identify higher
level security criteria, like confidentiality, integrity and availability. Depending on the
context, it might be necessary to refine them or to specify more precise security crite-
ria, like we do by using the security constraints Keep estimates private and Keep
integrity of calculation (cf. Figure 6.14).
Risk-related concepts
Risk is described by the event of the risk, corresponding to the Authentication
attack in Figure 6.15. The potentional negative consequence of the risk, identified
by a negative contribution link between the Authentication attack and the softgoal
Documents of quality is called impact of the risk. Here, the impact negates the
security criteria Keep integrity of calculation.
In Figure 6.15, the goal Login info known corresponds to the threat describing the
potential attack targeting the IS asset Information database. The threat is triggered
by the threat agent Attacker who knows about the lack in security awareness for
employees, as identified by the belief in Figure 6.15. To break into the Study office
system, the Attacker carries an attack method consisting of the plan Use social
engineering.
Note that in Figure 6.17, belief only partially corresponds to ISSRM vulnerability.
Firstly, the fact that the actor (who has the role of the attacker) thinks he knows, might
be true. In this case, the belief will correspond to vulnerability in the sense of the
ISSRM. However, facts known by the attacker might be wrong: in this case there is no
corresponding concept in the ISSRM. Finally, belief does not represent vulnerabilities
which exist in the system, but is not known by the attacker. We will come back to the
discussion about belief in Section 6.6, where we suggest to use vulnerability points to
address the ISSRM concept of vulnerability.
Risk treatment-related concepts
In our case, we apply risk reduction decision. This leads to a modification of the IS
design, reducing the identified risk. New security requirements (cf. Figure 6.16) are
identified as the goal Make users security aware and the plan Perform awareness
training. We illustrate the countermeasure only using the Secure Tropos goal and
plan constructs, however we must note that, depending on the selected risk treatment
decision, the combination of actor, goal, softgoal, resource, plan, and security constraint
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might result in different security control systems. A new model implementing the
necessary security components is the output of this phase.
6.4.3 Discussion
Our alignment of Secure Tropos constructs with the concepts of the ISSRM domain
model has shown several limitations of Secure Tropos, to investigate security RM at
the early stages (requirements) of the IS development. At the same time, it suggests
a number of possible improvements for Secure Tropos, in the context of security RM:
• Analysis showed that Secure Tropos has to provide guidelines as to when and
how to use each construct, in order to avoid misinterpretations of the ISSRM
concepts. For example, as shown in Figure 6.17, the plan construct can be used to
model business assets, IS assets, threats and security requirements. One possible
solution in this situation might be introduction of labels in front of the construct
label (e.g., [BS]  business assets, [IS]  IS assets, [Th]  threat, and [SR] 
security requirements). Another solution is to design a discriminating concrete
syntax, which would allow to separate these concerns. Finally, decomposition of
the model into separate diagrams, where separate concerns (business assets, IS
assets, attack scenario and security requirements) would be modelled, should be
considered. The latter two aspects we develop in Section 6.6.
• We have also noticed that Secure Tropos could be improved with additional
constructs to better cover the concepts of ISSRM. Figure 6.17 indicates that
several concepts such as risk, risk treatment, and control are not in the Secure
Tropos approach. Thus, one needs either to define graphical constructs to address
these concepts, or to provide methodological guidelines how these concepts might
be addressed in the model.
• Finally, the semantics of individual modelling constructs should be adapted so
that they adequately represent ISSRM concepts. For example, as discussed previ-
ously, the belief construct only partially covers vulnerability. A possible improve-
ment, on the one hand, is to suggest the modelling construct which would ade-
quately support modelling of system vulnerabilities. On the other hand, recently
in [EY07], Elahi and Yu have introduced vulnerable points. We will investigate
the latter option in Section 6.6.
6.5 Summary of language comparison
Our provisional general remarks about security-oriented languages, after their align-
ment with the ISSRM domain model, are the following. Misuse cases [SO05] and
Abuse Cases [MF99] are mainly focused on eliciting threat agents and their attack
methods. The main difference between the two is that Misuse cases integrate regular
Use Cases with threatening Use Cases, whereas Abuse Cases only focus on the latter.
KeS already integrates some core ISSRM concepts like threat or vulnerability. KAOS
was initially designed to cope with safety-critical software systems [vLL00]. However,
the approach is not risk-driven and the concept of risk does not appear. Secure-Tropos
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[MG09, MGMP02, GMZ05] features three complementary kinds of models: classical
Secure-Tropos models, attack diagrams (adaptation of security reference diagrams) and
security attack scenarios [MMM+08]. None of those three kinds of models addresses
security with a risk-driven approach, and some core components of the concept of risk
are missing (e.g., risk, impact). Table 6.1 summarises the ISSRM support by these
security-oriented languages.
Table 6.1: Survey of ISSRM support by security-oriented languages
Misuse cases Misuse cases template Secure Tropos KeS
Asset
Actor and Use case
-
Actor, Goal, Softgoal,
Plan, Ressource
Goal, Requirement,
Expectation, Operation,
object
Business
asset
Related business rules
IS asset -
Security cri-
terion
- -
Security constraint, Soft-
goal
Goal, Object attributes
Risk - Stakeholders and risks - -
Impact - Worst case threat
Contribution between
threat and softgoal
-
Event - - Threat Goal, Requirement,
Expectation (in
anti-model)
Threat
Misuser and Misuse
case
- Goal, Plan
Vulnerability -
Assumption, Precondi-
tion
- 1 Domain property
Threat
agent
Misuser Misuser profile Actor Agent
Attack
method
Misuse Case
Basic path, Alternative
path, Extension points
Plan, relationship attack
Operationalisation + Do-
main and required condi-
tions + Operations
Risk treat-
ment
- - - -
Security re-
quirement
Use case Mitigation point
Actor, Goal, Softgoal,
Plan, Ressource, Secu-
rity constraint
Goal, Requirement, Ex-
pectation
Control
New model implement-
ing security compo-
nents
-
New model implementing
security components
New model implementing
security components
Our assessment provides a path for improving each proposed language with ISSRM
concepts, as we already started to discuss for selected languages (Section 6.2 to 6.4).
The main ways of improvement are:
• to be able to distinguish the ISSRM concept represented, when several concepts
are supported by the same modelling construct;
• to complete the coverage of the language for the ISSRM concepts not supported;
• to extend or precise the language when some ISSRM concepts are only partially
covered.
Although we did not completely study the other security-oriented modelling lan-
guages, we surveyed them and provided some preliminary conclusions. The coverage
of Abuse Frames [LNI+03b, LNIJ04, LNI+03a] is close to KAOS', apart from the con-
cepts related to risk treatment. Abuse Frames are indeed focused on detailing the
1According to the definition found in Tropos literature [BGG+04], Belief can partially be compliant with
vulnerability modelling. However we did not observe any example of its use.
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security problem domain rather than investigating possible designs. Mal-activity di-
agrams [Sin07] are focused on detailing a threat scenario, by precisely describing the
behaviors of the involved actors, including naturally malicious ones. Finally, the Tro-
pos Goal-Risk framework [AG06] deals with RM at a general level, without taking into
account security-specific concepts. A complete analysis of those languages will provide
more precise results.
6.6 A Risk-aware Secure Tropos
The purpose of this section is to develop syntactic, semantic and methodological ex-
tensions to Secure Tropos, that would support modelling of security risks and their
countermeasures. First, we suggest extensions to the concrete syntax and show how
they are addressed in the abstract syntax. Next, we define methodological guidelines.
Finally, we discuss the extensions with respect to the ISSRM domain model.
6.6.1 Concrete syntax extension
In Section 6.4 (Figure 6.17), we have separated the concrete syntax of Secure Tropos
according to three construct categories: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts,
and risk treatment-related concepts. In addition to the ISSRM constructs aligned
in Figure 6.4, here in Figures 6.18, 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21, we consider how ISSRM
relationships (e.g., supports, constraint of, exploits, targets, mitigates, and others) can
be expressed with Secure Tropos. We also make a link between Secure Tropos concrete
and abstract syntax, which is considered in Section 6.6.2.
Asset-related concepts.
The ISSRM assets (cf. Fig. 6.18) are modelled using actor, hardgoal, plan, resource,
softgoal constructs and their compositions constructed using dependency, means-ends,
contribution, and decomposition relations. Moreover, ISSRM supports relationship,
between IS and business assets, is expressed using the different Secure Tropos rela-
tionships.
The ISSRM security criterion is represented through softgoal and/or security con-
straint. Softgoal represents generally high-level security criteria and security constraint
their refinement. Note that in Secure Tropos, one security constraint can be decom-
posed to others, thus, forming a security constraint hierarchy.
The ISSRM relationship constraint of is addressed both implicitly and explicitly
in Secure Tropos. Firstly, in the Secure Tropos security-enhanced actor model, we
can observe an implicit restriction of the dependum (hardgoal, task or resource) in
the dependency relationship. This means that security constraint is imposed to the
depender or/and dependee actor. Secondly, in the security-enhanced goal model, the
ISSRM constraint of relationship is presented explicitly by the restricts relationship.
It shows the actual goal, plan or resource restricted by the security constraint.
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Figure 6.18: Asset-related concepts (C  concept, R  relationships)
Risk-related concepts.
As presented in Figure 6.17, standard Secure Tropos constructs can be used to model
risk-related concerns. However, there exists a high degree to misinterpret the pre-
sented information. Thus, we recommend to differentiate concrete syntax of these
Secure Tropos concepts. In [LYM03] and [EY07], black shadows are used to represent
malicious language constructs. Elsewhere, in [SO05], malicious information is mod-
elled using contrasting construct colours (e.g., white vs. black). For Secure Tropos,
we suggest to use more solid (darker) colours applied for the construct background
(cf. Figure 6.19). We represent threat agent as an actor, attack method as a plan,
threat as a hardgoal and/or plan. As proposed in Section 6.4.3, vulnerability point is
introduced to represent a vulnerability. This extension coming from [EY07] is more
aligned with vulnerability of ISSRM than the existing Belief. Secure Tropos attacks
relationship represents the targets relationship of ISSRM. In order to be compliant
with ISSRM, we also introduce the exploits relationship, which defines a link between
a plan (ISSRM threat) and an asset with a vulnerability point.
After defining how we can represent threat agent, attack method, and vulnerability,
we can combine these concepts to represent the event of the risk (cf. Figure 6.20).
To generalise this representation, one can use the Secure Tropos threat constructs.
The former representation of the risk event is used in the security attack scenario, in
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Figure 6.19: Risk-related concepts - I (C  concept, R  relationships)
order to represent details of the event. The latter representation is used in the attack
diagram, to identify risks to assets. Here, a risk is understood as the combination of
the risk event (represented as the Secure Tropos threat) and impact (represented using
the impacts relationship).
Figure 6.20: Risk-related concepts - II (C  concept, R  relationships)
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Risk treatment-related concepts.
For the necessity of differentiating ISSRM concepts, we also need to update the vi-
sual syntax of risk treatment-related concepts. Constructs, like actor, hardgoal, plan,
softgoal, and security constraint (and/or their combinations), which represent security
requirements and/or controls, need to carry a dotted background pattern (cf. Fig-
ure 6.21). Security requirement mitigates the identified risk. To represent this, we
introduce mitigates relationship, defining a link between constructs representing the
ISSRM security requirement concept and the threat (as the ISSRM event of the risk).
Figure 6.21: Risk treatment-related concepts (C  concept, R  relationships)
6.6.2 Abstract syntax extension
In Section 6.4, we have not presented abstract syntax of Secure Tropos due to the
need of the simple introduction of the language itself. However, to illustrate how the
proposed syntactic Secure Tropos extensions are used, we need to present abstract
syntax elements and the rules how they can be combined together.
The abstract syntax of Secure Tropos consists of two meta-models: SEAM (Security-
Enhanced Actor Model) and SEGM (Security-Enhanced Goal Model). Due to the need
of reducing presentation complexity, in addition to these two meta-models, we will
discuss abstract relationships of the security constraint and security attack scenarios
separately.
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Security-Enhanced Actor Model
Figure 6.22 presents the SEAM abstract syntax. The major element is an Actor who
might be a depender or dependee in a Dependency relationship [BGG+04, Yu97]. A
Security Constraint is imposed to an Actor, that represents a restriction on the
Hardgoal(s), Plan(s) and/or Resource(s) on an Actor related to security issues
[MG07a]. A Security Constraint enhances the language by defining the notion of
Secure Dependency.
A Secure Dependency introduces one or more Security Constraint(s) that
must be fulfilled for the dependency to be valid [MG07a]. We distinguish among three
types of secure dependencies: dependee secure dependency, depender secure depen-
dency, and double secure dependency. Different Secure Dependency types are defined
using Depender and Dependee attributes of Security Constraint.
Figure 6.22: SEAM abstract syntax
Security-Enhanced Goal Model
Figure 6.23 presents the SEGM abstract syntax. Again, the major element of this
meta-model is an Actor who executes Plans, uses Resources, and has Goals. Plans
can be and/or decomposed to other Plans, Resources, or Hardgoals. Hardgoals
(and Secure goals) are achieved through and/or Means-ends relationship by satisfying
other Hardgoals, executing Plans or making Resources available. In order to satisfice
Softgoals, a sufficient degree contribution should be defined with other Softgoals,
Security constraints, Plans, Resources or Hardgoals.
Security constraint and Threat
As already illustrated in the SEAM meta-model, Security constraint is imposed to
Actor. It Restricts (cf. Figure 6.24) execution of Plans, availability of Resources
and achievement of Hardgoals held by this Actor. One analyses Security Constraints
using a number of modelling techniques, such as security constraint decomposition; se-
curity constraint delegation and security constraint assignment [Mou04]. A secure
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Figure 6.23: SEGM abstract syntax
goal represents the strategic interest of an Actor with respect to security. Secure goals
are mainly introduced to contribute to the satisfaction of Security Constraints by
defining Satisfies relationship (cf. Figure 6.24). A secure plan is defined as a Plan
(by managing isSecure attribute) that represents a particular way for satisfying a se-
cure goal. On the other hand, a secure resource is defined as an entity that is security
critical for the system under development.
A proper definition of how Security constraint is satisfied, is needed to illustrate
how it can mitigate a Threat. Threats are mitigated to lower the Impact to Plans,
Resources and Hardgoals.
As discussed above, Security Constraint is one of the major elements which
defines security concerns in the model; thus, it requires a special attention (cf. Figure
6.24). Security Constraint has a number of relationships with other concepts of the
language. Security Constraint can Restrict Plan, Resource and Hardgoal. The
visual representation for Restrict is used in the SEGM model, however its implicit
meaning is contained already in the SEAM model because Security Constraint
places restrictions on the Secure Dependency fulfillment.
Security attack scenarios
Figure 6.25 presents the abstract syntax of Secure Tropos used when defining the se-
curity attack scenarios. Here we have to note that, in security attack scenarios, two
conceptually different sets of constructs are used: asset- and risk-related constructs
to address the corresponding ISSRM concepts. Thus, they both obey the same syn-
tax rules (presented in Figure 6.22 and 6.23) when combined within this conceptual
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Figure 6.24: Abstract syntax of Security constraint and Threat
boundary. The difficulty arise when one wants to show relationship between them
both.
Figure 6.25: Abstract syntax of Security attack scenario
We need to distinguish system actors (assets) from malicious actors (attakers).
First, we introduce an attribute attacker to the class Actor, as shown in Figure
6.25. Next, we define an integrity constraint, saying that Actor A who executes a
Plan exploiting/attacking other elements in the diagram, and Actor B who holds
exploited/attacked elements, are different. Finally, for actor A, we set an attribute
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attacker true, meaning a malicious actor (graphical representation is provided in
Figure 6.19). Actor B's attribute is set as false, meaning that this actor represents
attacked assets (graphical representation in Figure 6.18).
Two relationships are defined between elements held by these two actors. A Plan
executed by an attacker Exploits a target (Hardgoal, Resource, or Plan). Exploits
relationship points to the vulnerability point (cf. attribute vulnerabilityPoint) of
the target. The Attacks relationship shows a link between a Plan executed by a
malicious actor and the Resource used by an attacked actor.
In the next subsection, we will provide methodological guidelines for the Risk-
aware Secure Tropos application. We will use the running example, and improve the
illustration provided in Section 6.4.
6.6.3 Application of Risk-aware Secure Tropos
The objective of this section is to demonstrate how concrete and abstract syntax
extensions are used in an example. Here, we will use the running example again and
incrementally provide guidelines for modelling with Risk-aware Secure Tropos.
Language application includes three major stages. The first stage covers the two
first steps of the ISSRM process, presented in Section 2.1: Context and asset iden-
tification and Determination of security objectives. The second stage comprises Risk
analysis and assessment. Finally, the third stage corresponds to Security requirements
definition, coming from Risk treatment decisions, and leading to new controls.
Stage 1. Asset identification and determination of security objectives.
At this stage, concrete syntax of Secure Tropos does not differ from the standard one
presented in [MGM02, MGMP02, MPM03, MG04, MJF06] and used in Section 6.4.
However, as we discussed in Section 6.4.3, here we need to make a separation between
two ISSRM concepts, namely business assets and IS assets. We do this separation
by constructing two diagrams: one presenting business assets (Figure 6.26), another
introducing IS assets (Figure 6.27). In the first diagram shown in Figure 6.26, there
is no information about how the IS supports different processes or information (i.e.
how it supports the business assets). Here, we represent only goals (e.g., Calculate
structure), plans and resources (e.g., Technical plans) related to business artefacts
and activities.
Following the steps of the ISSRM process (Figure 2.1), we need to define security
objectives. In Secure Tropos, it is possible to identify general security objectives
using softgoals (e.g., Documents of quality in Figure 6.26) and then to refine them
using security criteria expressed with security constraints (e.g., Keep integrity of
calculation and Keep estimates private). This strategy is a `top-down' security
objectives identification. However, in Secure Tropos, after defining actor model, it is
more natural to define implicit security objectives as the secure dependencies. Then,
identified security constraints (e.g., Keep integrity of calculation) are examined
with respect to security objectives of higher level (e.g., Documents of quality) for
the system. This strategy we name as `bottom-up'.
Then, the IS assets are represented in a diagram, shown in Figure 6.27. Here,
the main objective is to discover what plans have to be performed, resources should
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be available, and goals need to be fulfilled, in order to support business assets. For
example, in Figure 6.27, plans (e.g., By hand, By tool) are introduced in order to
fulfil the goal Calculate structure.
Figure 6.26: Modelling of business assets
Figure 6.27: Modelling of IS assets
Stage 2. Risk analysis and assessment.
At the second stage, we introduce possible risks. We start by determining the security
events. Figure 6.28 focuses on a possible event of the risk to which the IS could be ex-
posed, called Authentication attack. It describes a situation where a threat agent
passes himself off as a trusted actor by stealing an identity, and damages the data
in the Information database. The Authentication attack impacts Documents of
quality. The traceability between Documents of quality and Calculate structure
shows the harm at the business level (Figure 6.26). However, in this situation Documents
of quality can be interpreted twofold. Firstly, it can represent an asset, which is im-
portant to an organisation. Then, the impacts link represents a harm the risk makes.
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Secondly, Documents of quality could be considered as a security criterion, which
needs to be respected. In this case, impact defines negation of the security criterion.
Figure 6.28: Identification of an authentication attack
After identifying the possible risk, we need to refine it in terms of threat, vulner-
ability, threat agent and attack method. This is done in the security attack scenario
in Figure 6.28. Here, an Attacker has a threat (Login info known) to an IS as-
set Information database, which supports business asset Calculate structure.
Attacker attacks Information database through exploiting the vulnerability identi-
fied in fulfilling the goal By tool. Thus, the exploits link shows a relationship between
an attack method (Use social engineering) and a vulnerable IS asset (By tool).
Stage 3. Security requirements definition.
In order to mitigate the identified risk about an Authentication attack, in our
example, we have chosen a risk reduction decision. This means we have to design
goals and plans that mitigate the risk. In this example, we add the secure goal Make
users security aware and the secure plan Perform awareness training. Note
that new goals and plans have a dotted background pattern, thus, identifying that
they represent security requirements in this diagram. In this situation, the Keep
integrity of calculation also becomes a security requirement mitigating the risk.
Figure 6.29: Risk treatment and security requirements definition
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As discussed in Section 2.1, the ISSRM process is iterative. After definition of
security requirements, one needs to test the system again against new possible risk
events. For example, modeller can now identify Internal threat. This means that
the modeller will need to analyse new vulnerabilities and define new countermeasure
related to an intentional bad information during security trainings. The first iteration
activity is to assume new security requirements become controls, and are, therefore,
part of IS. This means that goal Make users security aware and plan Perform
awareness training become IS assets, so removing their pattern in the diagram. A
risk analysis and assessment can be performed again.
6.6.4 Theoretical evaluation
We will evaluate our proposal according to the principle of semiotic clarity [OHS05,
Moo08]. According to this principle, there should be a one-to-one correspondence
between a visual language construct and its referent concept. Otherwise we need
to speak about language redundancy, overload, incompleteness (deficit), and under-
definition (excess) problems.
Redundancy
Redundancy means that two language constructs have the same or overlapping seman-
tics. Redundancy problems with respect to ISSRM were identified in Secure Tropos
and discussed in Section 6.4.3. Firstly, in Risk-aware Secure Tropos, we have de-
creased redundancy level by introducing different visual constructs to model asset-,
risk-, and risk treatment-related concepts. Secondly, it might seen that, within the
conceptual groups, there is still a high degree of redundancy. For example, an ISSRM
asset can be expressed using almost all concepts of Risk-aware Secure Tropos (e.g.,
Actor, Hardgoal, Softgoal, Plan, Resource). However, we do not see it as a limi-
tation, but rather the opposite. When following the ISSRM asset definition, we need
to have means to express information (by Resource), process (by Plan) and different
organisational objectives (by different types of a Goal). Similar needs can be observed
within other two conceptual groups.
An ISSRM security criterion can be represented either by Softgoal or by Security
constraint. This correspondence is not used for the same modelling purpose. We
represent abstract security criterion (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and availability)
using Softgoals and more concrete security criterion using Security constraints.
As mentioned previously, the concept of event is represented by Threat in the
atack diagram and by a set of constructs (e.g., goals, plans, actors, etc.) in the
security attack scenario. Hopefully, this separation of concepts to different levels of
abstraction gives better model analysis possibilities, and facilitates the user to catch
the information provided in the diagrams [Moo02]. However, this needs to be validated
in empirical settings.
Overload
An overload exists if the same language construct has several meanings. In our pro-
posal, there is a link impacts, which is used to represent impacts negates and impact
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harms concepts of the ISSRM domain model. We allow this overload, first, because it
keeps the language relatively simple, without too many modelling constructs. Second,
the semantical difference is captured in the label of the impacted construct (Goal,
Plan, Resource or Softgoal), as we have discussed in Section 6.6.3.
Incompleteness
Incompleteness (or deficit) appears when a language does not convey information on
a certain phenomenon. With respect to the incompleteness, first, we need to discuss
concepts, which, although present in the ISSRM domain model, are skipped in the
Risk-aware Secure Tropos. These are Risk treatment (and relationships decision to
treat and leads to), relationships provokes and refines.
We do not define visual construct for Risk treatment (also relationships decision to
treat and leads to), because this concept does not present any modification done to
the modelled IS. This concept stands as a rationale and indicates modeller's mental
decision. Nevertheless, it needs to be recorded in the system specification, additionally
to the created IS model, using other means.
In Risk-aware Secure Tropos, we do not define the single concept of Risk. We
represent it as combination of a Threat and Impacts relationship. This means that
the ISSRM relationship significance assessed by is not explicitly represented by a
link. However, we can implicitly identify this relationship by analysing links between
security criteria (expressed using Softgoals or Security constraints) and the con-
cerned risk (expressed by the Threat and Impacts).
Due to the overlapping semantics of the Impacts relationship, we can only implic-
itly define provokes relationship. This is done through multiple use of the impacts
link. However, language does not allow modelling which impact has provoked which
impact. This information needs to be captured using other means.
Some concepts addressed in Risk-aware Secure Tropos are considered differently
than how they are defined in the ISSRM domain model. For example, the ISSRM
threat consists of a threat agent and an attack method. Following principles of Tropos,
we define that attack agent (Actor) holds threat and attack method (expressed using
Hardgoals and Plans).
Further, the ISSRM event consists of threat and vulnerability. In case of Risk-aware
Secure Tropos, we define event either as a Threat or as a combination of an Actor,
Goal, Plan, Vulnerability point, Targets and Exploits. In this situation, we are
not able to identify the precise vulnerability per se (only the point where it exists).
This means that exact vulnerability needs to be specified using other means.
Under-definition
Under-definition (or excess) arises when a language construct has no semantics. In
our proposal, we do not observe any under-definition problem.
Secure Tropos
Our proposal has few limitations with respect to Secure Tropos, from which it was
derived. In this work, we have stressed that our purpose is to develop a security risk
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management approach specifically used during the early stages of IS development.
This means that we do not consider Secure Tropos extensions to security, which are
defined at the late stages of system development. For example, we do not take into
account actor capability analysis [MGM04, MG07b], or how Secure Tropos models can
be used in the system design stages [MJF06]. We understand that these extensions are
important for the later modelling stages, however, with respect to Risk-aware Secure
Tropos, they require additional investigation.
6.7 Conclusion
This section provides conclusions for the different sections of this chapter.
6.7.1 Research method
The objective of this chapter is to assess the ISSRM support of security-oriented mod-
elling languages. Following the research method we have proposed, we analyse Misuse
cases, KeS and Secure Tropos. We show which construct of these languages could be
used to support one (or several) ISSRM concept(s), and give some explanations for
these assumptions. Our research method did not propose any quantitative assessment
of the matches/mismatches between the ISSRM concepts and the language concepts,
like, e.g., no match / marginal / partial / total. Such a quantitative estimation has
deemed to be too risky in our context. The results we might obtain would not have
been reproducible. The quantitative level of match might be indeed different regarding
the people involved. Moreover, such an experimentation would have been difficult to
set up, mainly regarding our time frame.
6.7.2 Assessment of ISSRM support by security-oriented languages
As a contribution, we highlight the coverage level of ISSRM concepts by security-
oriented languages. In most cases, the proposed modelling languages have not been
originally designed with security in mind. Such aspects have been incrementally in-
troduced and have enriched existing languages, because of the growing importance
of security. As a consequence, such languages have progressively included security
risk concepts without a real systematic language design approach. Moreover, most
languages are dedicated to specific phases of the system design lifecycle. Therefore,
depending on the considered focus, some languages put more emphasis on RM re-
quired at the business level (security goals, business assets, security requirements) like
Secure-Tropos, while others, more oriented towards late requirements and design, cover
concepts like IS asset, vulnerabilities and controls in their scope, like KAOS.
6.7.3 Summary of language comparison
Table 6.1 shows what is missing in terms of concepts for the three completely studied
languages to fully support the ISSRM domain. The main observation concerning the
coverage table is that currently no perfect match with respect to ISSRM is provided
by any existing RE modelling language. Although the languages actually include some
risk concepts, their approaches are not complete regarding ISSRM. The coverage table
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helps to choose the most suitable language, considering the modelling scope of the
analyst and the needed concepts and associated activities. For example, Misuse cases
appear adequate for eliciting threat agents and attack methods, whereas Secure-Tropos
will be more suitable for identifying assets and associated security constraints of an
organisation.
This table can also facilitate interoperability between security-modelling languages.
Since some languages are better suited to support some risk-related activities than
others, they can be used in a complementary manner during the IS development. The
coverage table provides a reference for linking and mapping different languages at
the ISSRM conceptual level. Moreover, someone already familiar and happy with a
language would not be satisfied if he must change this language for another to be able
to perform ISSRM at the RE level.
6.7.4 A Risk-aware Secure Tropos
Finally, based on the suggestions for improvement made during the assessment of the
language, we have extended both language syntax and semantics, in order to comply
with the ISSRM. This has resulted in the Risk-aware Secure Tropos. In addition to
the language itself, we have defined methodological guidelines for the application of
the language, illustrated through the running example.
The results are discussed in a theoretical evaluation through semiotic clarity. It is
generally a difficult task to define an effective modelling language, producing good
diagrams in the sense that they help to communicate effectively [Moo06b]. A trade-off
should be found between extending a language and improving its expressive power,
and keeping it simple. Risk-aware Secure Tropos should thus be evaluated through
additional criteria. Some modelling practices, like using views, decomposition (use
small models and link them with one another) or concept abstraction (use one con-
struct to represent several concepts and thus omit unimportant details), should be
assessed [Moo06b]. This discussion should be completed by an experiment in a real
environment. Such an experiment would provide the clues of the effectiveness of this
extension to support ISSRM and highlight its weaknesses.
6.8 Chapter summary
In this chapter, security-oriented languages were compared to the ISSRM domain
model. The objective was to assess their coverage level for ISSRM concepts.
First, a research method was proposed. This research method describes how we
proceeded to compare a language with respect to the ISSRM domain model. The
languages analysed were Misuse cases, KeS and Secure-Tropos. Then, a summary of
language comparison and ways of improvement for a better coverage level was pro-
posed, and some preliminary remarks were suggested for Abuse cases, Abuse frames,
Mal-activity diagrams and Tropos Goal-Risk framework, based on our current knowl-
edge of these languages.
The identified ways of improvement were then particularly examined for Secure
Tropos. We proposed a concrete and abstract syntax extension of Secure Tropos.
This extension was applied on the running example. Finally, an evaluation of this
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extension was performed based on the principle of semiotic clarity. The chapter ends
by some conclusions.
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Part III
Applications
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Chapter 7
Evaluation
T his chapter reports on an experimentation of the domain model and its associatedmetrics on a Luxemburger SME, in the context of an ISO/IEC 27001 certification
[ISO05b]. More and more companies are interested in the ISO/IEC 27001 certification
in Europe and particularly in Luxembourg. It is also becoming a source of interest for
the security research community. Consequently, it is deemed a valuable application
case to experiment some artefacts produced in this thesis, since the set up of an
ISO/IEC 27001 compliant ISMS relies on a security risk management approach. The
research question addressed in the reported experiment can be formulated as: Are
the ISSRM domain model and its associated metrics a sufficient guideline for ISSRM
activities in the frame of an ISO/IEC 27001 certification?
The ISO/IEC 27001 certification is considered as complex and difficult to set up,
mainly for SMEs, which generally have a low budget and very few human resources to
allocate to such a project. Helping the SMEs to reach the certification is an objective
of the CRP Henri Tudor, in its role of assistance to SMEs. The Codasystem company,
in the aim to obtain the certification, accepted to be the target of an experimentation
of some research results developed at the CRP Henri Tudor, for supporting SMEs
in their certification process. The experimentation started in June 2006 and ended
in May 2008. The collaboration between our team and Codasystem is evaluated at
about 100 man-days of CRP resources. The total documentation produced is over
300 pages. In this context, the ISSRM domain model and its associated metrics were
experimented. This chapter reports on this experimentation and evaluates some of our
research results. The complete study cannot be shown. For confidentiality reasons,
only excerpts are provided for illustration purposes.
Section 7.1 presents the Codasystem company. The experiment being based on an
ISO/IEC 27001 certification, an introduction to the certification appears in Section 7.2.
Section 7.3 explains how the ISSRM domain model was a key driver for our experiment.
Then, Section 7.4 reports on the experiment with the ISSRM metrics, defined in
Chapter 5. Section 7.5 discusses about the metrics used, their implementation and
the differences with the metrics proposed in Chapter 5. Section 7.6 lists the threats
to validity. Finally, Section 7.7 draws conclusions from our experimentation.
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7.1 The Codasystem company
Codasystem is a SME in Luxembourg offering innovative security services based on
new IT technologies. The value proposition associated to their services is based on the
management of the authenticity of digital documents. It is further detailed in Section
7.1.1 and relies on an authenticity process presented in Section 7.1.2. The security of
its IS is a main issue, considering its business.
7.1.1 Context and proposed product
Figure 7.1: Proposed product (as appears in [Cod])
Digitalisation of documents and communications brought considerable advantages:
speed, ease of use, ease of communication, forwarding, improved editing and archiving,
gain of physical space, increase in search speed and ease of exchange of large amounts
of information. However, it also comes with quantity of risks: information access to
unauthorised individuals (aggravated by ease of transfers), content alteration (photo
editing, creation of fakes, etc.), uncertainty of provenance (hoaxes, misinformation,
etc.), viruses, etc.
The product of Codasystem addresses the need for a reliable, secure and easy to
use system, capable of circumventing these risks both on electronic documents and
exchanges (Figure 7.1). Currently solutions available on the market are focused on
securing exchanges (authentication, email signatures, cryptography, as depicted in the
left part of Figure 7.1). No solution exists that could provide undisputable proof in
court for both the electronic document and its exchange exists.
Codasystem offers the first integrated solution for the creation of digital proofs
and their secure distribution. The solution of Codasystem has been examined by
a law firm expert in digitalisation and legal property, and has received an approval
regarding its legal value. The technology of Codasystem is patented in France and
extended worldwide.
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7.1.2 Technology
The process guaranteeing the authenticity of a document (called the authenticity
process) consists in the following steps, illustrated in Figure 7.2, and extracted from
[Cod]:
Figure 7.2: The authenticity process of Codasystem (as appears in [Cod])
Step 1
• A place, an object, a document, an event requires control.
• With a Tablet PC and a digital camera, or a smartphone device, a digital picture
is taken on the spot.
• It can also be a digital audio recording or a short video recording.
Step 2
• The picture created is immediately tattooed (using steganographic1 techniques)
with the environmental information captured at the precise instant the picture
was taken.
• The information captured can be : the author, the localisation (using GPS),
time and date (certified), altitude, temperature or any other kind of numerical
information.
1Steganography is used to insert hidden information without cryptography
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• Pictures taken can also be instantly included in a document dynamically created
by a word processing software.
Step 3
• The recipients of the documents are then selected in the software (email ad-
dresses).
• The pictures and the report are encrypted and sent via GPRS, EDGE, UMTS,
WIFI or home/office Internet connection to the servers of Codasystem.
Step 4
• The Codasystem server authentifies the author of the picture and of the email
and verifies the integrity of the files generated.
• The server stores the files in the private storage area of the author.
• The server notifies the recipients of the arrival of the files (notification sent by
email with url to see them).
Step 5
• The files stored on the server are then digitally archived in conformity with
European norm on digital archiving (NF Z 42-013 [NF 01]).
Step 6
• The recipients receive the notification and access the documents via the url pro-
vided.
• If the recipients are declared users of the system, they can, in turn, sign and send
these proofs via our certified mail platform (Codamail) to other recipients.
• The ultimate proof stays on the Codasystem servers.
The authenticity process and its implementation are regularly evaluated by security
experts. The objective is to audit the service proposed by Codasystem. The process is
currently considered as secure regarding the last evaluations. However, even if the pre-
sented process is secure, some security flaws can emerge from the global organisation
of Codasystem. The objective of Codasystem to obtain the ISO/IEC 27001 certifica-
tion is motivated by the improvement of its global security, instead of focussing on the
technical aspects of their proposed services. Codasystem now wants to broaden the
scope of security risk management to the whole of its organisation.
7.2 The ISO/IEC 27001 certification
The outcome of an ISO/IEC 27001 certification is the effective establishment and
management of an ISMS (cf. Section 2.4.1). It is built around a PDCA (Plan-Do-
Check-Act) cycle, which objective is a continual improvement of IS security.
For an organisation to be certified, it is necessary to be compliant with the set of
normative requirements defined by the standard. Those are expressed from [ISO05b,
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Figure 7.3: The ISO/IEC 27001 requirements in a nutshell
Section 4] to [ISO05b, Section 8] of the document. The other sections are considered
to be informative, and hence not mandatory for the certification. The set of normative
requirements can be summarised as represented in Figure 7.3. The figure presents the
different parts of the standard, structured by section.
First of all, it is necessary to establish and manage the ISMS following the PDCA
cycle, composed of four iterative steps (described from [ISO05b, Section 4.2.1] to
[ISO05b, Section 4.2.4]). These four steps are supported by a specific documenta-
tion, whose requirements are explained in [ISO05b, Section 4.3]. The four steps and
the documentation represent the core requirements that one should satisfy to be certi-
fied. Additionally, some requirements are especially developed in a dedicated section,
because of their importance or complexity. The first one in this case is the management
responsibility, explaining where it is necessary for the management to be specifically
involved [ISO05b, Section 5]). A part is dedicated to the way to perform the inter-
nal ISMS audits, which are mandatory [ISO05b, Section 6]). Regular management
reviews are necessary in the cycle. They also have a dedicated part [ISO05b, Section
7]). Finally, the normative requirements sections end with an explanation about how
to perform the ISMS improvement [ISO05b, Section 8]).
Regarding the RM process, it is at the core of the standard. It first starts in the
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`Plan' step, with a complete assessment and management of risks. In the `Do', the
risk treatment plan is applied and the selected measures are implemented. Then, in
the `Check' step, the risk assessment results and the efficiency of the RM process are
evaluated. If some updates are necessary or if some ways of improvement are identified
for either the risk assessment results or the RM process, the appropriate improvements
are done in the `Act' step.
7.3 Evaluation of the ISSRM domain model
The ISSRM domain model was used as a guideline to perform the different risk-related
tasks and to explain the different concepts to the stakeholders. First, the domain model
and its associated definitions were the central artefacts used during the trainings of the
Codasystem team. Second, instantiating the different concepts of the domain model
were used to produce all the risk-related artefacts required by the standard.
We chose to present the different tasks to perform and concepts to use with the
help of the domain model, instead of using, as usual, documents (methods, standards,
etc.) in natural language. No formal conlusion can be drawn from the efficiency of
using our model instead of text for learning purpose. To compare both approaches, a
dedicated experiment should be performed. However, the result we obtained is that
the Codasystem team catched the domain quickly and without any problem. They
considered our domain model easy to understand and helpful in gaining a general view
of ISSRM. Moreover, they integrated the domain model in the training that has to be
followed by each new employee.
As depicted in Figure 7.4, the instantiation of the meta-model led to different
documents, that are the risk-related part of the whole ISMS documentation. Four
different documents were built, following mainly the different tasks (Section 2.1) to
perform. They concern:
1. Business assets and the related security objectives : we identified 6 business as-
sets, leading to 18 security objectives in terms of confidentiality, integrity and
availability.
2. IS assets and their link to the business assets : more than 100 IS assets were
identified.
3. Risk assessment and treatment decisions : 78 risks were identified and treated.
4. Statement of applicability, about the chosen security requirements and their con-
crete application, and risk treatment plan, about what still needs to be imple-
mented and how, with respect to the statement of applicability : 112 security re-
quirements were selected and implemented.
As seen in Figure 7.4, every concept was part of a document (except asset, that
is abstract). The validation that the instanciation of the meta-model is sufficient to
cover the requirements of the standard in terms of risk-related tasks was provided by
the auditors. Those had to check the documentation and highlight missing elements.
However, they claimed that the documentation was complete with regards to the
ISO/IEC 27001 requirements.
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Figure 7.4: Mapping between the ISMS documentation and the ISSRM domain model
7.4 Evaluation of the ISSRM metrics
After checking the completeness of our domain model in terms of concepts to integrate
in the risk-related tasks, we now focus on the ISSRM metrics. The following section
is dedicated to the experimentation of the ISSRM metrics.
7.4.1 Process and approach
The process followed is mainly based on the ISO/IEC 27005 standard [ISO08], which
provides guidelines for performing security risk management. This approach was cho-
sen because it is the one specially developed to satisfy the requirements of the ISO/IEC
27001 standard. We complemented these guidelines with the knowledge bases and
some methodological parts borrowed from the EBIOS method [DCS04b], like the se-
curity objective analysis, because they are well suited to satisfy the requirements of
the standard. The key driver of our work was to be compliant with the ISO/IEC 27001
requirements.
As seen in Section 5.4.1, the ISO/IEC 27005 standard promotes the use of metrics.
Yet, the user has to complete them and choose how they are defined and used. In our
case, we tried to adapt and complete these metrics with regards to the ones we have
identified in Section 5.5, to test their relevance in a concrete case. Our objective was
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therefore to validate that our set of metrics can be concretely instanciated, and that
it satisfies the requirements related to estimation activities (i.e. estimation of each
necessary concept). For each metric identified in Section 5.5, we proposed a concrete
implementation, and discuss it now with regards to its application in our context and
the requirements of the standard.
The presentation of the work done is performed following the steps identified in
Section 2.1.
7.4.2 Context and asset identification
In this step the assets of Codasystem were identified. We started by defining what
are the business assets of the organisation and then, based on the inventory of the
IS assets, we mapped each IS asset to its related business asset(s). For identifying
business assets, a process-oriented approach was chosen. We first modelled the Co-
dasystem organisation under the form of processes, and then, each process represented
an asset. The security-sensitive information was identified as input and/or output of
the processes.
Each asset was then estimated in terms of its intrinsic value for the organisation,
through the business asset value metric. A qualitative estimation was proposed based
on Table 7.1. This table had three levels: normal, high and very high. The description
column was filled with the help of Codasystem and mainly its management, who best
knew what was of value for the company. A three-level scale was judged satisfactory
by Codasystem. Situating an asset in one of the three categories was usually non sub-
ject to ambiguity. A business asset that concerned directly the authenticity process or
had a great importance for the clients had a very high value. A high level concerned
Codasystem's clients. Finally, an asset with normal value only concerned the internal
functioning of Codasystem, that is, had no any direct relation with the clients. An
asset considered to be of low value for the company was not retained as being of in-
terest for the rest of the process. This explains why there was no `Low' line in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Qualitative scale of value for the value of business assets
Business asset value
Value Description
Very high Asset concerning the authenticity process or with great importance regarding the clients
High Asset concerning the clients of Codasystem
Normal Asset concerning the internal functioning of Codasystem
Example: The process of `Photo taking', i.e. the first activity to perform in the
whole authenticity process, is identified as a business asset of Codasystem. This pro-
cess is described in terms of its tasks. Its inputs and outputs are also identified in
order to highlight important information. They are not completely described here for
confidentiality purpose. The value of this asset is naturally estimated to be very high,
because it is part of the authenticity process.
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7.4.3 Determination of security objectives
In this step, we cross-checked the business assets identified in the preceding step with
the selected security criteria. With the Codasystem's management, we decided to
select confidentiality, integrity and availability as the security criteria of interest re-
garding the business. They cover well the security issues of the company. Moreover,
in ISO/IEC 27001 these are the main criteria to perform ISSRM.
For each of these criteria, a qualitative scale of four levels was defined (cf. Table
7.2), representing the level of security need. This scale was based on the results of
the value estimation of business assets. Levels 1 to 3 were defined in accordance with
the business asset value scale, aiming at aligning security objectives with business
assets value. So, each business asset had at most (for a given criterion) the same level
as the one obtained in the preceding step. Naturally, a business asset could even so
have a lower level, for example when it was not concerned with the given criterion
(e.g., a financial information with a very high value can need to be kept confidential,
but can have no need of availability). The top level was level 3. For confidentiality,
this meant the disclosure of information (external or internal to Codasystem) was
restricted to the clients. For integrity, it was a modification of the authenticity of
digital documents, which we saw was the top concern in the preceding step. Finally,
for availability, it was a disruption with major effects on the clients. Level 2 was, for
confidentiality, about the disclosure of information shared between Codasystem and its
clients. It was one level below, because the Codasystem team was allowed to know this
kind of information. For integrity, it was an acceptable modification of integrity (by
`acceptable' we meant that the integrity could be restored, e.g., through a backup).
At last, for availability, it was a disruption with minor effect on the clients. Level
1 was, for confidentiality, about disclosure of information restricted to Codasystem
(internal to the company) and hence not concerning the clients. For availability, it
was about a disruption without any effect on the clients. For integrity, in agreement
with the management, no relevant security need level was found, that was equivalent
with this level of confidentiality or availability. This level was therefore not used for
this criterion. That is neither a problem for the risk assessment, nor regarding the
certification requirements. The lowest level was 0, used when the business asset had
no security need for this criterion.
It is interesting to note that the description of each security need level was based
on the potential impacts. This way of proceeding is common in several approaches,
like the EBIOS method [DCS04b]. It aims at first focussing on impact when analysing
risks. Therefore, it avoids to have a too long and complex set of risks to manage,
because we ignore security events without relevant impacts. Each business asset was
thus situated in this table in order to define the security objectives to consider and
their associated security needs. We read the table in the the following way: if the
criterion X is not respected for the business asset Y, the impact would be [...]. So
each business asset is associated with security criteria, defining security objectives with
security needs.
Example: The process of `Photo taking' has no need of confidentiality. This process
covers the tasks performed on the device when taking the photo, until its transfer to the
Codasystem production site. At this time, we consider that everyone in this context
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Table 7.2: Qualitative scale of value for the security need metric
Security need levels
Confidentiality Integrity Availability
0 No need of confidentiality No need of integrity No need of availability
1
Disclosure of information
restricted to Codasystem
/
Disruption internal to Co-
dasystem without any ef-
fect on the clients
2
Disclosure of information
restricted to Codasystem
and its clients
Acceptable modification of
integrity
Disruption with minor effect
on the clients
3
Disclosure of information
restricted to Codasystem’s
clients
Modification of the authen-
ticity of digital documents
Disruption with major effect
on the clients
knows the content of the photo (or can know, talking about people not taking the photo
but around the actor taking the photo). However, the authenticity process starts by the
tasks done by the device and the integrity is therefore maximum. A modification of
integrity for this process leads to a modification of the authenticity of the document.
The same applies for availability, on which a failure is considered for this business
asset as having a major effect on the clients. Codasystem's clients have generally
contractual requirements to respect that include time constraints. Not to be able to use
its system can lead, for example, to financial penalties for the client. As a summary,
the process of `Photo taking' has respectively for the criteria of confidentiality, integrity
and availability a security need of 0, 3 and 3.
7.4.4 Risk analysis and assessment
Once security needs of assets were defined for each security criterion, we analysed
the risks. We first started by identifying the threats relevant to the IS. This task
was done first by a brainstorming with some key actors of the company, like the
security officer, and then complemented by an analysis of the available knowledge
bases [DCS04b, ISO08] for completeness purposes.
The likelihood of the threat was estimated on a qualitative scale going from 1 to 3
(Table 7.3). As for business asset value, three levels were chosen in agreement with
Codasystem. On this scale, it was possible for Codasystem to estimate threats in a
non-ambiguous manner. The first level depicted threats that were unlikely regarding
the statistics, the incurred cost or the necessary competence. These threats should
happen rarely. The second level was a transitional level, including threats that could
arrive sometimes but not very often, at the opposite of level 3. Finally, the third
level was about threats that were very likely to happen, or easy to perform with no
particular investment or competence necessary. Level 0 was not proposed because only
the relevant threats, that might arrive at least rarely, were selected.
Threats were associated with some vulnerabilities that were exploited by the threat
for the risk to take place effectively. Once again, the vulnerabilities were identified
through a brainstorming with some key actors of the company and then complemented
by an analysis of the available knowledge bases. EBIOS proposes, for example, for
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Table 7.3: Qualitative scale of value for the likelihood metric
Likelihood of threat
Level Description
1 Unlikely regarding the statistics, the incurred cost or the necessary competence
2 Can happen occasionally
3 Very likely, easy to perform, no particular investment or competence necessary
each kind of threat, a list of vulnerabilities that are common and relevant regarding
the threat. The vulnerabilities related to IS assets of Codasystem were taken into
account.
A qualitative scale of four non-ambiguous levels was determined for vulnerability
level estimation (Table 7.4). The first level corresponded to very low vulnerabilities,
taking place when security measures were in place and efficient against the threat.
This level was 0 because we considered the best was done regarding the state of the
art of security measures, the threat concerned and the context. Level 1 corresponded
to medium vulnerabilities. Some security measures were in place, but they were in-
sufficient or not perfectly adapted to the situation. The next level appeared when
vulnerabilities are high, and when no effective security measure was in place. How-
ever, at this level, some security measures were starting to be implemented or already
implemented but not efficiently. The highest vulnerability level was 3, considered as
very high vulnerabilities, with a lack of security measures, or some existing security
measures that were obsolete or not applied. In our context, each vulnerability was
not estimated independently. For each threat, a set of vulnerabilities was generally
identified and then the global vulnerability level was estimated. This way of proceed-
ing allows to have, for a given risk, only one likelihood and one vulnerability level,
that facilitates the calculation of event potentiality. This point is further discussed in
Section 7.5.
Table 7.4: Qualitative scale of value for the vulnerability level metric
Vulnerability level
Level Description
0 Very low, security measures in place and efficient against the threat
1 Medium, security measures insufficient or not adapted
2 High, no effective security measure in place
3 Very high, lack of security measure, obsolete or not applied
At this point, each element necessary to estimate the risk had been itself estimated:
impacts in Section 7.4.3 through security needs determination, and threats and vul-
nerabilities in Section 7.4.4. We thus defined the following assumption for the concept
of event: the potentiality of the event is calculated by summing the likelihood and
the vulnerability level minus 1. Based on the examples already seen in the literature,
the feedback received from other ISO/IEC 27001 implementers and our experience
[Her], this equation produces some well-balanced risk levels, by better aligning the
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impact level with the potentiality. It is necessary to make such calculation assump-
tions for determining the risk level, and determining the risk level is mandatory for
the certification. The ISO/IEC 27001 standard does not provide any constraint for
this estimation. The same for ISO/IEC 27005 that only provides some examples for
risk and event estimation. We are therefore free to define our own way of calculating
the risk level.
Then, a risk matrix was produced (Table 7.5). This risk matrix indicated the risk
level, based on the potentiality (equal to likelihood + vulnerability level - 1) and
the maximum impact level of the concerned impacts for the studied business asset.
By `concerned impact', we mean that each threat will not lead to impacts negating
every security criteria for each asset. Some threats are particular to some kinds of
security criteria. For example, a threat based on the `Remote spying' attack method
is only leading to impacts having effect on the confidentiality criterion [DCS04b]. This
kind of threat cannot negate the integrity or the availability of assets, having not an
active effect on the assets. Therefore, we defined the impact level of a risk as being
the maximum of concerned security needs (Table 7.2). The risk level was calculated
by multiplying the potentiality by the impact level. It was obtained by spotting the
risk level in the risk matrix (Table 7.5).
Table 7.5: Risk matrix
Risk levelhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhImpact level
Potentiality
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 1 2 3 4 5
2 0 2 4 6 8 10
3 0 3 6 9 12 15
As preliminary work for this step, we needed to define what was an intolerable risk
and hence the acceptable level of risk. This is mandatory in ISO/IEC 27001. Each
organisation has its own level of acceptable risk, depending on its objectives in terms
of security. For example, one can determine that an unacceptable risk is a risk that
can happen occasionally (likelihood=2), that has insufficient or not adapted security
measures (vulnerability level=1) and that has an impact level of 3. In this case, the
level of this unacceptable risk is 6 (Risk level=3x(2+1-1)=6) and each risk having
a level below this one is considered as acceptable. This level has to be determined
and formally approved by the management. Each risk having a level superior to the
acceptable risk level has to be treated in the next step (represented in bold in Table
7.5).
Example2: `Software malfunction' of the software provided by Codasystem and in-
cluded in the device taking photos is a threat that can occur. Its likelihood is estimated
at 2, because it can happen sometimes based on the experience of developers. Some
vulnerabilities are identified that allow the threat to occur. `Documentation not up-
to-date', `Deficiencies in software testing', `Deficiencies in incident reports' are the
2This example and the associated levels of metrics are fictitious, and are not extracted from the real
experimentation.
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vulnerabilities highlighted that are related to the threat. The global vulnerability level
is of 2 because no effective measures are in place for these vulnerabilities. Finally the
impact level is 3, coming from the security need in terms of integrity and availability
for `Photo taking', that are both concerned by this threat. The level of risk is thus
estimated to 9 according to the risk matrix. During risk evaluation, we compare this
risk level with the risk acceptance level, that is of 6. This risk is therefore unacceptable
and shall be treated.
7.4.5 Selection of risk treatment and security requirements
For each risk, it was now necessary to choose a suited risk treatment and associated
security requirements. In our method based on ISO/IEC 27005, each risk having a
level inferior to the risk acceptance level was systematically accepted. If the risk level
was superior to the risk acceptance level, it was necessary to reduce, transfer or avoid
the risk. In case of risk reduction, requirements (called `controls' in ISO/IEC 27005,
as seen in Section 4.3.3) were selected in the ISO/IEC 27002 standard [ISO05c], as
recommended for the certification. However, it is possible to select requirements from
other sources or define our own requirements if necessary. Requirements regarding the
third parties were also recommended when some risks were transferred. With regards
to the selection of these security requirements, the vulnerability level (called New
vulnerability level in Table 7.6) was calculated, leading to a new risk level. Thus, the
risk reduction of the chosen risk treatment was deduced, being the original risk level
minus the new risk level. Table 7.6 recapitulates the risk assessment and treatment of
our example.
Example: The risk treatment chosen is to reduce the risk with some security re-
quirements. Three requirements are chosen to mitigate the three vulnerabilities found.
First, the software developed shall be carefully documented for reducing the weakness
of documentation that is not up-to-date. Second, test data shall be selected carefully.
Moreover, test data shall be protected and controlled. This helps to mitigate the vul-
nerability of deficiencies in software testing. Finally information security events shall
be reported through appropriate management channels and as quickly as possible. This
last requirement covers the deficiencies in incident reports. These requirements lead to
a new vulnerability level of 0, the security measures chosen being now efficient against
the threat. Thus, the new risk level is 9, with respect to the risk matrix (Table 7.5).
The risk reduction of the chosen treatment is 6.
7.4.6 Control selection and implementation
Statement of applicability and Risk treatment plan are two mandatory documents
according to the standard requirements. The first one summarises the chosen security
requirements and shows how they are currently implemented. The second one collects
the controls that still need to be implemented, for completely fulfilling the chosen
security requirements.
In the risk treatment plan, the costs of the controls were estimated. These costs
are generally defined in terms of financial data or in man-day.
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Table 7.6: Risk assessment and treatment table
Risk assessment and treatment
Business asset Photo taking
Security need C=0 I=3 A=3
Threat Likelihood Software malfunction 2
Documentation not up-to-date
2Vulnerability
Vulnerability
level
Deficiencies in software testing
Deficiencies in incident reports
Risk level 9
Risk treatment Risk reduction
The software developed shall be care-
fully documented
0
Security
requirement
New
vulnerability
level
Test data shall be selected carefully, and pro-
tected and controlled
Information security events shall be re-
ported through appropriate management
channels as quickly as possible
New risk level 3
Risk reduction of the risk
treatment
6
Table 7.7: Risk treatment plan
Control selection and implementation
Control Start date End date Resource Owner Cost
Write documentation of existing
developed software
01/04/09 31/06/09 John Doe John Doe 10 man-days
Example: To fulfil the requirement of documenting carefully the developed software,
a resource has been assigned to write documentation about the already developed soft-
ware. The cost of this task is 10 man-days.
7.5 Discussion
From the feedback obtained through this experimentation, this section discusses some
particularly interesting aspects. They are the methodological differences with the rec-
ommended ISO/IEC 27005 standard, the metrics definition and their implementation.
7.5.1 Methodological aspects
In the first step about context and asset identification, our method was slightly differ-
ent from the one generally adopted when following ISO/IEC 27005. Instead of directly
valuing the assets according to their impact value, as it is commonly done, we first
valued the intrinsic value of the assets and then their security needs based on the
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potential impacts on the assets in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability,
as defined in Chapter 5. This method provided some benefits. It was first easier to
explain this step of the process to the Codasystem team. This step of the process is
indeed generally difficult to understand for the users seeking to estimate the assets. It
also helped the users to limit their answers. Based on our experience, it was noticed
that it is usually difficult for the stakeholders to precisely describe their security needs
and to express all of them at the same level of granularity. The security need levels
table was built thanks to the results of the asset estimation. For example, it was only
there that we clearly defined that the most important assets (and so impacts) were
those related directly to the clients and to the authenticity of digital documents.
7.5.2 Definition of the scales
With regards to our experience, we mainly used qualitative estimations. This choice
was motivated by several arguments. First, qualitative scales are easier to define and
use especially in SMEs. Qualitative estimation is suited for organisations that have
few security incident in their history. This is the case for Codasystem, which is a
young company. Moreover, the examples provided in ISO/IEC 27005 for performing
ISSRM according to an ISO/IEC 27001 certification are mainly qualitative. Thus, such
estimations are sufficient and suited in our context. The main difficulty regarding
the set-up of the qualitative scales was to be precise and to avoid ambiguities as
much as possible. This objective is considered to be reached, because the different
people who used the estimation tables did not have any difficulty to use them and
distinguish the different levels. It is however necessary to note that these scales were
built incrementally, with refinements coming from comments of Codasystem's users.
7.5.3 Implementation of the metrics
Assets in general have to be estimated for the certification. So, although our set of
metrics does not propose any metric for IS assets, it has been necessary to define a
value for IS assets. Regarding the existing mapping between IS assets and business
assets (supports link of the domain model in Figure 4.4), each IS asset inherits from the
highest security needs (for each security criterion) of the business assets it supports. By
applying this method, we got good results and improved the efficiency of the process.
IS assets are usually numerous (about 100 in our case) and difficult to manage one by
one. Focussing on business assets helps to concentrate on the main concerns of the
organisation and give their right value to the IS assets regarding the business.
The threats and vulnerabilities were estimated in a classical manner with regards
to the guidelines of the standard. The vulnerability level metric was not implemented,
as suggested in the ISSRM domain model, by associating one level to each vulnera-
bility. The vulnerability level was defined for the set of vulnerabilities exploited by
the threat studied. The feedback coming from this implementation is that: either the
ISSRM process could be improved by associating a vulnerability level to each vulner-
ability and thereby refine the risk analysis, or we should include the notion of group of
vulnerabilities in the ISSRM domain model. In our context, defining a vulnerability
level for each vulnerability was evaluated as too time-consuming. However, it is now
identified as a way of improving our process.
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The risk reduction was only calculated for the risk treatment chosen. Following
our assumption of estimating the set of vulnerabilities and not each vulnerability
separately, we estimated the risk reduction of the set of requirements refining the
risk treatment, equal to the risk reduction of the risk treatment. It is difficult to
precisely estimate the contribution of each security requirement with regards to the
idenfitied vulnerabilities (cf. Section 5.5). One security requirement can mitigate
several risks and one risk can be mitigated by several security requirements. However,
to improve the risk reduction estimation, and refine the calculation of the ROSI of the
security requirement, it is necessary to be able to estimate the contribution of each
security requirement regarding the risks. Improving either the metric implementation,
or the way of analysing the vulnerabilities and the security requirements, is considered
as a possible improvement of the method. Another way to improve it could be to
reformulate more precisely the different vulnerabilities and security requirements, to
be able to define precisely the risk reduction of each security requirement. Moreover,
this method implies to define new knowledge bases in support of the process. Within
the `Check' phase of the PDCA cycle, this represents a way of improving the efficiency
of the RM process. Not having a precise estimation of the risk reduction of security
requirements prevents a precise calculation of ROSI. Instead, the ROSI can only be
calculated at the level of risk treatment.
Finally, the cost was not estimated for each security requirement and/or risk treat-
ment. The cost was only estimated for the controls still in need of implementation,
within the document called Risk treatment plan. Thus, the ROSI was not formally
calculated with the help of a metric. It was the role of the management to evaluate
which security requirement (or set of security requirements) is cost-effective or not.
Even so, we tried to implement the different cost metrics. It remained difficult to
concretely implement them. The method used for the cost was the following: for each
non-acceptable risk, its cost was roughly estimated. Then, the cost of the suggested
security requirements (or of some other kind of risk treatment, e.g., risk transfer) was
also estimated. Depending on both these costs, it was up to the management to accept
this security solution to risk or a new risk treatment is chosen.
7.6 Threats to validity
The relevance of the evaluation results has to be confronted with the particularities
of our experiment. We thus now discuss the threats to validity of the claim: the
ISSRM domain model and its associated metrics are valid and useful to perform ISSRM
activities.
7.6.1 Context of Codasystem
The business of Codasystem is to guarantee the authenticity of digital documents.
This implies naturally to take into account many security aspects, like keeping these
documents confidential or making sure the integrity is preserved. Despite the fact that
the Codasystem team had no particular knowledges about ISSRM, their learning of
the domain might have been facilitated by their security awareness.
Concerning the time spent on the certification, it is difficult to interpret the figures
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proposed in the introduction, and still more to use them, for example for comparison
with other certification. First, the estimation done concerns only the time spent on site
with the Codasystem team. It was not possible to estimate and trace our learning and
preparation time, because it was completely mixed with other related research and
standardisation activities. Second, the time spent was dependent of Codasystem's
organisation. One of the major difficulty we had to face was the human resource
changes. The team in charge of the certification changed actually two times during
the experiment.
7.6.2 Certification specificities
Our evaluation was performed within the scope of an ISO/IEC 27001 certification.
The domain model and the metrics were evaluated in this setting. Thereby, this
evaluation corresponds to one application of the domain model and the metrics. A
fixed conclusion on the validity and the usability of the domain model and the metrics
can only be drawn based on several experiments. In a controlled experiment, we could
compare in a controlled environment the efficiency and relevance of using the domain
model and implementing the proposed metrics.
Moreover, our conclusions were mainly drawn based on the audit performed by
the auditors. The audit was not performed on the whole ISMS, but on a sampling.
Furthermore, the audit results were naturally subjective, because dependent of the
experience, knowledge and culture of the auditors.
7.6.3 Experiment specificities
This experiment was led by our team and therefore by the creators of the domain model
and the metrics. Naturally, our knowledge of these artefacts was already thorough and
no time had to be spent on learning the concepts. This also means that the artefacts
were clear to us and not subject to misinterpretation. However, this clarity cannot be
generalized and this experiment cannot give information about the effectiveness of use
of the domain model and the metrics by other people, without the guidance of their
developers. Further evaluation is needed to answer this question.
7.7 Conclusion
The first conclusion we can draw from our evaluation is that our ISSRM approach was
effective. Codasystem was certified and no nonconformity was related to the ISSRM
process3.
The metrics proposed in Chapter 5 were suited for performing ISSRM in the frame
of an ISO/IEC 27001 certification. The auditors did not find any problem with regards
to the related requirements of the standard. This experiment has thus shown that
our set of metrics is sufficient for the risk-related activities of an ISO/IEC 27001
certification.
When comparing the metrics identified in Chapter 5 and the approach performed
in our evaluation, the weakest point identified is related to the ROSI calculation. First,
3In our context, to be certified, the audit report should not mention any major nonconformity and not
more than five minor ones. In our case, four minor nonconformities were found in the whole ISMS
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vulnerabilities were estimated by group and hence risk reduction of security require-
ments follow the same approach. The risk reduction level was therefore only estimated
for each risk treatment. Moreover, the ROSI was not formally calculated. The risk
treatments and security requirements costs were roughly estimated and weakly docu-
mented (estimations of costs were depicted in the risk treatment plan, presenting the
cost of each requirement that still needed to be implemented). This is explained first
by the fact that the calculation of ROSI is not mandatory in the ISO/IEC 27001 stan-
dard. The main objective underlying the ISSRM process within the ISO/IEC 27001
standard is not to have the best ROSI4, but to have the insurance that the organi-
sation is aware of its risks and has risk governance. Second, it is necessary to note
that Codasystem already had a legacy in terms of security. Many security controls
were already implemented before starting the experiment. Some security requirements
selected after the risk assessment for mitigating some risks were thus already imple-
mented, and hence did not need to be estimated in terms of implementation cost. In
the frame of an IS development, the ROSI calculation for each security requirement
has more sense. After our experiment, another remark on the complexity of the cost
metric implementation, is that it is difficult to compare qualitative metrics (risk re-
duction) with quantitative ones (cost of treatments). Finally, it is necessary to note
that in Codasystem (and, we guess, in most of companies seeking ISO/IEC 27001 cer-
tification) a global budget was allocated by the management to security. The initial
objective regarding the financial aspect was to respect this budget, rather than pur-
sue an optimal ROSI. A good and efficient estimation of costs and ROSI calculation
remains an open challenge. A new case study focused on ROSI calculation shall be
defined, to validate whether every metric of the ISSRM domain model is necessary
and adapted to ROSI calculation.
Finally, our approach was supported by tables and no dedicated software was de-
veloped to facilitate data gathering and the various estimations. To improve and
accelerate the process, a software tool would be useful.
7.8 Chapter summary
This chapter was about the experimentation of the ISSRM domain model and its
associated metrics. This experimentation was done in the frame of an ISO/IEC 27001
certification. We collaborated with the Codasystem SME to assist their team in the
implementation of their ISMS.
We first explained how the domain model was used as a training artefact for the
Codasystem team, and as a guideline for performing the different risk-related tasks.
The goal was to satisfy the requirements of the standard. Second, the set of metrics
defined in Chapter 5 was experimented. Throughout the RM process, we evaluated
whether instanciating the metrics we identified was sufficient or not to cover the re-
quirements of the standard in terms of risk estimation. The results were positive, but
some possible improvements were nonetheless identified. We finally discussed about
the limitations of the work done and the threats to validity.
4Even if the RM process is especially used to balance the security risks and the costs involved in the
security
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
N owadays, information security is not simply a technical problem any more. Themanagement of security has become a key issue within organisations. The cost
of a security solution is considered with as much attention as its effectiveness. Se-
curity risk management methods are methodological tools dealing with this concern.
However, this research has observed that, first, despite structured processes, the (in-
termediate and final) products of those methods are generally informal. Second, those
methods are usually designed to evaluate a posteriori existing IS, rather than support-
ing the IS development. Moreover, since each method uses its own terminology, it is
difficult to combine them.
In this thesis, we have proposed a model-based approach for ISSRM, applicable
since the early phases of IS development, but also applicable once the IS is designed.
Our work focuses on the modelling support to such an approach, by proposing a
domain model for ISSRM. We do not address the methodological aspects, nor the
tool support. Our domain model helps improving the interoperability between the
existing ISSRM approaches when combining them, as well as the different artefacts
produced. The domain model is also used to compare the ISSRM support of existing
security-oriented modelling languages. To meet these objectives, we have proposed
three complementary contributions summarised in the next section. Then, limitations
of the contributions and future work are described.
8.1 Research contributions
This section summarises the three contributions of this thesis. The first one is the
definition of an ISSRM domain model. The second one is the definition of the ISSRM
metrics and their integration in the domain model. Finally, the last contribution is
the assessment of the ISSRM support of security-oriented modelling languages, and
the improvement of Secure Tropos.
8.1.1 An ISSRM domain model
The first research question (addressed in Chapter 4) of this thesis is: what are the
concepts that should be present in a modelling language supporting ISSRM ? To answer
it, a research method was defined. This research method is composed of two successive
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steps. Based on a survey of the literature, the first step was about an ISSRM concept
alignment. Concepts related to ISSRM were gathered from the different sources in the
literature. Then, the concepts of all sources were aligned, in order to find semantically
equivalent concepts. Through iterative processing of the sources, the ISSRM domain
model was built. This conceptual model takes the form of a UML class diagram,
completed with definitions for each concept, provided in a glossary. Various kinds of
validation of the domain model were done. First, a validation by experts: practitioners,
scientists and standardisation experts reviewed the domain model. Second, the model
was applied to assess a real IS, as part of an ISO/IEC 27001 certification.
The contributions related to this first research question are:
• State of the art in ISSRM. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the different ap-
proaches from the ISSRM domain, as input for the concept alignment. RM
standards, security standards, security RM standards and security RM methods
are surveyed and summarised. There are compared with respect to four crite-
ria: are there i) security-oriented, ii) risk-based, iii) concentrating on RE, iv)
model-based.
• Semantic alignment of the ISSRM concepts and conceptual interoperability be-
tween the sources. A conceptual study of the sources included in the state of the
art was performed. It resulted in an alignment table, semantically analysing each
concept. The table produced is a comparison framework, allowing to confront
each new ISSRM source with those already studied, and assess its conceptual
coverage with respect to the others. The table contributes to improve the inter-
operability between the various approaches. It highlights the equivalent concepts
between two sources and thus suggests a path to shift from one method to the
other, or to combine methods depending on one's specific needs.
• Definition of an ISSRM domain model. The domain of ISSRM is generally con-
sidered as difficult to catch, and the terminological difference between the sources
is an additional gap. The ISSRM domain model proposes a unified terminology,
represented under the form of a model, generally easier to understand than a
method or a standard in pure natural language. It is built on ISSRM standards
and methods, and its compliance with them is assured through the alignment
table.
8.1.2 ISSRM metrics
To complete the domain model, the second research question (addressed in Chapter 5)
is: what are the metrics relevant to perform ISSRM and to reason about ROSI ? A new
research method was defined and followed, in order to identify the ISSRM metrics.
First, the GQM approach was applied on the ISSRM domain. It aims at defining
metrics by focusing on the main objectives of ISSRM. This work was completed by an
analysis of existing ISSRM sources, to identify the metrics currently used in practice.
The resulting metrics were finally added to the domain model under the form of class
attributes of the conceptual model. This set of metrics was experimented through their
use in the risk assessment of a real IS, in the frame of an ISO/IEC 27001 certification.
The contributions related to this second research question are:
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• Metrics survey in the ISSRM literature. Each ISSRM source that has a process
description and that deals with measurement was surveyed. This work provides
additional information for comparing and choosing a suited method, by making
clear what are the concepts measured.
• Definition of the metrics relevant for performing ISSRM and reasoning about
ROSI. The outcome of this contribution is the enrichment of the domain model
with metrics suited for ISSRM. First, a generic measurement framework for per-
forming ISSRM and reasoning about ROSI was proposed. This work can be used
as input for any new ISSRM approach definition, like a method, a software tool, a
modelling language, etc. Second, the conformity between the metrics highlighted
in the literature and the metrics of the domain model was assured through the
tables produced for each studied source. It thus becomes possible to link the
results obtained by a method to the domain model, and, by analogy, to link an
instance of the domain model to a given method. The interoperability between
the domain model and sources of the literature is thus guaranteed. This work
also contributes to the interoperability between methods.
• An ISO/IEC 27001 compliant example of metrics instantiation. The domain
model with the metrics framework were deemed sufficient guidelines for perform-
ing risk-related tasks to obtain an ISO/IEC 27001 certification. This experiment
also contributed to provide a concrete example of the proposed framework.
8.1.3 Assessment of ISSRM support by security-oriented modelling lan-
guages
Finally, our third research question (addressed in Chapter 6) is: what is the ISSRM
support provided by security-oriented modelling languages and how it can be improved?
A research method was designed, based on theoretical analysis of languages and their
practical use on an example, to assess their support with regards to ISSRM. This
research method was applied on three security-oriented modelling languages: Misuse
cases, KAOS extended to security and Secure Tropos. For each of them, a table high-
lighting the constructs available for supporting the different ISSRM concepts was pro-
posed, and improvements of the corresponding languages were suggested. For Secure
Tropos, the work goes further and a syntactic and semantic extension was proposed
to better support ISSRM. This extension was applied on an illustrative example.
The contributions related to this third research question are:
• State of the art of security RE frameworks and security-oriented modelling lan-
guages. Chapter 3 surveys security RE frameworks and security-oriented mod-
elling languages, with a focus on concepts at stake. This literature is evaluated
with respect to the same four criteria as for ISSRM standards and methods.
• A method to assess how ISSRM is supported by existing modelling languages.
For reaching our objective of assessing the security-oriented modelling languages
with regards to the ISSRM domain model, an assessment method was developed.
This method can be further applied on each existing modelling language.
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• An assessment of Misuse cases, KAOS extended to security and Secure Tropos,
and an improvement path for better supporting ISSRM. First, guidelines for using
these languages (as-is) for ISSRM were suggested, and illustrated through an
example. Second, the conclusions drawn from the assessments helped to find
ways of improving these languages to better support ISSRM.
• An adaptation of Secure Tropos to better support ISSRM. The outcome of this
thesis is the proposal of a modelling support for ISSRM, applicable since the
early phases of IS development. By proposing a Risk-aware Secure Tropos, we
contribute to this objective.
8.2 Limitations
The work reported in this thesis has several limitations. The limitations we have
noticed are:
• The application part of the thesis was about the evaluation of the domain model
and its metrics in a real context. The conclusion drawn on this evaluation are
limited, because no comparative analysis was performed to assess the efficiency
of the domain model and the metrics. An experiment related to i) the efficiency
of the use of the domain model, compared to the use of a method or standard in
natural language, for learning purposes ii) the efficiency of the use of the domain
model, compared to the use of a method or standard in natural language, as
guidelines for risk assessment, would both increase the validation level of the
contributions.
• The validation is also limited for the proposal of Risk-aware Secure Tropos. This
extension was only illustrated on an example. Its use in a business case study or
in a real environment would validate its usefulness and efficiency to support the
different ISSRM steps. It would also highlight its limitations. Another limitation
of the validation of Risk-aware Secure Tropos is that the example only assessed
our work on an existing IS. Our contribution was not experimented during IS
development.
• The ISSRM process depicted in Section 2.1 is one of our research assumption,
used as an input for our research methods. However, it could be interesting to
have the reverse approach: investigate the processes supporting the elicitation of
models and introduce risk concepts. Such an approach would also validate the
concepts of the domain model.
• The methodological part of how to use models to support ISSRM has just been
started to be studied in Chapter 6. This represents a limitation with regards to
the validation of the usability of a modelling support for ISSRM.
• In Chapter 5, we defined a set of metrics related to ISSRM. This set of metrics
was compared to the ISSRM literature: the second part of the related research
method was about an analysis of the literature and a comparison with the elicited
metrics. However, it could be useful to compare these metrics with other secu-
rity measurement frameworks, like [HGF+05]. This comparison could highlight
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strengths and weaknesses of ISSRM approaches with regards to other security
approaches, and their differences at the metric level.
• Regarding the comparison of modelling languages, only conceptual support was
taken into account. However, a comparison at the metric level is also necessary
to fully assess a language, with respect to the domain model. For example,
evaluation capabilities of Secure Tropos [CNYM00, CKM02] are not considered
and should be analysed with regards to our estimation needs, to fully assess the
language support. The same remark could be applied to each studied language.
• To support efficiently ISSRM through a model-based approach, a tool support is
necessary. This part of the work has not been addressed.
8.3 Future work
The contributions and the limitations of our work point out some open issues for
further research:
• Validation of the domain model through further experimentation. In order to fur-
ther validate the domain model, an experiment should be designed for assessing
its use, with regards to the use of a standard or a method, for learning ISSRM.
This experiment could be developed, for example, as part of security master
courses, or for security trainings in the frame of ISO/IEC 27001 certification.
• Validation of Risk-aware Secure Tropos through further experimentation. The
extension proposed for Secure Tropos could be further validated through its ex-
perimentation i) in a real environment ii) during IS development.
• Improvement of visual representations for models. The work performed on mod-
elling languages has shown some limitations, not only regarding ISSRM support,
but also regarding the cognitive effectiveness [Moo06a] of their visual represen-
tations. Adapting security-oriented modelling languages to improve the support
for ISSRM should naturally take this concern into account [Moo06b, Moo06a,
Moo08].
• Methodological analysis of ISSRM. This thesis focuses on the conceptual aspects
of ISSRM, and does not take into account the methodological part. The same
kind of approach, based on a study of the literature, can be performed at the
process level. Each ISSRM source could be analysed at the methodological level,
and some method chunks [Rol07, MR05] (or method fragments [BSH98]) could
be defined. The objective would be to identify the equivalent steps of each
approach, and precisely specify the scope of the source, with respect to the whole
ISSRM process. By combining these chunks (or fragments), one could define
methods for different contexts (e.g., IS development or existing IS assessment,
risk management or only risk assessment, etc.)
• Traceability between the ISSRM steps. After having proposed some methodologi-
cal guidelines for performing ISSRM, it is necessary to guarantee the traceability
between the different ISSRM steps. ISSRM is always seen as an iterative process,
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needing to be continuously monitored and reviewed [AS/04, ISO08] (cf. Section
2.1). Through the iterative use of the domain model and its instantiation through
modelling languages, mechanisms should be defined in order to guarantee this
traceability between the ISSRM steps.
• Software tool support. As depicted in the introduction (Section 1.5), this thesis
focuses on the development of the modelling language part and does not address
the tool support. To deal with issues like the complexity of models, the iterations
in the activity of modelling, the need of traceability between models, etc., a
software tool is needed, in order to manage the models.
• Extending our focus from early requirements to RE in general. One of our main
assumptions is that it is necessary to deal with security since early stages of
RE. We thus focus our work on early modelling approaches. By extending our
approach to RE, we need to take into account other approaches such as UMLsec
[J02], SecureUML [LBD02] or Mal-activity diagrams [Sin07]. The work on Secure
Tropos could also be extended, in order to contain improvements not only for
the RE stage of Secure Tropos, but also for the design stage.
• The relation between trust and risk in a decision making process. Usually, risk is
not the only element involved in the decision process. For example, in a typical
business environment, the client's trust in the supplier is of equal importance.
A current running project aims at defining a trust model and integrate it with
the ISSRM domain model [ADM+09]. Its definition could follow an approach
analogous to the one followed for the ISSRM domain model definition.
• A modelling support for argumentation. The objective of the modelling language
part is to represent the IS, taking into account identified risks. The reasoning
behind risk decision is supported by the information available in these models,
but it is not supported by the models themselves. To go further, a model-based
argumentation of risk-related reasoning could be provided, for example with the
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [SPW96].
8.4 Publications in relation to this thesis
Many aspects of this thesis have been published. The following list presents the most
relevant publications ordered by type:
Book chapters
Eric Dubois, Nicolas Mayer, André Rifaut, and Vincent Rosener. Enjeux de la sécurité
multimédia (Traité IC2, série Informatique et systèmes d'information, chapter Con-
tributions méthodologiques pour l'amélioration de l'analyse des risques, pages 79-131.
Hermes, 2006. [DMRR06]
Eric Dubois, Nicolas Mayer, and André Rifaut. Social Modeling for Requirements
Engineering, chapter Improving Risk-based Security Analysis with i* . Accepted for
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publication in MIT Press, 2009. [DMR09]
Journal papers
Nicolas Mayer, Eric Dubois, Patrick Heymans, and Raimundas Matulevi£ius. Défis de
la sécurité de l'information  Support à la gestion des risques de sécurité par les mod-
èles. In Colette Rolland, Oscar Pastor, and Jean-Louis Cavarero, editors, Nouveaux
challenges dans les systèmes d'information, volume 13, pages 37-74. Hermes, March
2008. [MDHM08]
Conferences / Workshops
Baptiste Alcalde, Eric Dubois, Sjouke Mauw, Nicolas Mayer, and Sa²a Radomirovi¢.
Towards a Decision Model Based on Trust and Security Risk Management. In Proceed-
ings of the 7th Australasian conference on Information security (AISC '09). Australian
Computer Society, Inc., 2009. [ADM+09]
Nicolas Mayer, Eric Dubois, Raimundas Matulevi£ius, and Patrick Heymans. Towards
a Measurement Framework for Security Risk Management. InModeling Security Work-
shop (MODSEC '08), in conjunction with the 11th International Conference on Model
Driven Engineering Languages and Systems (MODELS '08). Toulouse, France, 2008.
[MDMH08]
Raimundas Matulevi£ius, Nicolas Mayer, Haralambos Mouratidis, Eric Dubois, Patrick
Heymans, and Nicolas Genon. Adapting Secure Tropos for Security Risk Management
during Early Phases of the Information Systems Development. In Proceedings of the
20th International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering (CAiSE
'08), pages 541-555. Springer-Verlag, 2008. [MMM+08]
Raimundas Matulevi£ius, Nicolas Mayer, and Patrick Heymans. Alignment of Mis-
use Cases with Security Risk Management. In Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on
Requirements Engineering for Information Security (SREIS'08), in conjunction with
the 3rd International Conference of Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES'08),
pages 1397-1404. IEEE Computer Society, 2008. [MMH08]
Nicolas Mayer, Patrick Heymans, and Raimundas Matulevi£ius. Design of a Modelling
Language for Information System Security Risk Management. In Proceedings of the
1st International Conference on Research Challenges in Information Science (RCIS
'07), pages 121-132. Ouarzazate, Morocco, 2007. [MHM07]
Nicolas Mayer, Eric Dubois, and André Rifaut. Requirements Engineering for Im-
proving Business/IT Alignment in Security Risk Management Methods. In Enterprise
Interoperability II: New Challenges and Approaches, Proceedings of the Third Inter-
national Conference on Interoperability for Enterprise Software and Applications (I-
ESA'07), pages 15-26. Springer-Verlag, 2007. [MDR07]
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Nicolas Mayer. Managing Security IT Risk: a Goal-Based Requirements Engineering
Approach. In RE'05 Doctoral Consortium, in conjunction with the 13th IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Requirements Engineering (RE '05), 2005. [May05]
Nicolas Mayer, André Rifaut, and Eric Dubois. Towards a Risk-Based Security Re-
quirements Engineering Framework. In Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop
on Requirements Engineering: Foundation for Software Quality (REFSQ '05), pages
83-97, 2005. [MRD05]
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Appendix A
Definitions extracted from the
different sources
A.1 ISO/IEC Guide 73
The definitions related to ISSRM for the ISO/IEC Guide 73 are extracted from the
Terms and definitions section of the standard [ISO02b].
Risk: combination of the probability of an event and its consequence
Consequence: Outcome of an event
NOTE 1: There can be more than one consequence from one event.
NOTE 2: Consequences can range from positive to negative. However, consequences
are always negative for safety aspects.
Event: Occurrence of a particular set of circumstances.
NOTE 1: The event can be certain or uncertain.
NOTE 2: The event can be a single occurrence or a series of occurrence.
Source: Item or activity having a potential for a consequence
NOTE: In the context of safety, source is a hazard.
Risk criteria: terms of reference by which the significance of risk is assessed
Risk treatment: process of selection and implementation of measures to modify risk
NOTE 2: Risk treatment measures can include avoiding, optimizing, transferring
or retaining risk.
Risk control: actions implementing risk management decision.
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A.2 AS/NZS 4360
The definitions related to ISSRM for AS/NZS 4360 are extracted from the Defini-
tions section of the standard [AS/04].
Consequence: outcome or impact of an event
Control: an existing process, policy, device, practice or other action that acts to
minimize negative risk or enhance positive opportunities
Event: occurrence of a particular set of circumstances
Hazard: a source of potential harm
Loss: any negative consequence or adverse effect, financial or otherwise
Risk: the chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives
NOTE 1: A risk is often specified in terms of an event or circumstance and the con-
sequences that may flow from it.
Risk criteria: terms of reference by which the significance of risk is assessed
Risk treatment: process of selection and implementation of measures to modify risk
NOTE 1: The term 'risk treatment' is sometimes used for the measures themselves.
NOTE 2: Risk treatment measures can include avoiding, modifying, sharing or
retaining risk.
A.3 ISO/IEC 13335
The definitions related to ISSRM for ISO/IEC 13335 are extracted from the doc-
ument Information technology  Security techniques  Management of information
and communications technology security  Part 1: Concepts and models for informa-
tion and communications technology security management [ISO04b]. They are mainly
extracted from the Definitions section, but also from the core of the standard, when
specified.
Asset: anything that has value to the organization.
(Section 3.2) These may include, without being limited to:
- physical assets (e.g., computer hardware, communications facilities, buildings),
- information / data (e.g., documents, databases), - software,
- the ability to provide a product or service,
- people, and
- intangibles (e.g., goodwill, image).
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Control: in the context of ICT security, the term control may be considered syn-
onymous with safeguard.
Impact: the result of an information security incident.
(Section 3.5) Impact is the result of an information security incident, caused by a
threat, which affects assets. The impact could be the destruction of certain assets,
damage to the ICT system, and compromise of confidentiality, integrity, availability,
non-repudiation, accountability, authenticity or reliability. Possible indirect impact
includes financial losses, and the loss of market share or company image.
Risk: the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group
of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization. It is measured in terms of a
combination of the probability of an event and its consequence.
(Section 3.6) Risk is the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of
an asset or group of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization.
(Section 3.6) The risk is characterized by a combination of two factors, the probability
of the incident occurring and its impact. Any change to assets, threats, vulnerabilities
and safeguards may have significant effects on risks.
Safeguard: a practice, procedure or mechanism that treats risk. Note that the term
safeguard may be considered synonymous with the term control.
(Section 3.7) Safeguards are practices, procedures or mechanisms that may protect
against a threat, reduce a vulnerability, limit the impact of an information security
incident, detect incidents and facilitate recovery.
(Section 3.7) Examples of specific safeguards are: policies and procedures, access
control mechanisms, anti-virus software, encryption, digital signatures, monitoring and
analysis tools, redundant power supplies, and back-up copies of information.
Threat: a potential cause of an incident that may result in harm to a system or
organization.
(Section 3.3) A threat has the potential to cause an incident that may result in harm
to an asset and therefore an organization.
(Section 3.3) Threats may be of environmental or human origin and, in the latter
case, may be either accidental or deliberate.
Examples of threats are: Eavesdropping, Information modification, System hacking,
Malicious code, Theft, Errors and omissions, File deletion, Incorrect routing, Physical
accidents, Earthquake, Lightning, Floods, Fire
Vulnerability: a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one
or more threats.
(Section 3.4) Vulnerabilities associated with assets include weaknesses in physical
layout, organization, procedures, personnel, management, administration, hardware,
software or information.
(Section 3.4) [. . . ] a vulnerability is merely a condition or set of conditions that
may allow a threat to affect an asset.
(Section 3.4) An example of a vulnerability is lack of access control, which could
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allow the threat of an intrusion to occur and assets to be lost.
(Section 4.1) ICT security requirements, e.g., in terms of confidentiality, integrity,
availability, nonrepudiation, accountability, authenticity and reliability, particularly
with regard to the views of the asset owners, [. . . ]
A.4 Common Criteria
The definitions related to ISSRM for CC are extracted from the document Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model  [Com06a].
(12) assets: entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon.
(74) security objective: a statement of intent to counter identified threats and/or
satisfy identified organisation security policies and/or assumptions.
(153) vulnerability: a weakness in the TOE that can be used to violate the SFRs in
some environment.
(192) Assets are entities that someone places value upon. Examples of assets include:
- contents of a file or a server;
- the authenticity of votes cast in an election;
- the availability of an electronic commerce process;
- the ability to use an expensive printer;
- access to a classified facility.
but given that value is highly subjective, almost anything can be an asset.
(195) Examples of threat agents include hackers, malicious users, non-malicious
users (who sometimes make errors), computer processes and accidents.
(196) The owners of the assets will perceive such threats as potential for impair-
ment of the assets such that the value of the assets to the owners would be reduced.
Security-specific impairment commonly includes, but is not limited to: loss of asset
confidentiality, loss of asset integrity and loss of asset availability.
(197) These threats therefore give rise to risks to the assets, based on the likeli-
hood of a threat being realised and the impact on the assets when that threat is
realised. Subsequently countermeasures are imposed to reduce the risks to assets.
These countermeasures may consist of IT countermeasures (such as firewalls and smart
cards) and non-IT countermeasures (such as guards and procedures).
(202) The Security Target then describes the countermeasures (in the form of Se-
curity Objectives) and demonstrates that these countermeasures are sufficient to
counter these threats: if the countermeasures do what they claim to do, the threats
A.4 Common Criteria 231
Figure A.1: 'Security concepts and relationships' for CC (as appears in [Com06a] (194))
are countered.
(292) A threat consists of a threat agent, an asset and an adverse action of that
threat agent on that asset.
(293) Threat agents are entities that can adversely act on assets. Examples of threat
agents are hackers, users, computer processes, TOE development personnel, and acci-
dents. Threat agents may be further described by aspects such as expertise, resources,
opportunity and motivation.
(296) Adverse actions are actions performed by a threat agent on an asset. These
actions influence one or more properties of an asset from which that asset derives its
value.
(304) The security objectives are a concise and abstract statement of the intended
solution to the problem defined by the security problem definition. The role of the
security objectives is threefold:
- provide a high-level, natural language solution of the problem;
- divide this solution into two part wise solutions, that reflect that different entities
each have to address a part of the problem;
- demonstrate that these part wise solutions form a complete solution to the problem.
(327) The SFRs1 are a translation of the security objectives for the TOE. They are
usually at a more detailed level of abstraction, but they have to be a complete trans-
lation (the security objectives must be completely addressed).
1Security Functional Requirements
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A.5 ISO/IEC 27001
The definitions related to ISSRM for ISO/IEC 27001 are extracted from the document
Information technology  Security techniques  Information security management sys-
tems  Requirements [ISO05b].
(p.2) asset
anything that has value to the organization
(p.2) information security
preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information; in addition,
other properties such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability
can also be involved
(p.3) risk treatment: process of selection and implementation of measures to modify
risk [ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002]
NOTE: In this International Standard the term 'control' is used as a synonym for
'measure'.
(p.4) Identify the risks.
1) Identify the assets within the scope of the ISMS, and the owners of these assets.
2) Identify the threats to those assets.
3) Identify the vulnerabilities that might be exploited by the threats.
4) Identify the impacts that losses of confidentiality, integrity and availability may
have on the assets.
(p.5) Identify and evaluate options for the treatment of risks.
Possible actions include:
1) applying appropriate controls;
2) knowingly and objectively accepting risks, providing they clearly satisfy the orga-
nization's policies and the criteria for risk acceptance;
3) avoiding risks; and
4) transferring the associated business risks to other parties, e.g. insurers, suppliers.
(p.13 to 32) Examples of controls
A.6 ISO/IEC 27005
The definitions related to ISSRM for ISO/IEC 27005 are extracted from the docu-
ment Information technology  Security techniques  Information security risk man-
agement [ISO08].
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(p.1) impact
adverse change to the level of business objectives achieved
(p.1) information security risk
potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of
assets and thereby cause harm to the organization.
NOTE: It is measured in terms of a combination of the likelihood of an event and its
consequence
(p.8) Risk evaluation criteria [...]
- Operational and business importance of availability, confidentiality and integrity
(p.8) Impact criteria [...]
- Breaches of information security (e.g. loss of confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity)
(p.10) A risk is a combination of the consequences that would follow from the oc-
currence of an unwanted event and the likelihood of the occurrence of the event
(p.10) An asset is anything that has value to the organization and which therefore
requires protection.
(p.11) A threat has the potential to harm assets such as information, processes
and systems and therefore organizations. Threats may be of natural or human origin,
and could be accidental or deliberate. Both accidental and deliberate threat sources
should be identified. A threat may arise from within or from outside the organization.
(p.12) Vulnerabilities that can be exploited by threats to cause harm to assets or
to the organization should be identified (relates to ISO/IEC 27001, Clause 4.2.1 d) 3)).
(p.13) The consequences that losses of confidentiality, integrity and availability may
have on the assets should be identified (see ISO/IEC 27001 4.2.1 d) 4)).
(p.15) Consequences or business impact may be determined by modelling the out-
comes of an event or set of events, or by extrapolation from experimental studies or
past data.
(p.17) Information security properties: if one criterion is not relevant for the or-
ganization (e.g. loss of confidentiality), then all risks impacting this criterion may not
be relevant
(p.17) There are four options available for risk treatment: risk reduction (see 9.2),
risk retention (see 9.3), risk avoidance (see 9.4) and risk transfer (see 9.5).
(p.19) ISO/IEC 27002 provides detailed information on controls.
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(p.30) The primary assets:
- Business processes & activities
- Information
The supporting assets (on which the primary elements of the scope rely) of all types:
- Hardware
- Software
- Network
- Personnel
- Site
- Organization's structure
(p.35) Criteria [...]
Another basis for the valuation of assets is the costs incurred due to the loss of con-
fidentiality, integrity and availability as the result of an incident. Non-repudiation,
accountability, authenticity and reliability should also be considered, as appropriate.
(p.40, Left column of the table) Threat source / Origin of threat: Hacker, cracker,
computer criminal, terrorist [...]
A.7 NIST Special Publication 800-27 Rev A and 800-30
The definitions related to ISSRM from the NIST '800' serie of standards are extracted
first from the glossary of the NIST SP 800-27 Rev A Engineering Principles for In-
formation Technology Security [SHF04] and second from the NIST SP 800-30 Risk
Management Guide for Information Technology Systems [SGF02].
NIST SP 800-27 Rev A - Engineering Principles for Information Tech-
nology Security 
IT-related risk / Risk: The net mission/business impact considering (1) the likeli-
hood that a particular threat source will exploit, or trigger, a particular information
system vulnerability and (2) the resulting impact if this should occur. IT-related
risks arise from legal liability or mission/business loss due to, but not limited to:
1. Unauthorized (malicious, non-malicious, or accidental) disclosure, modification, or
destruction of information.
2. Non-malicious errors and omissions.
3. IT disruptions due to natural or man-made disasters.
4. Failure to exercise due care and diligence in the implementation and operation of
the IT.
Security goals: The five security goals are confidentiality, availability, integrity, ac-
countability, and assurance.
Threat: Any circumstance or event with the potential to harm an information system
through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or de-
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nial of service. Threats arise from human actions and natural events.
Threat source: Either (1) intent and method targeted at the intentional exploita-
tion of a vulnerability or (2) the situation and method that may accidentally trigger
a vulnerability.
Vulnerability: A weakness in system security requirements, design, implementation,
or operation, that could be accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited and result
in a violation of the system's security policy.
NIST SP 800-30 - Risk Management Guide for Information Technology
Systems
(p.12) Threat: The potential for a threat source to exercise (accidentally trigger or
intentionally exploit) a specific vulnerability.
(p.14 Table 3.1) Human Threats: Threat-Source, Motivation, and Threat Ac-
tions
(p.14 Table 3.1) Threat action: Hacking, Social engineering, System intrusion,
Break-ins, Unauthorized system access, Blackmail [...]
(p.14 Table 3.1) Threat source: Floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, landslides, avalanches,
hacker, cracker, terrorist [...]
(p.19) The goal of this step is to analyze the controls that have been implemented,
or are planned for implementation, by the organization to minimize or eliminate the
likelihood (or probability) of a threat's exercising a system vulnerability.
(p.22) The following list provides a brief description of each security goal and the
consequence (or impact) of its not being met:
- Loss of Integrity. [...]
- Loss of Availability. [...]
- Loss of Confidentiality. [...]
(p.27) Risk mitigation can be achieved through any of the following risk mitigation
options:
- Risk Assumption. To accept the potential risk and continue operating the IT system
or to implement controls to lower the risk to an acceptable level
- Risk Avoidance. To avoid the risk by eliminating the risk cause and/or consequence
(e.g., forgo certain functions of the system or shut down the system when risks are
identified)
- Risk Limitation. To limit the risk by implementing controls that minimize the ad-
verse impact of a threat's exercising a vulnerability (e.g., use of supporting, preventive,
detective controls)
- Risk Planning. To manage risk by developing a risk mitigation plan that prioritizes,
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implements, and maintains controls
- Research and Acknowledgment. To lower the risk of loss by acknowledging the vul-
nerability or flaw and researching controls to correct the vulnerability
- Risk Transference. To transfer the risk by using other options to compensate for the
loss, such as purchasing insurance.
(p.33-34) Controls: Identification, Cryptographic Key Management, Security Ad-
ministration, Authentication, Protected communication, Audit [...]
A.8 The IT-Grundshutz
The definitions related to ISSRM from the IT-Grundshutz are extracted first from
the glossary of the Catalogues The IT-Grundschutz Catalogues 2005  [Bun05d] and
second from the Risk analysis standard BSI Standard 100-3 Risk analysis based on
IT-Grundschutz  [Bun05c].
The IT-Grundschutz Catalogues 2005 
Applied threat
An applied threat is a basic threat which has a direct effect on an object as the result
of a vulnerability. A basic threat therefore only becomes an applied threat for an
object when combined with a vulnerability.
For example, are computer viruses a basic or applied threat to the user who is surfing
the Internet? According to the above definition it can be ascertained that all users are
principally exposed to a basic threat by computer viruses on the Internet. The user
who downloads an infected file is exposed to an applied threat by the computer virus
if his computer is vulnerable to this type of computer virus. Users with an effective
anti-virus programme, a configuration which prevents the function of the virus, or an
operating system which cannot execute the virus code is, however, not exposed to an
applied threat as a result of downloaded malicious program.
Asset
Everything which is important for an organisation (financial assets, knowledge, ob-
jects, health).
Basic IT security parameters
The IT-Grundschutz defines three fundamental IT security values: confidentiality,
availability and integrity.
Each user is naturally free to include additional fundamental values when assessing
protection requirements if this is helpful in individual cases. Other generic terms con-
cerning IT security are, for example:
- Authenticity
- Liability
- Reliability
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Basic threat
A basic threat in general terms is an event or condition which involves the risk of dam-
age. The damage is related to a concrete value such as financial assets, knowledge,
objects or health. In IT terms a basic threat is a condition or an event which can
negatively affect the availability, integrity or the confidentiality of information, which
in turn results in damage to the owner of the information. Basic threats can result
from the effects of force majeure, organisational shortcomings, human errors, technical
failure or deliberate acts.
IT assets
IT assets refers to all the infrastructural, organisational, personnel and technical com-
ponents which serve to perform tasks in a particular field of information processing.
IT assets can refer to all the information technology of an organisation or to individ-
ual areas defined in terms of organisational structures (e.g. departmental network) or
shared IT applications (e.g. personnel information system).
Risk
A risk is the prediction of possible damage, often based on calculation, in a negative
case (danger), or in a positive case a possible advantage (chance). The definition of
damage or advantage depends on the benchmark values.
Risk is also often defined as the combination of the probability of the occurrence of
damage and the extent of this damage.
Security safeguard
The term security safeguard refers to all actions which serve to control and counter
security risks. This includes organisational, personnel, technical or infrastructural
security safeguards. The terms security precaution and protective measure are often
used synonymously. Safeguard is used as a general term. In addition to safeguard
the term control is often used.
Vulnerability
A vulnerability can result in the manifestation of a basic threat and damage to an
organisation or a system. As a result of a vulnerability an object (an organisation or
a system) is susceptible to threats.
BSI Standards 100-3 Risk Analysis based on IT-Grundschutz 
(Section 1.2) The methodology outlined below demonstrates how the threats listed
in the IT-Grundschutz Catalogues can be used to carry out a simplified analysis of IT
risks.
(Section 1.2) Have a high or very high security requirement in at least one of the
three basic parameters of confidentiality, integrity or availability
(Section 2) An IT structure analysis must have been performed for the IT assets, as
specified in Section 4.1 of the IT-Grundschutz Methodology.
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(Section 2) The standard security measures stated in the individual modules form
the basis for the IT-Grundschutz security concept for the IT assets under review.
(Section 3) In contrast to the IT-Sicher-heitshandbuch, threats, vulnerabilities
and risks are not examined separately here.
(Section 6) Therefore, a decision on how to deal with the remaining threats has to
be taken.
A.9 EBIOS
The definitions related to ISSRM for the EBIOS method are extracted from the docu-
ment EBIOS - Expression of Needs and Identification of Security Objectives, Section
1 - Introduction [DCS04c].
Asset: Any resource of value to the organisation and necessary for achieving its ob-
jectives. There is an important distinction between essential elements and entities
needing to be protected.
Examples: - list of names; - certification request; - invoice management; - encryption
algorithm; - laptop computer; - Ethernet; - operating system; - etc.
Attack: Exploiting one or more vulnerabilities using an attack method with a given
opportunity.
Examples: - strong opportunity of using counterfeit or copied software resulting from
total absence of awareness or information concerning copyright legislation; - software
damaged by a virus through easy loading of malicious programmes onto the organisa-
tion's office network; - etc.
Attack method: Standard means (action or event) by which a threat agent carries
out an attack.
Examples: - theft of media or documents; - software entrapment; - attack on avail-
ability of personnel; - passive wiretapping; - flood; - etc.
Entity: An asset such as an organisation, site, personnel, equipment, network, soft-
ware, system.
Examples: - facilities management company; - the organisation's premises; - system
administrator; - laptop computer; - Ethernet; - operating system; - teleprocedure gate-
way; - etc.
Essential element: Information or function with at least one non-nil sensitivity.
Examples: - list of names; - certification request; - invoice management; - encryption
algorithm; - etc.
Impact: Consequences for an organisation when a threat is accomplished.
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Examples: - loss of customers' confidence in a trade mark; - financial loss of 10% of
turnover; - infringement of laws and regulations leading to legal proceedings against
the Director; - etc.
Risk: Combination of a threat and the losses it can cause, i.e.: of the opportunity, for
a threat agent using an attack method, to exploit one or more vulnerabilities of one
or more entities and the impact on the essential elements and on the organisation.
Examples: - a former member of the personnel with little technical ability but possibly
strong motivation, deliberately damages the system software by introducing a virus,
taking advantage of the ease of installing harmful programmes on the organisation's
office network; this could affect, for example, the functions generating estimates or sig-
nature certificates, which could result in the inability to provide a service, impossibility
of fulfilling contractual obligations and serious consequences in terms of confidence in
a trade mark; - a cracker with a good level of expertise, standard equipment and paid
for his actions, steals confidential files by remotely accessing the company's network,
causing a transaction with a partner to fail and loss of customers' confidence; - etc.
Security criterion: Characteristic of an essential element allowing the various sen-
sitivities to be assessed.
Security functional requirements: to contribute to covering one or more security
objectives for the target system.
Examples: - the system must generate the encryption keys in compliance with a spec-
ified encryption key generation algorithm and with the specified sizes of encryption
keys in compliance with specified standards; - the system must unambiguously detect a
physical intrusion that could compromise it; - a lightning conductor must be installed
at the organisation's premises; - etc.
Security measure: A measure designed to improve security, specified by a security
requirement and implemented to comply with it. The effect of the measures may be to
anticipate, prepare, dissuade, protect, detect, confine, combat, recover, restore, com-
pensate, etc.
Security objectives: Expression of the intention to counter identified threats or
risks (depending on the context) and/or comply with the organisational security poli-
cies and assumptions; an objective can concern the target system, its development
environment or its operational environment.
Examples: a) open objectives (security objective can be covered by a wide range
of means): - the configuration of internal network stations must be upgradable; - the
rooms must be protected against lightning; - etc. b) closed objectives (security ob-
jective can only be covered by a narrow range of means): - the system must allow
unique identification and authentication of users before any interaction between the
system and the user; - two different and compatible antivirus programmes must be
installed and the signature bases updated every two weeks; - etc.
Threat: Possible attack of a threat agent on assets.
240 APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS EXTRACTED FROM THE DIFFERENT SOURCES
Examples: - a former member of the personnel with little technical ability but possibly
a strong motivation to carry out an attack deliberately damages the system software
by introducing a virus, taking advantage of the ease of installing harmful programmes
on the organisation's office network; this could affect, for example, the functions gen-
erating estimates or signature certificates; - a cracker with a good level of expertise,
standard equipment and paid for his actions, steals confidential files by remote access
to the company's network; - a developer or member of the personnel with a very good
level of expertise in source codes but little ISS knowledge deliberately modifies the
source code; - a visitor steals equipment containing confidential information; - etc.
Threat agent: Human action, natural or environmental element that has potentially
negative consequences on the system. It can be characterised by its type (natural,
human or environmental) and by its cause (accidental or deliberate). In the case of an
accidental cause, it is also characterised by exposure and available resources. In the
case of a deliberate cause, it is also characterised by expertise, available resources and
motivation.
Examples: - former member of the personnel with little technical ability and time
but possibly a strong motivation to carry out an attack; - cracker with considerable
technical ability, well equipped and strongly motivated by the money he could make;
- very wet climate for three months of the year; - virus; - users; - developers; - etc.
Vulnerability: Characteristic of an entity that can constitute a weakness or flaw in
terms of information systems security.
Examples: - no fire safety arrangements for an Organisation type entity; - little atten-
tion drawn to security problems for a Personnel type entity; - ease of intrusion into
site for a Site type entity; - possibility of creating or modifying system commands for
a Network type entity; - etc.
A.10 MEHARI
The definitions related to ISSRM for the MEHARI method are extracted from the
document MEHARI 2007: Concepts and Mechanisms [CLU07a]
(p.3) Critical assets + High vulnerability = Unacceptable risk
(p.6) Classification of assets using the three basic criteria (Availability, Integrity,
Confidentiality).
(p.6) It is usual to distinguish primary assets (business activities and related infor-
mation) and supporting assets.
(p.7) The vulnerability of an information system is the addition of its weak points
whereby an accident, error or deliberate act could damage the organization.
(p.7) A security service is a response to a security need, expressed in generic and
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functional terms that describe what the service should do, and generally referring to
certain types of threat. A security service describes a security function. This
function is independent of the real mechanisms or solutions that ensure the effec-
tive implementation of the service. For example: the access control service is designed
(as its name implies) to control user access, or to only allow access to authorized users.
(p.8) Security services provide functions that can, themselves, require complemen-
tary services, or sub-services, as they will be called.
(p.8) A Mechanism is a specific way of ensuring the function of a service or sub-
service (whether totally or partially). This may take the form, for example, of a
procedure, an algorithm, or some specific technology.
(p.8) A security solution is the real implementation of a mechanism and includes
the hardware and/or software components required for its deployment, the installation
procedures, and operational support, as well as organizational structures needed for
its correct use.
(p.8) Some services can be considered to be general measures, where others are tech-
nical.
- General measures are security measures that are considered to be generally useful,
or even necessary, to the security of the information system. However, their effect may
be felt at the level of the organization, security operation or awareness, but with no
direct influence on specific risk situations.
- Technical measures have a specific role, a direct objective and have an immediate
effect in certain risk situations that can be defined.
(p.11) Security services, as defined in MEHARI, are security functions and these
functions are implemented through security solutions that are, or will be, installed
in the organization.
(p.13) A risk scenario is the description of a malfunction and the way in which the
malfunction can happen. The malfunction states the potential damage, or the direct
deterioration caused by the malfunction, and any indirect consequences. It is usual to
speak of a risk situation, where it is understood that the organization is potentially
exposed to such a scenario.
A risk situation is often identified as a result of a stakes analysis. However, it could
also be identified at the level of a project, or detected through systematic search.
(p.14) Each scenario will therefore be described as follows:
- The type of consequence (sometimes in relation with predefined value scale)
- The type of assets implicated by the scenario (sometimes in relation with the pre-
defined critical resources)
- The types of causes that can lead to the risk situation
A risk scenario that could be envisaged is described below:
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Scenario description
Description of the event and its consequence(s) Description of its cause and origin
Destruction of basic data used for paying
salaries (calculations & parameters)
. . . due to an operational error: a disk crash pre-
venting data from being read
Destruction of basic data used for paying
salaries (calculations & parameters)
. . . due to intentional deletion of the files by a
member of the operations staff

A.11 OCTAVE
The definitions related to ISSRM for the OCTAVE method are extracted from the
document OCTAVE criteria, Version 2.0  [AD01a] which has a common glossary
with the OCTAVE method [AD01b].
Actor: a property of threat that defines who or what may violate the security re-
quirements (confidentiality, integrity, availability) of an asset.
Area of Concern: a situation or scenario where someone is concerned about a threat
to important assets. Typically, areas of concern have a source and an outcome - a
causal action that has an effect on the organization.
Asset: something of value to the organization. Information technology assets are the
combination of logical and physical assets and are grouped into specific classes (infor-
mation, systems, software, hardware, people).
Impact: the effect of a threat on an organization's mission and business objectives.
Key classes of components: types of devices that are important in processing,
storing, or transmitting critical information. They represent related assets to critical
assets.
Outcome: a property of threat that defines the immediate outcome (disclosure, mod-
ification, destruction, loss, interruption) of violating the security requirements of an
asset.
Protection Strategy Practice: actions that help initiate, implement, and maintain
security within an organization. A protection strategy practice is also called a security
practice.
Risk: the possibility of suffering harm or loss. It is the potential for realizing un-
wanted negative consequences of an event. Risk refers to a situation where a person
could do something undesirable or a natural occurrence could cause an undesirable
outcome, resulting in a negative impact or consequence.
(p.5) It breaks down into three basic components: asset, threat, and vulnerability
[AD01a]
Security requirements: requirements outlining the qualities of information assets
that are important to an organization. Typical security requirements are confidential-
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ity, integrity, and availability.
Threat: an indication of a potential undesirable event. A threat refers to a sit-
uation in which a person could do something undesirable (an attacker initiating a
denial-of-service attack against an organization's email server) or a natural occurrence
could cause an undesirable outcome (a fire damaging an organization's information
technology hardware). Threats have defined properties (asset, actor, motive, access,
outcome).
Vulnerability: a weakness in an information system, system security practices and
procedures, administrative controls, internal controls, implementation, or physical lay-
out that could be exploited by a threat to gain unauthorized access to information or
disrupt processing. There are two basic types of vulnerabilities (organizational and
technology).
Risk mitigation plans: a plan that is intended to reduce the risks to a critical asset.
Risk mitigation plans tend to incorporate actions, or countermeasures, designed to
counter the threats to the assets.
A.12 CRAMM
The definitions related to ISSRM for the CRAMM method are extracted from the
document CRAMM User Guide [Ins03].
(p.3-1) Assets within an information system or network can be considered under
three categories:
- information or data assets
- software assets
- physical assets, such as file servers, workstations, bridges, routers.
(p.3-2) Typical threats include:
- deliberate attacks such as hacking, spoofing, insertion of false messages, introduction
of damaging or disruptive software, theft, wilful damage
- disasters such as fire, flood, lightning strike
- errors by individuals
- technical failures.
(p.3-2) The level of risk is identified from the value of the assets, the level of threat
and the extent of the vulnerability.
(p.7-33) For each data asset, you need to discuss with the interviewee the effect of
the following impacts.
Unavailability
The consequences resulting from data being unavailable may vary depending on the
length of the loss of service. CRAMM allows you to investigate these consequences
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Figure A.2: 'The IT risk analysis and management process' for CRAMM (as appears in
[Ins03] (p.3-3))
against the following timeframes: [...]
Destruction
This impact investigates the consequences that could result from:
- loss of data since the last successful back-up
- total loss of data including back-ups.
You need to find out how often back-ups are taken and where they are stored when
looking at this impact.
Disclosure
This impact is investigated in terms of:
- disclosure to insiders (those people working for the organisation, but who are not
authorised to see the data)
- disclosure to contracted service providers (staff of third party organisations who may
have legitimate access to the system or network, but not necessarily to the data -
examples include those organizations running outsourced IT services or virtual private
networks)
- disclosure to outsiders (all other individuals).
Modification
The issues to explore when examining this impact vary according to the end-user ser-
vice that the data is using, as follows. [...]
(p.8-4) Countermeasures in each sub-group are arranged in a hierarchical struc-
ture, with all countermeasures being assigned to one of three possible categories:
- category 1: security objectives - a high-level statement
- category 2: a detailed description of the security functions that help to achieve
the security objectives
- category 3: examples of how the functions can be implemented.
(p.B-2) Accountability: The property that ensures that the actions of an entity may
be traced uniquely to the entity. (ISO 7498-2/3.3.3)
(p. B-3) Asset: A component or part of the total system. Assets may be of four
types:
- physical
- application software
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- data
- end user services.
(p.B-4) Availability: The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by
an authorised entity. (ISO 7498-2/3.3.11)
(p.B-8) Confidentiality: The property that information is not made available or dis-
closed to unauthorised individuals, entities or processes. (ISO 7498-2/3.3.16)
(p.B-9) Countermeasure: A check or restraint on a system, designed to enhance
security in one of the following ways:
- reducing the threat of an attack occurring
- reducing the vulnerability to an attack
- reducing the impact of an attack
- detecting an attack
- recovering from an attack.
(p.B-9) Countermeasure category: CRAMM's countermeasure library is hierarchi-
cal in structure. Countermeasures can be in one of the following three categories:
- Security Objectives
- Functions
- Examples or implementation options.
(p.B-16) Impact: The effect on the organisation of a breach in security.
(p.B-29) Security risk: The likelihood of a system's inherent vulnerability being ex-
ploited by the threats to the system, leading to the system being penetrated.
(p. B-34) Threat: A potential violation of security.
(ISO 7498-2/3.3.55)
NOTES
1 For example, disclosure, modification, destruction, or denial of service.
A threat is defined by its source, motivation, path, target, and result.
See also - accidental threat, intentional threat, active threat, passive threat and phys-
ical threat.
(p. B-38) Vulnerability: A weakness or lack of controls that would allow or facilitate
a threat actuation against a specific asset or target.
NOTES
1 A vulnerability may be an omission or it may relate to a deficiency in a control's
strength, completeness or consistency.
A vulnerability may be technical, procedural or operational.
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A.13 CORAS
The definitions related to ISSRM for the CORAS method are extracted from the paper
Assessing Enterprise Risk Level: The CORAS Approach [VML+07].
(p.313) Assets are the parts or features of the target which have value to the client
of the analysis, such as physical objects, know-how, services, software and hardware,
and so on.
(p.313) A vulnerability is a weakness of the system or organization.
(p.313) A threat may exploit a vulnerability and cause an unwanted incident.
(p.313) [...] an unwanted incident, an event which reduces the value of one or more
of the assets.
(p.313-314) A risk is an unwanted incident along with its estimated likelihood and
consequence values.
(p.314) Treatments represent various options for reducing risk.
(p.317) Part of defining the scope is selecting which security properties are to be
considered in the analysis, such as confidentiality, integrity and availability, as well as
other aspects of interest.
(p.321) Assets are the parts or features of the target of analysis that have value to
the client and that the client wants to protect, such as physical objects, key personnel,
services, software and hardware, or more intangible things such as know-how, trust,
market share and public image.
(p.325) Vulnerabilities can also be system characteristics that are impossible to
treat; an internet connection that is crucial to the system, for example.
(p.325) Vulnerabilities can be thought of as control mechanisms that ideally should
be in place, but for some reason are missing or not sufficiently robust.
(p.325) [...] a threat (e.g., a disloyal employee or a computer virus) [...]
(p.325) An unwanted incident is an event resulting in a reduction in the value of
the target asset. Furthermore, an unwanted incident may initiate or lead to other
unwanted incidents, forming chains of events.
(p.325) [...] threat scenario, which is a sequence of events or activities leading to
an unwanted incident.
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A.14 Firesmith
The definitions related to ISSRM from the Firesmith research work are extracted first
from the technical report Common Concepts Underlying Safety, Security, and Sur-
vivability Engineering [Fir03] and second from the paper A Taxonomy of Security-
Related Requirements [Fir05].
Common Concepts Underlying Safety, Security, and Survivability Engi-
neering 
(p.3) Safety is largely about protecting valuable assets (especially people) from
harm due to accidents. Security is largely about protecting valuable assets (espe-
cially sensitive data) from harm due to attacks. [...] In all three cases, a primary focus
is in dangers (hazards and threats) and their associated risks and the system's
vulnerabilities to them.
(p.15) In fact, security has historically been defined more often in terms of its most
popular subfactors (typically availability, integrity, and privacy) than in terms of its
subclasses.
(p.29) Asset (with regard to safety engineering) is anything of value that should be
protected from accidental harm.
(p.30) Harm (when dealing with safety requirements) is significant damage to or a
negative impact (i.e., negative outcome) associated with an asset due to an accident.
Harm must be sufficiently significant to warrant relatively prompt remedial action to
prevent such harm in the future.
(p.30) Hazard is a situation that increases the likelihood of one or more related
accidents.
A hazard thus consists of hazardous states (i.e., a set of one or more incompatible
system conditions or states, possibly including one or more conditions in the system's
environment) together with the accident (type) they may cause. Potential hazards
should be identified early during requirements engineering or architecting, while ac-
tual hazards may be identified in existing systems. The following are two examples of
such potential and actual hazards with their various components identified:
- Potential hazard: The subway doors are opening, open, or closing while the subway is
moving (hazardous conditions), which may result in passengers and/or their property
(assets) falling out (accident) and being injured, killed, or damaged (harm).
- Actual hazard: Riders and/or their property within the doorway when the subway
doors are closing (hazardous conditions) may result in the passengers and their prop-
erty (assets) being crushed (accident) and thus injured, killed, or damaged (harm).
Examples of primarily internal hazardous conditions include dangerous conditions in-
volving hazardous chemicals, high voltages, and robotic-controlled moving machinery.
A more specific example would be a moving elevator with open doors, two incompati-
ble states of an elevator. Examples of primarily external hazardous conditions include
fires and such natural disasters as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes.
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(p.31) Safety mechanism (also known as a safeguard or safety tactic) is an ar-
chitectural mechanism (i.e., strategic decision) that helps fulfill one or more safety
requirements and/or reduces one or more safety vulnerabilities.
(p.31) Safety requirement is a quality requirement that specifies a required amount
of safety (typically a subfactor of safety) in terms of a system-specific criterion and a
minimum mandatory level of an associated quality metric that is necessary to meet
one or more safety policies.
(p.31) Safety risk is the potential risk of harm to an asset due to accidents.
Safety risk is defined as the sum (over all relevant hazards) of the products of the
following two terms: (1) the largest negative impact of the harm to the asset (i.e., its
criticality, severity, or damage) times (2) the likelihood that the hazard will result in
an accident.
Using the basic theory of conditional probability, the likelihood that a hazard results in
an accident causing harm can be calculated/estimated as the product of the following
terms: (1) the likelihood that the hazard exists, (2) the likelihood that other necessary
conditions also exist (also known as latency), and (3) the likelihood that the hazard
will lead to an accident if it and the other necessary conditions exist (also known as
danger).
(p.31) Safety vulnerability is a weakness in the system that increases the likelihood
that an accident will occur and cause harm.
This weakness may be in the architecture, design, implementation, integration, de-
ployment, and configuration of the system. Examples of safety vulnerabilities include
the lack of safety features, the lack of warning mechanisms, or defects that could cause
failures.
(p.34) Asset (with regard to security engineering) is anything of value that should
be protected from malicious harm.
(p.34) Attacker (also known as adversary) is an agent (e.g., person or program) that
causes an attack due to the desire to cause harm to an asset.
(p.34) Harm (when dealing with security requirements) is a negative impact associ-
ated with an asset due to an attack. Harm is due to an accident when dealing with
safety requirements, is due to an attack when dealing with security requirements, and
may be due to both accidents and attacks when dealing with survivability require-
ments.
(p.34) Threat is a situation that increases the likelihood of one or more related at-
tacks.
The threat consists of the existence of one or more potential attackers together with
a set of one or more system conditions or states that provide motivation to the at-
tackers. Thus, the threat of theft may result in an actual theft (attack), and threats
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correspond to attacks that are typically classified by attacker motivation (e.g., theft)
as opposed to technique (e.g., spoofing). In some books and articles, the different but
highly related terms attack and threat are sometimes confounded by being used as
synonyms.
(p.35) Security mechanism (also known as countermeasure or security tactic)
is an architecture mechanism (i.e., strategic decision) that helps fulfill one or more
security requirements and/or reduces one or more security vulnerabilities.
Security mechanisms can be implemented as some combination of hardware or software
components, manual procedures, training, etc. It should also be noted that the same
architectural mechanism (e.g., redundancy) can often be used as a safety, security, and
survivability mechanism.
(p.35) Security requirement is a quality requirement that specifies a required
amount of security (actually a quality subfactor of security) in terms of a system-
specific criterion and a minimum level of an associated quality metric that is necessary
to meet one or more security policies.
(p.35) Security risk is the potential risk of harm to an asset due to attacks.
Security risk is the sum (over all relevant threats) of the negative impact of the harm
to the asset (i.e., its criticality) multiplied by the likelihood of the harm occurring.
Using the basic theory of conditional probability, the likelihood that harm results
from an attack can be calculated/estimated as the product of the following terms: (1)
the likelihood that the threat of attack exists, (2) the likelihood that other necessary
conditions (e.g., vulnerabilities) also exist, and (3) the likelihood that the threat will
lead to a successful attack if it and the other necessary conditions exist. The term
likelihood is used rather than probability because the probability is typically not
accurately or precisely known but rather only grossly estimated (guesstimated).
(p.36) Security vulnerability is any weakness in the system that increases the like-
lihood that a successful attack (i.e., one causing harm) will occur.
Security vulnerability is not restricted to only those vulnerabilities due to program-
ming problems. It also includes vulnerabilities in the system's architecture and design,
how the system is installed and configured, how its users are trained, etc. The vulner-
abilities of a system may involve its data components, hardware components, software
components, human-role components (i.e., wetware or personnel), and document com-
ponents (i.e., paperware).
(p.46) Asset is anything of value that should be protected from harm.
(p.46) Harm is significant damage to or negative impact (i.e., negative outcome)
associated with a valuable asset that is due to an incident. Harm can be decomposed
according to the type of asset harmed (e.g., harm to people includes such things as
injury, illness, death, or victimization by a cybercrime) or the type of incident (e.g.,
harm due to attack may include exposure of sensitive information). Harm must be
sufficiently significant to warrant relatively prompt remedial action to prevent such
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harm in the future.
(p.48) Danger (also known as obstacle) is a situation (i.e., a set of one or more
incompatible conditions or states of the system, possibly including one or more condi-
tions in the system's environment) that increases the likelihood of one or more related
incidents. As such, dangers are ways of organizing related categories of incidents.
- Hazard is a danger that may result in one or more related accidents.
- Threat is a danger that may result in one or more related attacks.
A Taxonomy of Security-Related Requirements
(p.2) Safety and security are subtypes of defensibility quality factor because they are
both primarily concerned with the protection of valuable assets from harm, which
is a significant negative consequence to the asset.
(p.3) Specifically, a danger is one or more conditions, situations, or states of a sys-
tem that in conjunction with conditions in the environment of the system can cause
or contribute to the occurrence of one or more related incidents.
(p.3) [...] dangers are classified into hazards and threats, whereby hazards can
cause safety incidents and threats can cause security incidents.
(p.3) Risk is usually defined as the probable magnitude of the potential harm to one
or more assets that can occur due to a danger and is conservatively estimated as the
maximum credible harm multiplied by the estimated probability that the associated
accident or successful attack occurs. And as before, risks can be classified as either
safety risks due to hazards or security risks due to threats.
A.15 Haley et al. and Moffett and Nuseibeh
The definitions related to ISSRM from the Haley et al. research work are extracted
from the research paper Security Requirements Engineering: A Framework for Rep-
resentation and Analysis [HLMN08] and for Moffett and Nuseibeh from the technical
report A Framework for Security Requirements Engineering [MN03].
Security Requirements Engineering: A Framework for Representation and
Analysis
(Section 2.1) Security needs arise when stakeholders establish that some resource
involved in a system, be it tangible (e.g., cash) or intangible (e.g., information or
reputation), is of value to the organization. Such resources are called assets, and
the stakeholders naturally wish to protect themselves from any harm involving these
assets.
(Section 3.1) The security community has enumerated some general security con-
cerns: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (labeling them CIA, and more re-
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cently adding another A for accountability).
(Section 3.1) By enumerating the assets in a system, then postulating actions that
would violate these security concerns for the assets, one can construct descriptions of
possible threats on assets. For example, one can erase (the action) customer records
(the asset) of a company to cause loss of revenue (the harm).
(Section 3.1) Knowing the goals of attackers could be useful when determining se-
curity goals for the system, for example when enumerating assets or quantifying harm.
(Section 3.2) We define security requirements as constraints on the functions of
the system, where these constraints operationalize one or more security goals. Security
requirements operationalize the security goals as follows:
- They are constraints on the system's functional requirements, rather than themselves
being functional requirements.
- They express the system's security goals in operational terms, precise enough to be
given to a designer/architect. Security requirements, like functional requirements, are
prescriptive, providing a specification (behavior in terms of phenomena) to achieve the
desired effect.
(Section 3.5.2.3) In general, harm is caused by the negation of the security con-
cerns described in Section 3.1: confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountabil-
ity.
A Framework for Security Requirements Engineering 
Figure A.3: 'Security Risk Analysis & Management Framework' for Moffett and Nuseibeh
(as appears in [MN03] (Section 2.2))
(Section 2.2) The meanings of terms in this area are not universally agreed. We will
use the following
- Threat: Harm that can happen to an asset
- Impact: A measure of the seriousness of a threat
- Attack: A threatening event
- Attacker: The agent causing an attack (not necessarily human)
- Vulnerability: a weakness in the system that makes an attack more likely to suc-
ceed
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(Section 2.2.1) There are many types of asset controlled by a system, including:
- Information
- Money
- Intangibles, such as an organisation's confidence and public reputation.
(Section 2.2.2) For each asset type, it is necessary to identify the threats that apply.
Thus for stored information there are the following possibilities:
- Unauthorised exposure
- Unauthorised alteration
- Loss of availability.
How much impact (harm) will the business suffer if each of these threats come to
pass?
(Section 2.2.3) For each threat, the baseline is analysed in order to identify the vul-
nerabilities, i.e. the means of exploiting a threat successfully.
(Section 2.2.3) Risk assessment combines the results of vulnerability analysis with
the impact valuation of threats to assets, and reaches an overall conclusion about
the level of risk to an asset.
(Section 2.4) We define security requirements to be the constraints, on functional
requirements, that are derived from security goals. A simple example is: The system
shall not display salary information except to members of Human Resources Dept.
A.16 The DITSCAP automation framework
The definitions related to ISSRM for the DITSCAP automation are extracted from
the research paper Discovering and Understanding Multi-dimensional Correlations
among Certification Requirements with application to Risk Assessment [GL07].
(Section 2.2.1) To support an overall risk-based strategy, C&A requirements should
explicitly identify relevant risk components. These are the threats to and vulnera-
bilities of the assets to be protected, and countermeasures that can mitigate or
reduce the vulnerabilities to acceptable levels.
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Figure A.4: 'Requirements and Risk Model' for the DITSCAP automation framework (as
appears in [GL07] (Section 2.2.1))
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Appendix C
Extraction of relationships between
the concepts of ISO/IEC Guide 73
Legend
Concepts involved are in italic. Information about relationships are in bold.
Risk : combination of the probability of an event and its consequence
Consequence: Outcome of an event
NOTE 1: There can be more than one consequence from one event.
NOTE 2: Consequences can range from positive to negative. However, consequences
are always negative for safety aspects.
Source: Item or activity having a potential for a consequence
Risk criteria: terms of reference by which the significance of risk is assessed
Risk treatment : process of selection and implementation of measures to modify risk
NOTE 2: Risk treatment measures can include avoiding, optimizing, transferring
or retaining risk.
Risk control : actions implementing risk management decision.
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Appendix D
Summary of ISSRM approaches
performing concept estimation
Legend
Concepts measured are in bold.
Metrics are in italic.
D.1 NIST 800-30
These different steps are extracted from the document NIST SP 800-30 Risk Man-
agement Guide for Information Technology Systems [SGF02].
• The likelihood that a potential vulnerability could be exercised by a given
threat-source that can be described as high, medium, or low. (p.21)
• Determine the adverse impact and its magnitude resulting from a successful
threat exercise of a vulnerability. (p.22)
• The determination of risk (risk level) for a particular threat/vulnerability pair
can be expressed as a function of: (p.25)
 The likelihood of a given threat-source's attempting to exercise a given vul-
nerability
 The magnitude of the impact should a threat-source successfully exercise
the vulnerability
 The adequacy of planned or existing security controls for reducing or elimi-
nating risk
Figure D.1 summarises the metrics proposition of NIST 800-30 regarding the ISSRM
domain model.
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Figure D.1: ISSRM domain model enriched with the metrics proposed by NIST 800-30
D.2 MEHARI
These different steps are extracted from the document MEHARI 2007: Concepts and
Mechanisms [CLU07a]
• For each asset, check if a loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability (classification
criteria) can lead to a relevant malfunction and so what is its value. This level
is so the asset classification value for the considered criterion. (p.6)
• For each security service, assess its quality with the help of a questionnaire or
a guideline, based on the following characteristics: service efficiency, robustness,
permanency. (p.8-10)
• Define: Natural exposure to risk, Effectiveness of dissuasive measures, Effective-
ness of preventive measures, directly or based on quality of security services.
(p.16-19)
• Estimate potentiality of cause of risk leading to risk, based on natural exposure
to risk, effectiveness of dissuasive measures, effectiveness of preventive measures,
with tables or directly. (p.19)
• Define : Intrinsic impact, Effectiveness of protective or confinement measures, Ef-
fectiveness of palliative measures, Effectiveness of recuperative measures, directly
or based on quality of security services. (p.20-25)
• Estimate impact of consequence based on intrinsic impact, effectiveness of pro-
tective or confinement measures, effectiveness of palliative measures, effectiveness
of recuperative measures, with tables or directly. (p.25)
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• Estimate seriousness of risk, defined by potentiality and impact, based on tables.
(p.26)
Figure D.2 summarises the metrics proposition of MEHARI regarding the ISSRM
domain model.
Figure D.2: ISSRM domain model enriched with the metrics proposed by MEHARI
D.3 OCTAVE
These different steps are extracted from the document OCTAVE Method Implemen-
tation Guide [AD01b]. Page numbers are extracted from the Complete example
results that shows the complete path of the method.
• Define for each asset the impact level of the impact based on the scale High,
Medium, Low. (p.57-59)
Figure D.3 summarises the metrics proposition of OCTAVE regarding the ISSRM
domain model.
D.4 CRAMM
These different steps are extracted from the document CRAMM User Guide [Ins03].
• Define impact severity (level of the impact) and cost, used only for Unavailability
and Physical Destruction impacts, with the help of interviews. (p.7-35 to 7-38 ;
Appendix E)
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Figure D.3: ISSRM domain model enriched with the metrics proposed by OCTAVE
• Define asset value by gathering every impact applicable on the asset or by re-
placing the asset value of physical assets (to be determined) by the one (if higher)
of data or application assets supported by this physical asset. (p.7-35 to 7-38 ;
Appendix E)
• Define threat level of identified threats. This is done with the help of question-
naires or manually for rapid risk assessment. (p.8-12 ; p. 8-20)
• Define vulnerability level for vulnerabilities associated to the identified threat.
This is done with the help of questionnaires or manually for rapid risk assessment.
(p.8-12 ; p. 8-20)
• Define for each risk the measure of risk, identified from the value of the assets,
the level of threat and the extent of the vulnerability. This is done based on the
risk matrix. (p.9-1 ; Appendix G)
• Select countermeasures with appropriate security level, where the measure of
risk falls within the range of security levels provided by the countermeasure.
(p.8-7)
• Prioritization of countermeasures, depending on many factors: (p.8-19 to 8-
20)
 it protects against several threats
 it is required to protect a high risk system
 there are no alternative countermeasures already installed
 cost
 effectiveness
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 the type of protection provided by the countermeasure
Figure D.4 summarises the metrics proposition of CRAMM regarding the ISSRM
domain model.
Figure D.4: ISSRM domain model enriched with the metrics proposed by CRAMM
D.5 CORAS
These different steps are extracted from the document Assessing Enterprise Risk
Level: The CORAS Approach [VML+07].
• Define value of assets by interviews. (p.13)
• Define likelihood and consequence of risk by interviews. (p.14)
• Define level of risk based on likelihood and consequence of risk. (p.14)
• Define risk reduction and cost of treatment by interviews and analysis. (p.21)
Figure D.5 summarises the metrics proposition of CORAS regarding the ISSRM do-
main model.
D.6 The IT-Grundschutz
These different steps are extracted from the document Risk analysis based on IT-
Grundschutz  [Bun05c]
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Figure D.5: ISSRM domain model enriched with the metrics proposed by CORAS
• Define the level of security requirements referring to the basic parameters of
confidentiality, integrity and availability based on three levels, namely normal,
high, very high. (p.5)
Figure D.6 summarises the metrics proposition of the IT-Grundschutz regarding the
ISSRM domain model.
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Figure D.6: ISSRM domain model enriched with the metrics proposed by the IT-Grundshutz
 
ABSTRACT 
 
During  the  last  twenty  years,  the  impact  of  security  concerns  on  the  development  and 
exploitation of  information systems never ceased to grow. Security risk management methods 
are methodological tools, helping organisations to take rational decisions, regarding the security 
of their IS. Feedbacks on the use of such approaches show that they considerably reduce losses 
originating  from  security  problems.  Today,  these  methods  are  generally  built  around  a  well 
structured process. However, the product coming from the different risk management steps  is 
still  largely  informal,  and  often  not  analytical  enough.  This  lack  of  formality  hinders  the 
automation  of  the  management  of  risk‐related  information.  Another  drawback  of  current 
methods  is  that  they are generally designed  for being used a posteriori,  that  is,  to assess  the 
way  existing  systems  handle  risks,  and  are with  difficulty  usable  a  priori,  during  information 
system development. Finally, with method using  its own terminology,  it  is difficult to combine 
several methods,  in  the aim of  taking advantage of each of  them. For  tackling  the preceding 
problems, this thesis proposes a model‐based approach  for risk management, applicable  from 
the early phases of  information  system development.  This  approach  relies on  a  study of  the 
domain's own concepts. 
 
This scientific approach is composed of three successive steps. The first step aims at defining a 
reference  conceptual  model  for  security  risk  management.  The  research  method  followed 
proposes  to  base  the  model  on  an  extensive  study  of  the  literature.  The  different  risk 
management and/or security standards, a set of methods representative of the current state of 
the  practice,  and  the  scientific  works  related  to  the  domain,  are  analysed.  The  result  is  a 
semantic  alignment  table  of  the  security  risk  management  concepts,  highlighting  the  key 
concepts  taking  place  in  such  an  approach.  Based  on  this  set  of  concepts,  the  security  risk 
management  domain  model  is  built.  This  model  is  challenged  by  domain  experts  in 
standardisation, risk management practitioners and scientists. 
 
The  second  step of  this  research work enriches  the domain model with  the different metrics 
used  in a risk management method. The proposed approach combines two methods to define 
this  set  of metrics.  The  first  one  is  the Goal‐Question‐Metric  (GQM) method  applied  on  the 
domain model. This method allows to focus on reaching the best return on security investment. 
The second one enriches the metrics  identified with the first approach, through a study of the 
literature based on standards and methods addressed during the first step. An experimentation 
on  a  real  case of  these metrics  is performed,  in  the  frame of  supporting  a  SME  towards  the 
ISO/IEC 27001 certification. 
 
Finally, in a third step, a set of conceptual modelling languages dedicated to information security 
is  noticed  in  the  literature.  These  languages  are  mainly  coming  from  the  requirements 
engineering domain. They allow to tackle security during the early phases of information system 
development. The conceptual support proposed by each of them is evaluated, and thus the gap 
to bridge for being able to completely model the different steps of risk management too. This 
work ends in an extension proposal of the Secure Tropos language, and a process to follow for 
using this extension in the frame of risk management, illustrated by an example. 
 
